




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I

INTRODUCTION

International interest in the history of the Netherlands and its colonies has increased significantly in the past few decades, and especially for the economic and social history of these areas. In the meantime, the number of journals has also increased. The *Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek* (Economic and Social History Yearbook) published since 1915, has been joined by the *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis* (Journal of Social History) published since 1975; the *Tijdschrift voor Industriële Archeologie* (Journal for Industrial Archeology) published since 1981; the *Jaarboek voor de Geschiedenis van Bedrijven en Techniek* (Yearbook for the History of Business and Technology) published since 1984; and, finally, the *NEHA-Bulletin*, published since 1987. However, since the series *Acta Historiae Neerlandicae* ceased publication in 1978, there is no journal published in English which focusses specifically on the history of the Netherlands, let alone on its economic and social history. Therefore, the Netherlands Economic History Archive (NEHA), an association of economic and social historians in the Netherlands, has taken the initiative to publish a journal called *Economic and Social History in the Netherlands*.

The new yearbook aims at improving the international exchange of research on Dutch economic and social history in its broadest sense, including the history of its former colonies. The contributions will include studies which may be of interest to a wide international audience. The journal will report the results of research carried out by Dutch scholars which have an explicit link to the international debates in economic and social history. The journal is not limited to a specific period of history: articles treating the Middle Ages or the era of the Dutch Republic are as welcome as articles about the nineteenth and twentieth century. In addition, each year the journal will include one or two historiographical studies which give an overview of the current state of affairs within a specific field of study. The journal's editorial board includes Professor H.F.J.M. van den Eerenbeemt (Catholic University of Brabant, Tilburg) Chairman, Professor J.L. van Zanden (Free University of Amsterdam) Secretary, Dr. P. Boomgaard (Free University of Amsterdam), Dr. C.A. Davids (University of Leiden), Dr. J.T. Lindblad (University of Leiden), and Dr. M.J.J.G. Rossen (Erasmus University, Rotterdam).

The format of this journal's first issue reflects its purpose. Two historiographical surveys are included: the survey by J.L. van Zanden covers the historiography of the economic history of the Netherlands since 1500;

the survey by J.T. Lindblad treats the historiography of the economic history of colonial Indonesia. A number of other articles fit into the current international discussions, including the articles by M. van Elteren and P. Boomgaard on the use of social psychology and anthropology in history and the article by H.A. Diederiks on criminal history. Yet other articles treat themes which traditionally have been of great importance in Dutch economic and social history; such as The numerous purses of the Dutch Republic: public loans in the early seventeenth century by M. 't Hart; Dearth, plague and trade: economy and mentality in the Northern Netherlands, fifteenth-nineteenth century by L. Noordegraaf; Periods and caesurae in the demographic and economic history of the Netherlands, 1600-1900 by H.P.H. Nusteling; The representativeness of the Dutch military register as a source for quantitative history by H.J. Brinkman, J.W. Drukker, and J.S. Stuurup.

This first issue of *Economic and Social History in the Netherlands* displays the wide range of research currently carried out in this field of study in the Netherlands. The editors hope that it will prove instrumental in furthering the international exchange of ideas and viewpoints about the history of the Netherlands and its former colonies.

II

DUTCH ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE PERIOD 1500-1940: A REVIEW OF THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

by

J.L. van Zanden

In studies tracing the development of economic historiography, it is customary to portray the 1960's as a period of discontinuity. The emergence of the *New Economic History* is seen as the cause of this discontinuity.¹ This new approach to economic history was characterized by (1) the explicit use of economic theory in order to analyze the economic process in-depth, (2) a preoccupation with quantitative data, and (3) the use of econometric techniques in order to test the economic theories. In contrast to this approach, the *old* economic history was viewed as descriptive, methodically less rigorous and primarily based on qualitative sources. In addition, the old economic history concerned itself more with the economy's institutional framework — including types of enterprises, guilds and unions, the government — whereas the new economic history was more concerned with the economic process as such, and paid less attention to the framework within which this took place.

In this article, in which a survey will be given of the development of economic historiography in the Netherlands, we will try to ascertain whether there was a contrast between the *old* and the *new* economic history. Although it will not be denied that there was a certain discontinuity in the 1960's, we will attempt to discover if the contrast between the *old* and *new* economic history was as simple and clear as stated above. In order to achieve this, a brief summary will be given of the profession's development between 1900 and 1960, and of the most important books published in the 1960's.

Subsequently, a more detailed account will be given of the most important debates which have taken place since the 1960's. The debates can be grouped into four categories: (1) the emergence and the character of the Dutch economy in the period before 1650, (2) the economic decline of the Dutch Republic between 1650 and 1800, (3) the slow and late industrialization of The Netherlands in the nineteenth century, and (4) the lengthy duration of the Depression during the 1930's.

This review will only treat the historiography of the period between circa 1500 and 1940. The literature which is included was largely chosen on the basis of the degree to which it contributed to the different debates. In addition, there was a preference for literature which dealt with developments at the national level. Consequently, this review can only have the character of a rough sketch. Readers who are familiar with Dutch economic history will probably find much that is well-known to them. I hope that the conclusion, in which several results will be summarized and a number of critical comments will be made, will at least be of interest to them.

1. *The profession between 1900 and 1960*

Economic history became a scientific specialism in the Netherlands during the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1904, H. Brugmans dedicated his inaugural lecture at the University of Amsterdam to "The importance of economic history".² He did not only introduce the term *economic history* with this lecture, but also inspired a number of young historians to follow in his footsteps. In 1902, the marxist poet H. Roland-Holst had already published the first interpretation of The Netherlands' social and economic history between 1780 and 1900.³ The first dissertations in economic history were published shortly after 1904. The two most important theses were written by N.W. Posthumus (1908) and W. van Ravesteyn (1906). Posthumus' study analyzed the development of the cloth industry in Leiden during the Middle Ages, while Ravesteyn's book analyzed the growth of Amsterdam in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Both of these studies immediately set a high standard.⁴ During this promising period, the first professorial chair of economic history was established at the Economic University of Rotterdam in 1913. Posthumus was the first appointee.

The most characteristic feature of the first generation of economic historians was their theoretical inspiration from the German Historical School and sometimes also K. Marx. Posthumus' thesis, for example, can be read as an extensive repudiation of the concept of the closed economy of the Medieval city used by the German Historical School. He demonstrates that in an early stage of its development, Leiden had an open economy which was dependent on the import of foreign resources and the export of goods.

As a result of their theoretical inspiration, the *big questions* in economic history were addressed; especially questions pertaining to the origin and development of capitalism. This can readily be seen in the subjects which were chosen: for instance, Leiden's development as an industrial city and the rise of Amsterdam. Roland-Holst's book, in contrast, explored why the labor movement in the Netherlands was so much weaker than elsewhere.

Moreover, these historians did not hesitate to use quantitative data. In fact, the studies published during this period seem very modern. For example, H.

E. Becht's thesis, published in 1908, was an exhaustive quantitative study on the development of international trade in the Netherlands between 1579 and 1715, based on the revenues of the import and export duties.⁵

The most important economic historians of the period before 1960 — N.W. Posthumus, J.G. van Dillen, Z.W. Sneller, and I.J. Brugmans — retained the aforementioned characteristics, even though the original passion gradually diminished. Nonetheless, the German Historical School (and W. Sombart, who can be included in this group) still had a large influence on their work. The Republic and the seventeenth century in particular, continued to be the most prominent field of research. Of the historians mentioned, only I.J. Brugmans focussed his research primarily on the nineteenth-century.

Quantitative data played a relatively important role in the work of these historians. This was, for example, the case both with Brugmans' study on the working class in the nineteenth century and with Van Dillen's study of the discount-banks in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Middelburg during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁶ In this respect, Posthumus' study of Leiden's textile industry in the period between 1580 and 1795 was the high-point of the economic history written in this period.⁷ In this study, he emphasizes the modern capitalistic features of the largest industrial city in The Netherlands in the seventeenth century. Labor relations — characterized among others by a number of "modern" strikes, a highly polarized income and wealth distribution, an orientation towards export and even business fluctuations which he typified as "modern-industrial" — are analyzed from this central viewpoint. But, most importantly, this study provides an enormous amount of quantitative data regarding prices, wages, production levels, the standard of living, taxes, and so forth.

This period ended around 1960 with the publication of two general surveys. Van Dillen's study covers the period 1580-1795, while Brugmans' study covers the period 1795-1940.⁸ These books summarize the knowledge which was accumulated about the economic history of these periods during the preceding sixty years. But much of the original inspiration — Marx and Sombart — has lost its appeal. In fact, both books are rather disappointing because they have been dated by developments in other fields of the profession. They lack a theoretical framework, description dominates, the quantitative data needed to support the most important assumptions are by and large simply not given, and they do not provide a synthesis.⁹

2. *A breakthrough around 1960?*

Around 1960 a number of monographs caused a breakthrough in the economic historiography of The Netherlands. The first book that ought to be mentioned is the study published by B.H. Slicher van Bath in 1957 on the countryside of Overijssel between 1600 and 1800.¹⁰ This study served as a

model for a number of other books on the Dutch countryside which were written by members of the faculty of Agrarian History at the University of Wageningen. This group of historians is often referred to as the Wageningen School.¹¹

Eleven years later, in 1968, a book appeared that would play the same role in the economic history of the nineteenth century as Slicher van Bath's book had done in the economic history of the period before 1800. This was J.A. de Jonge's thesis on industrialization in the Netherlands between 1850 and 1914.¹² The example set by this book was followed, after a while, by a growing number of modern studies on economic development in the nineteenth century. Other important books dating from this period which had less following, were the theses written by Joh. de Vries on the economic decline of the Republic in the eighteenth century (1959) and by P.W. Klein on entrepreneurship in the Dutch staple market in the seventeenth century (1965).¹³

The studies by Slicher van Bath, De Jonge and De Vries all had in common that their most important contribution lay in collecting, processing and analyzing large amounts of new quantitative material. They were not very innovative insofar as the use of theory was concerned. On the contrary, theorizing was avoided even more than in the past. The exception to this "rule" is Klein's dissertation which offered many new theoretical insights.

Slicher van Bath's seminal study on the history of Overijssel presented a new method called historical sociology which was explicitly a-theoretical.¹⁴ Sociology was a movement which originated within the social sciences in the Netherlands. This movement was very critical of the use of abstract theories and the endless debates in the social sciences. In their view, this led to a neglect of research regarding the actual "social facts". With this in mind, sociographers set about publishing case studies of cities, villages, and regions, in which diverse pieces of interesting information concerning social life were recorded without a preconceived plan. Slicher van Bath wanted to apply the same method to economic and social history. The available quantitative data regarding the size and composition of the population, the means of production and the social structure of a given region were systematically collected and analyzed in the expectation that by doing so, a clear picture of the past would arise.

De Jonge's pioneering work was, in fact, also a-theoretical. While past generations of historians had complained about the lack of source material needed to study economic development in the nineteenth century, De Jonge showed how much quantitative material could be gathered and analyzed. On the basis of this data, he reconstructed the development of the most important branches of industry. But he did not use the available theoretical models which had been constructed in this field. The last chapter of De Jonge's book, in which he looked at the stage-theory of W. W. Rostow, was added later to the book on the advice of his thesis advisor, professor W.J. Wieringa, and is

definitely not an integral part of the book.

The books by Slicher van Bath and De Jonge showed that real progress could be made by using the available quantitative data to study a relatively well-defined subject. The questions asked were, in comparison with the first period, much more precise, yet more limited. Slicher van Bath looked for answers to questions concerning the size of a region's population; its occupational structure; the amount of arable land; the number of horses, cows and pigs; and so forth. De Jonge basically asked the same kind of questions: how many people were employed in a certain branch of industry, how fast did production grow, how many steam engines were used, and so forth. The *big questions*, like the emergence of capitalism, were not addressed. The progress which was made in this period was that we learned much more about more narrowly defined areas of interest.

Since the aforementioned studies by Slicher van Bath, Joh. de Vries, Klein and De Jonge, interest in the economic history of the Netherlands has increased. The number of researchers and the number of publications has risen significantly since the 1960's. The a-theoretical orientation of the first books in the field of new economic history has made way for a growing interest in theoretical questions and models. As will be seen in the next section, we have mainly the Anglo-Saxon historians (J. Mokyr, Jan de Vries, and R. Griffiths) to thank for this gradual shift.

3. *The historiography since 1960*

a. *The period 1500-1650*

One of the most striking — and one of the most regrettable — developments since 1960 is the relative neglect of the period preceding 1650 (or even the period preceding 1800). To the detriment of the study of the Middle Ages and the early modern period, the center of attention has shifted to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

This, of course, does not mean that important work has not been done insofar as the sixteenth and seventeenth century are concerned. The publications by the Wageningen School have led to a better understanding of demographic developments in this period, but even this research focussed primarily on the period after 1650.¹⁵ L. Noordegraaf's research on the development of nominal and real wages in Holland during this period was also of great importance.¹⁶ His conclusion that real wages in Holland were rising in the first half of the seventeenth century while they were declining elsewhere, sheds new light on the development of the economy in this period. More recently, studies by J.D. Tracy and M.C. 't Hart have called attention to the modern characteristics of the capital market and state expenditures during the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century.¹⁷

The most important contribution to the field of history and theory was

Klein's thesis on entrepreneurship in the Dutch staple market.¹⁸ Posthumus had already given some thought to the monopolistic practices of the merchants in his study of the prices on the Amsterdam staple market.¹⁹ Klein interpreted these practices on the basis of his case study, the entrepreneurship of members of the Trip family, and through using the theory developed by J. Schumpeter. In Schumpeter's view, the profit in industrial capitalism derived from monopolistic practices is the reward for innovative entrepreneurship: in this way, it is the main driving force of the entire system. Likewise, Klein argued that in the phase of merchant capitalism, the profit derived from monopolistic practices is the reward for opening up new markets, for the development of new production centers, and for finding new sources of raw materials. Without this profit, the risks associated with investing in large stocks and of stabilizing the market to counter imperfections in the market system would be too great for the merchant to bear.

This interpretation, or perhaps defense, of the monopolistic practices in the staple market has hardly been the subject of serious discussion. J.W. Veluwenkamp has criticized Klein's theory and evidence on a number of points.²⁰ Most importantly, he has convincingly demonstrated that the largest part of the Republic's international trade was not characterized by monopolistic practices. In his view, Klein's study of the Trip family is not representative. Klein, however, has not made any attempt to parry the criticism.

Aside from Klein's thesis, the study on Dutch agriculture between 1500 and 1700 written by the American historian Jan de Vries has radically changed the view of the "Golden Age".²¹ In his book, he demonstrates that during this period a process of specialization took place in the countryside of the coastal provinces. This process of specialization led to the creation of a relatively large, capital intensive agricultural sector and to a considerable rise in agricultural productivity. On the one hand, these developments in agriculture were made possible by the economic expansion of Holland in this period (the growth of industry and of the cities as markets for their products). On the other hand, these changes in the countryside made a large contribution to the modernization of the Dutch economy.

Only after some time did a number of objections arise to the view which had been presented by De Vries. The criticism was directed primarily towards his analysis of the Dutch countryside around 1500. Could it really be typified as an unspecialized peasant economy? Publications by historians of the Middle Ages made it clear that the process of change in the countryside (and in the cities) had most likely started much earlier, around 1350.²² Contrary to what De Vries thought, the Dutch countryside around 1500 already had strikingly "modern" characteristics.²³ Noordegraaf reproached De Vries for making a too one-sided use of the available data.²⁴

With this we come to the central problem of the period before 1650:

Holland's development from a relatively backward and peripheral region around 1350 to the center of the world economy around 1650. And it is this central problem which has been neglected by historians. In the field of theory, no use has been made of the international discussion concerning this problem (for example the well known "Brenner debate"). Recently, Van Zanden has tried to interpret the development of the Dutch economy by making use of the theory of proto-industry, but this has not yet led to more than a few speculative hypotheses.²⁵ Likewise, empirical research into the period before 1650 has shown a relative stagnation since 1960.

b. The period 1650-1813

By the middle of the seventeenth century, presumably between 1640 and 1680, the economic expansion of the Dutch economy came to an end. A century and a half of (relative) decline followed, which ended with the deep crisis of the French period (1809-1813). Economic historians concerned with this period have been primarily concerned with two questions. First, how did the process of economic decline manifest itself? When did it start and when did it reach its nadir? Did an absolute decline occur (a decline of real per capita income) or can we only speak of a relative decline of the Dutch economy in relation to the neighboring countries? Second, what were the causes of the decline? Should they be sought in the political or institutional framework, or did economic circumstances play a decisive role?

The new economic history starts here with Joh. de Vries' thesis.²⁶ On the basis of extensive research, he gives a systematic account of the Dutch economy's development between 1700 and 1800. According to De Vries, on balance, real per capita income remained fairly constant between 1700 and 1780. Only after 1780 did a process of absolute economic decline set in. However, it should be noted that the stability until 1780 was the result of the uneven development of the economy's most important sectors: industry and fishing showed a marked decline, while commerce remained stable and the financial sector and agriculture grew.

The relatively optimistic view held by Joh. de Vries — that there was only a relative decline until 1780 — was first questioned by research on the demographic development of the Netherlands in this period. Van der Woude and Faber discovered a significant decline in the population of Holland and Friesland between 1650 and 1750.²⁷ In Holland north of the IJ, for example, the population fell from 211,000 in 1650 to 128,000 in 1750! The demographic decline was viewed as the result of the economic decline in these regions.

This pessimistic view was supported by Jan de Vries' research into the development of barge transportation in Holland.²⁸ On the basis of the strong decline in the number of passengers who made use of the barges and a number of assumptions regarding the relationship between real per capita income and the demand for transportation, he estimated that real per capita income in the

cities of Holland declined by more than 30% between 1660/69 and 1740/49. Van der Woude, Faber and Jan de Vries established — in accordance with the theory of the secular trend — an absolute decline between 1650 and 1750, after which — and here they are once again at odds with Joh. de Vries — there was a certain recovery or stabilization in the second half of the century.

The historians who studied Holland and Friesland in this period were generally inclined to view the period after 1650 with more pessimism than Joh. de Vries. Quite different opinions were heard from historians who studied the inland provinces. In contrast to what one might think, the agrarian depression which lasted from 1650 to 1750, led to important changes in the economy, especially in the agricultural sector in these parts of the country. H.K. Roessingh published a brilliant study on the rapid growth of tobacco industry in Gelderland and Utrecht during this period.²⁹ J. Bieleman ascertained important changes in agriculture in Drenthe during the first half of the eighteenth century.³⁰ In his book on Overijssel, Slicher van Bath had already called attention to the emergence of the textile industry in Twente in the same period.³¹ J.C.G.M. Jansen discovered that after centuries of stability, a strong increase in agricultural productivity occurred in Southern Limburg around 1750.³²

There were also more optimistic signs concerning the economic development of Holland. J.C. Riley, who published an important study on the growth of Amsterdam as a financial center,³³ tried to give a more optimistic interpretation of the eighteenth century. He based his interpretation largely on the highly divergent national income estimates which have been made for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.³⁴ Van Zanden systematically tested this hypothesis against new data, and concluded that it should be discarded.³⁵ Faber has recently called attention to the Republic's deteriorating terms of trade during the second half of the eighteenth century, caused primarily by a strong increase in grain prices. This fact might explain why real per capita income seems to have declined after 1750 (or 1780), in spite of the stability in the Dutch economy's level of output.³⁶

In summary, we can safely say that Joh. de Vries' view of the economy's long-term stability has basically remained intact, despite the attempts to revise this view. This also applies to the explanation he gave of the Republic's (relative) economic decline. He posits that the emancipation of the neighboring countries was the most important cause of the decline because it led to a lower demand for Dutch services and industrial products. In his opinion, the psychological factor or lack of entrepreneurship was only as a result of the difficult economic situation. After examining the role of the government, he concluded that the provincialism and the wanting state of the state expenditures were supplementary causes of the economic decline.³⁷

J.M.F. Fritschy has recently contested this criticism of the Republic's institutional structure by comparing, among other things, government

expenditure in the Republic with those in the United Kingdom.³⁸ She concludes that Dutch government expenditure was strikingly "modern". In the same spirit, W.T.M. Frijhoff has defended the Republic's system of higher education against criticism that it was backward.³⁹ In general, there is a strong tendency in recent historical publications to stress the modern characteristics of the Republic and to relativize the criticisms of contemporary writers and earlier generations of historians, who pointed to its backwardness.⁴⁰

In the current literature, the decline after 1650 is explained solely by the fact that the Republic's economic circumstances were constantly deteriorating. The high level of wages in the Republic, for example, has received a great deal of attention. Jan de Vries was the first to point to the fact that nominal wages in Holland barely changed between 1635 and 1850, despite a rise in unemployment (even though this last point is still disputed).⁴¹ He attributed this primarily to a limitation in the supply of labor after 1650, which was a result of the demographic decline and generous poor relief. This made, on the one hand, the existence of a large group of unemployed paupers possible, while on the other hand, entrepreneurs had to make use of (foreign) migrant workers. J. Mokyr ascribed the high wage level in the Netherlands to the same facts, but he also pointed to high labor productivity in the agricultural sector as an explanation.⁴²

These views have been largely overturned by recent research on the labor market. J. Lucassen's study made it clear that migrant workers only played a role in specific segments of the labor market, especially in sectors where the demand for labor was strongly seasonal.⁴³ Poor relief was at most only a small supplement to wages, and was definitely insufficient to keep an unemployed person alive.⁴⁴ That is why prolonged unemployment hardly existed. Besides, the high nominal wages have been shown to correspond to the high level of the cost of living; as a result of which Dutch workers, in terms of purchasing-power, were not better off.⁴⁵ In short, we again see that the problem of the high level of wages is increasingly explained by "objective" economic circumstances.

c. The period 1813-1914

The question of the late (and slow) industrialization of the Netherlands was central to the historiography of the nineteenth century in the period around 1960. There were differences of opinion regarding when industrialization began — Brugmans maintained that it started around 1850, while others dated it after 1890 — and regarding the question of why the Netherlands was so late to industrialize in comparison with neighboring countries. The opinion held by Van Dillen, that economic circumstances were responsible for this backwardness, was repudiated by Wieringa. He placed more emphasis on the so-called psychological causes: for example, the lack of entrepreneurship.⁴⁶

The study by De Jonge settled, at least for the time being, the discussion concerning the timing of industrialization, which he defined as the emergence of the large mechanized firm. Based on a detailed analysis of the development of a large number of branches of industry, he demonstrated that the mechanized firm only started to play an important role after 1890.⁴⁷

Of great importance in the theoretical field was the work done by J. Mokyr on the industrialization in the Low Countries.⁴⁸ He tried to explain why Belgium was able to industrialize in the first half of the nineteenth century, while the Netherlands was not. His theoretical model of a dual proto-industrial economy predicted that wage levels would be the decisive factor. And, indeed, this appeared to be the case: wages in Belgium were considerably lower than in the Netherlands. After this ambitious attempt to simultaneously explain stagnation in the Netherlands and industrialization in Belgium, research has increasingly concentrated on the determinants of entrepreneurial behavior. The central question is why Dutch entrepreneurs did not introduce, or at least not until a later date, the new production techniques made available by the industrial revolution.

The dissertation by R.T. Griffiths contains the first systematic analysis of this problem by studying the relative factor costs which determined the entrepreneur's choice of technique.⁴⁹ As Mokyr had already indicated, the wage rate in Holland (and the other coastal provinces) turned out to be relatively high. Given the absence of coal mining and a competitive engineering industry and relatively high transportation costs, the prices of coal and (steam) engines (and raw materials) were higher than elsewhere. This was especially the case in the inland provinces where the transportation system was extremely underdeveloped. Consequently, entrepreneurs were unable to switch to the new mechanized production technique. In the same year that Griffiths published his thesis (1979), R.W.J.M. Bos published an article in which the same analysis of the factor costs was given: modern industry was late in developing because the cost structure was unfavorable to change and as a result, traditional production techniques remained competitive for a long(er) time.⁵⁰

This approach has proved to be very rewarding for research at micro and meso levels. E.J. Fischer demonstrated that the introduction of the power loom in the cotton industry in Twente was properly delayed until 1860 because of the low wages in the region and the high costs of transporting coal and machines. As a result of changes in the infrastructure and a rise in the wage level after 1855, entrepreneurs quickly decided to adopt the new production techniques.⁵¹ In the *Jaarboek voor de geschiedenis van bedrijven techniek* (Yearbook for the History of Industry and Technique) several case studies concerning entrepreneurship were published in which the same conclusions were generally reached. In the first overview of this literature, H.W. Lintsen also stressed the relationship between the size of the firm and the possibility of using steam engines.⁵² The use of steam engines was only profitable if the

scale of production was large enough.

A further elaboration of this approach is the research project on technique and industrialization in the nineteenth century being carried out by a research group in Eindhoven under the supervision of Lintsen⁵³ Starting from the central presupposition that the Netherlands was dependent of the diffusion of new techniques, the choice of technique by entrepreneurs in a number of branches of industry is being studied. Special attention is being given to the adaptation of foreign techniques to the specific local circumstances. This thorough investigation of entrepreneurship has, by the way, inadvertently lead to the relativizing of the analysis based on the economic factor costs. In particular, the study by G. Verbong demonstrated for the cotton-printing industry that comparative factor costs can lead to very different reactions by entrepreneurs, which can result in very different development patterns in the same industry. Some companies, for example, were relatively successful in adapting the traditional techniques, while others were equally successful after implementing a radical change of the production technique.⁵⁴

In short, the most important cause of the relatively slow rate of industrialization seems to have been certain unfavorable factor costs. The next step, of course, is to try to explain these factor costs. Why were wages in Holland so high (see the discussion in the last paragraph)? Why did the costs of transporting coal and steam engines remain so high and why did it take so long for a modern infrastructure to be developed? Why did a competitive engineering industry not emerge?

The tendency to explain the slow progress by the unfavorable circumstances is especially marked in the case of the railways. Griffiths pointed to the large costs involved in constructing a railway in a swampy area.⁵⁵ Jan de Vries demonstrated that the advantages of the railway were relatively insignificant because Holland already had a relatively efficient transportation system.⁵⁶ S. Boon and P. Saal concluded their study by stating that a rapid expansion of the railway system was not rational before 1860 because of the disappointing rate of return earned on the existing lines.⁵⁷ Fritschy is one of the few historians who did not subscribed to this view, and instead stated that government policy was the primary cause of the delay.⁵⁸

An important by-product of this research on the development of the industry was that the traditional view of the long period of stagnation was somewhat revised. According to J.M.M. de Meere and Griffiths, the development of industry (and of agriculture and the service sector) in the first half of the century was far more encouraging than is usually thought to have been the case.⁵⁹ They found a strong development of the international services sector and a modest growth in agricultural production between 1825 and 1850. This also appeared to be the case in industry, where there was a marked rise in output in a number of very important industries (textiles and engineering).

The discussion of the period between 1850 and 1910 was primarily

concerned with the available estimates for national income and the national product. J. Teijl was the first (in 1971) to publish a series of estimates for the period 1850-1910.⁶⁰ These were based on the following two methods: national income was estimated by assuming a constant relationship between tax revenues and national income; and national product was estimated by making use of a production function and estimates of the input of energy and labor. Both calculations showed a reasonable convergence. In any case, they demonstrated that the process of economic growth had already started by 1850.

The next step was taken by H.P.H. Nusteling. In his study of the development of shipping on the Rhine in the period 1831-1914, he established that the strong growth of this sector dates back to the 1830's. The period after 1890, which was so crucial in De Jonge's interpretation, did not show clear signs of discontinuity in shipping on the Rhine.⁶¹ As Teijl, Nusteling concluded that the expansion of the Dutch economy started around 1850. He was also the first to criticize the tendency of historians to pay attention only to the development of industry. In his view, the international services sector, of which shipping on the Rhine was a part, was the leading sector which put the Netherlands on the road to economic growth. It is curious that although this interpretation has not been contested and has been hailed as a work of great importance, attention is still primarily directed towards industry.

In a short article by Griffiths and De Meere published in 1983, the interpretations of the Dutch economy's development based on the calculations made by Teijl (and others) were sharply criticized.⁶² They convincingly demonstrated that the existing estimates of national income and the national product were completely insufficient; they were based on highly disputable presuppositions and on insufficient statistical data.

Since the publication of this article, two more attempts have been made to calculate the national product (or income) in the nineteenth-century, but through using other methods. A study by H.J. Brinkman, J.W. Drukker and B. Slot demonstrated that between 1900 and 1940 there was a strong relationship between the physical height of recruits and national per capita income.⁶³ In the tradition of Teijl, this relationship was projected back into the past to cover the period 1846-1900, making use of the available data on the height of recruits in this period. The second attempt was undertaken by Van Zanden. He estimated the development of the gross national product in the years 1805, 1850, 1880 and 1910 on the basis of data pertaining to production and/or the use of raw materials in thirty branches of industry.⁶⁴ Both studies concluded that economic growth in the period 1850-1880 (or the years 1861-1869, according to Brinkman, et. al.) was substantially faster than we would expect from the estimates made by Teijl.

The search for the industrial revolution or the beginning of industrialization seems to have been abandoned. De Meere, Griffiths, and

Van Zanden stress the gradual character of the growth of industrial production after 1825.⁶⁵ Economic development was presumably relatively fast between 1825 and 1842, 1860 and 1880, and after 1895; whereas the intervening periods are seen as years of stagnation and perhaps even decline.

It is in all probability not a coincidence that both periods of stagnation were relatively bad periods for agriculture as well. The importance of the agricultural sector for the economy's development in the nineteenth century, and the relatively modern character of this sector, has been demonstrated by Van Zanden in his thesis.⁶⁶ If we add to this the importance of the international service sector, first studied by Nusteling, then a picture emerges of an economy with balanced growth. In his inaugural speech in 1981, Griffiths has put forth such an interpretation of the development of the Dutch economy in the nineteenth century.⁶⁷ After comparing industrialization after 1890 with Gerschenkron's theory of the great spurt, he presented the picture of an economy in which, between 1830 and 1914, we see the gradual growth of all sectors (industry, agriculture and services). He concluded that the Netherlands was not backward, but had merely followed a different and unique path of development.

d. The period 1914-1940

Immediately after 1945, a large number of studies appeared in the series *The Dutch Economy between the Two World Wars*, in which divers aspects of Dutch economic development were intensively studied.⁶⁸ The most influential contribution in the series was the study by the economist F.A.G. Keesing on economic fluctuations and evolution of the government's economic policy.⁶⁹ In this book he sharply criticized the government's policy in the 1930's. His criticism was aimed mainly at the different cabinets headed by Colijn, which, by adhering to the gold standard for so long and by following a rather inconsistent policy, were responsible for the duration and gravity of the depression. Despite numerous publications by historians — among others, Brugmans⁷⁰ — which offered a less blunt judgement of economic policy in the 1930's, it was not until 1971 that Keesing's view was fundamentally criticized by P.W. Klein. He did not refute the claim that the adherence to the gold standard had been a wrong decision, but he maintained that the stagnation of the Dutch economy in the 1930's was mainly the result of structural factors.⁷¹ The Netherlands was primarily an agricultural country — foodstuffs were a large portion of the exports — and, in his view, the services sector was relatively backward. The severeness and length of the depression was not only caused by the fact that the market for agricultural exports was hit relatively hard by the depression, but also by the fact that Holland, with a small and open economy, was very dependent on international trade.

This explanation for the lengthy duration of the depression has to a large extent been accepted by Joh. de Vries, as can be seen in a number of

publications, and by J.J. Seegers, who did some important research on the development of the industrial sector between 1920 and 1940.⁷² An extreme view was presented by the authors of a study by the *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* (CBS) on national income in the period 1921-1939. They concluded that the adherence to the gold standard did not hamper economic recovery, but that the currency devaluation at the end of 1936 did have a harmful effect on the Dutch economy.⁷³

The view put forward by Klein (and a fortiori by the authors of the CBS study) has recently been criticized by Van Zanden.⁷⁴ He stresses the detrimental effects of the currency policy; the share of Dutch exports on the world market declined as a result of this between 1931 and 1936. The constant necessity of having to deflate the price level at home in order to bring it in line with the world market blocked the recovery after 1933. Moreover, an international comparison shows that the countries which left the gold standard early (in 1931) recovered more quickly than countries which devaluated at a later date (in 1935 or 1936). A systematic relationship linking the structure of the economy and the duration and gravity of the depression does not appear to have been present. Not only the currency policy had detrimental effects, H. Klemann demonstrates that the international trade policy was decidedly weak and to a large extent also contributed to the problems of the Dutch economy.⁷⁵

An important aspect of the government policy in the 1930's was that it was the first time it intervened extensively in the economy in peace-time. A. van Schaik studied the very limited success of the policy aimed at protecting industry.⁷⁶ P.E. de Hen analyzed how gradually a more offensive policy was formulated to protect and restructure industry — incidentally, it was only after 1945 that this policy could reach fruition.⁷⁷ A study by Griffiths, et. al. tried to determine why political pressure was not exercised to abandon the gold standard between 1931 and 1936.⁷⁸ Unfortunately, a study on the creation of the agricultural policy pursued in these years is still lacking. Also, there has not been any interest in the role of the labor market during the depression. The only study in which the labor market plays a role of any importance is R. Kloosterman's analysis of regional differences in unemployment in the 1930's.⁷⁹ He found that the wage level in a particular city influenced the relative amount of unemployment in that city.

4. Conclusion

Dutch economic historiography has changed considerably since 1960, but the contrast between the *old* and the *new* economic history does not really apply here. The present-day generation of historians is not, for example, more inspired by theoretical questions and problems than the first generation of economic historians. On the contrary, the big questions have gradually

receded into the background and current research is increasingly concentrating on very confined subjects. This has led to important progress in certain fields, but this approach has also resulted in a notable and regrettable lack of synthesis. Especially large studies are missing in which economic history is combined in a meaningful way with social, cultural, and political history.⁸⁰

An important shift has taken place regarding the periods which are being investigated. Research on the nineteenth century has grown enormously, while the period preceding 1800 — and to an even bigger extent the period preceding 1650 — has largely been neglected. Characteristic of this shift is that in an overview of Dutch economic history published in 1979, the chapters dealing with the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century were written by Belgians.⁸¹ Despite frequent appeals for historians to do more research on these periods, this has turned out to be difficult to realize.

In reviewing the discussions summarized above, it seems that historians have primarily been concerned with the phenomenon of stagnation, decline and backwardness. Despite the fact that the Dutch economy can be counted among the most prosperous of Europe, there is a lot of debate on the decline in the eighteenth century, on the late or slow industrialization in the nineteenth century and on the stagnation during the 1930's. Moreover, in all of these debates, comparable interpretations have confronted each other. The first and usually older interpretation stresses the subjective factors, while the second and usually newer interpretation stresses the objective factors.

The following are the most frequently encountered subjective factors: (1) a failing government policy. The decline in the eighteenth century for example, is ascribed to the absence of an adequate policy designed to protect and stimulate industry; while the long duration of the depression in the 1930's is explained by the adherence to the gold standard; (2) the quality of entrepreneurship. The Dutch East India Company, for instance, is said to have collapsed as a result of failing entrepreneurship. Likewise, the slow industrialization in the nineteenth century is explained through the lack of energetic entrepreneurs with the right mentality (the infamous Jan Salie-spirit); (3) the lack of venture capital. Industry was not able to develop due to a lack of capital, which in turn was caused by conservative investment behavior and/or conservative bank policy.⁸²

The following are the objective factors: (1) the structure of the economy was small and open. Therefore it was dependent on the development of international trade and of agriculture (see the above discussion concerning the 1930's); (2) the development of world trade and commercial policy of neighboring countries. This was of great importance in the eighteenth century (mercantilism and the economic emancipation of the trading partners), and in the 1930's; (3) the cost structure which confronted Dutch trade and industry, especially the high wages and high prices of the raw materials (see the discussion above on the industrialization in the nineteenth century).

What these debates have in common is the repeated stress placed upon the objective factors, while the independent influence of the subjective factors has been denied or downplayed. Government policy was said not to be important. Sometimes it was put even more strongly: the government was said to always have reacted in an efficient and adequate way. The supply of entrepreneurship and capital was always sufficient or was said to have been impeded by unfavorable objective factors. The conclusion of the debates was almost always — except maybe the debate on the 1930's — that the stagnation (insofar as it occurred) can be completely explained through unfavorable objective factors. In view of the unfavorable economic circumstances, stagnation might even have been the best outcome possible.

This, one might say one-sided, tendency in the economic historiography can probably be explained by two causes. In the first place, the objective factors were easier to measure. The influence of these factors was therefore relatively easy to demonstrate. The researchers did not need the subjective factors to explain the stagnation. They did not need to analyze them, let alone repudiate them. The subjective factors could simply be ignored.

In the second place, much of the recent work has been permeated by the presuppositions of the economic sciences: namely, that at the micro level people always act in an economically rational way and that the result of these actions is also economically rational. For example, conservative investment behavior does not exist by definition, because all investment behavior is rational. If it is conservative, then it will be explained as a rational form of risk aversion. The same reasoning applies to the question regarding the supply of entrepreneurship: the lack of entrepreneurs is by supposition due to the lack of chances of profit.

As the result of the systematic use of such economic presuppositions, many historical myths have been swept aside. Examples are the conservatism of the cabinets of Colijn, the monopolistic practices of the Amsterdam merchants, the corruption and inefficiency of the Dutch regents, the static and closed agriculture in Drenthe and the Jan Salie spirit during the first half of the nineteenth century. These kind of familiar images were rationalized and exposed. The Dutch past is now exclusively populated by innovative farmers, rational investors, competitive merchants, energetic industrialists and efficient officials. In short, we find ourselves with *Candide*, the famous hero of Voltaire, in the best of all possible worlds.

Translation: drs. A. Callewaert.

NOTES

1. A.J. Field, ed., *The Future of Economic History* (Boston 1987); J.H. van Stuijvenberg, "Traditionele en moderne economische geschiedenis", *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 40 (1977) 1-25.
2. H. Brugmans, *Het belang der economische geschiedenis* (Amsterdam 1904); see also: P.W. Klein, "De beoefening van de economische geschiedschrijving in Nederland: een globaal overzicht", in: P.W. Klein, ed., *Van stapelmarkt tot welvaartsstaat* (Rotterdam 1970) 135-138.
3. H. Roland Holst-van der Schalk, *Kapitaal en arbeid in Nederland* (Amsterdam 1902); a second part, dealing with the period 1902-1925, was published in 1932 under the same title, together with a revised part I.
4. N.W. Posthumus, *De geschiedenis van de Leidsche lakenindustrie*, ('s Gravenhage 1908) I; W. van Ravesteyn, *Onderzoekingen over de economische en sociale ontwikkeling van Amsterdam gedurende de 16de en het eerste kwart der 17de eeuw* (Amsterdam 1906).
5. H.E. Becht, *Statistische gegevens betreffende den handelssomzet van de Republiek der Vereenigde Nederlanden gedurende de 17e eeuw (1579-1715)* ('s Gravenhage 1906).
6. I.J. Brugmans, *De arbeidende klasse in Nederland in de 19e eeuw 1813-1870* ('s Gravenhage 1925); J.G. van Dillen, *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der Wisselbanken*, ('s Gravenhage 1925) R.G.P. no. 59, 60.
7. N.W. Posthumus, *De geschiedenis van de Leidsche lakenindustrie* ('s Gravenhage, 1936-1939).
8. J.G. van Dillen, *Van rijkdom en regenten* ('s Gravenhage 1970); I.J. Brugmans, *Paardenkracht en mensenmacht* ('s Gravenhage 1961); the period before 1580 was covered by W. Jappe Alberts & H.P.H. Jansen, *Welvaart in wording* ('s Gravenhage 1963, an abridged edition including the period 1500-1585 was published in 1977).
9. According to P.W. Klein's review of Van Dillen's book in: *Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis*, 85 (1972) 550-554.
10. B.H. Slicher van Bath, *Een samenleving onder spanning* (Assen 1957); a reinterpretation of some of the results of his study is given in J.L. van Zanden, "De opkomst van een eigenerfde boerenklasse in Overijssel, 1750-1830", *AAG-Bijdrage* 24 (1984) 105-130.
11. See the publications of J. Bieleman, J.A. Faber, H.K. Roessingh, A.M. van der Woude (in the series AAG-Bijdragen) cited below.
12. J.A. de Jonge, *De industrialisatie in Nederland tussen 1850 en 1914* (Amsterdam 1968).
13. Joh. de Vries, *De economische achteruitgang der Republiek in de achttiende eeuw* (Leiden 1959); P.W. Klein, *De Trippen in de 17e eeuw* (Assen 1965).
14. Slicher van Bath, *Samenleving*, 1-11; also see A.M. van der Woude, *Het Noorderkwartier* (Wageningen 1972) 15.
15. J.A. Faber et. al., "Population Changes and Economic Development in the Netherlands: a historical survey", *AAG-Bijdragen* 12 (1965) 47-113.
16. L. Noordegraaf, *Hollands welvaren?* (Bergen 1985) gives an interpretation and summary of this research.
17. J.D. Tracy, *A financial Revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands* (Berkeley 1985); M.C. 't Hart, *In Quest for Funds* (Leiden 1989).
18. Klein, *De Trippen*.
19. N.W. Posthumus, *Nederlandsche Prijsgeschiedenis* (Leiden 1946) I, LXXVIII.

20. J.W. Veluwenkamp, *Ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt in de tijd van de Republiek* (Leiden 1981).
21. J. de Vries, *The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700* (New Haven/London 1974).
22. D.E.H. de Boer, *Graaf en grafiek* (Leiden 1978).
23. J.L. van Zanden, "De prijs van de vooruitgang?" *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 51 (1988) 80-92.
24. L. Noordegraaf, "Het platteland van Holland in de zestiende eeuw", *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 48 (1985) 8-19.
25. J.L. van Zanden, "Op zoek naar de "missing link", *Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis* 14 (1988) 359-388.
26. See note 13.
27. Van der Woude, *Noorderkwartier*; J.A. Faber, *Drie eeuwen Friesland* (Wageningen 1971); H.P.H. Nusteling has criticized some of these results, see Nusteling, *Welvaart en werkgelegenheid in Amsterdam 1540-1860* (Amsterdam 1985) 53-60.
28. J. de Vries, "Barges and capitalism", *AAG-Bijdragen* 21 (1978) 251-303; some critical comments on his "model" are made by J.L. van Zanden, "De economie van Holland in de periode 1650-1805: groei of achteruitgang?", *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 102 (1987) 578-579.
29. H.K. Roessing, *Inlandse tabak* (Wageningen/Zutphen 1976).
30. J. Bieleman, "Boeren op het Drentse zand 1600-1910", *AAG-Bijdragen* 29 (1987).
31. Slicher van Bath, *Een samenleving*, 200-210.
32. J.C.G.M. Jansen, *Landbouw en economische golfbeweging in Zuid-Limburg 1250-1800* (Assen 1979).
33. J.C. Riley, *International Government Finance and the Amsterdam Capital Market 1740-1815* (Cambridge 1980).
34. J.C. Riley, "The Dutch Economy after 1650: Decline or Growth?", *The Journal of European Economic History*, 13 (1984) 521-569; a contrasting view is given by J. de Vries, "The Decline and Rise of the Dutch Economy, 1675-1900", in: G.Saxonhouse & G.Wright, eds, *Technique, Spirit, and Form in the Making of the Modern Economies: Essays in the Honor of William N.Parker* (Greenwich 1984) 149-189.
35. Van Zanden, "De economie".
36. J.A. Faber, "The economic Decline of the Dutch Republic in the second half of the eighteenth century and the international terms of trade", in: W.G. Heeres et. al. eds, *From Dunkirk to Danzig* (Hilversum 1988) 107-115.
37. It is symptomatic of the lack of fresh research into the causes of the decline in the eighteenth century that in 1979, 20 years after the publication of the thesis of Joh. de Vries, exactly the same set of causes were mentioned as he did; see J.A. Faber, "De achttiende eeuw", in: J.H. van Stuijvenberg, ed., *De economische geschiedenis van Nederland* (Groningen 1979) 154-155.
38. J.M.F. Fritschy, *De Patriotten en de financiën van de Bataafse Republiek* (Amsterdam 1988).
39. W.Th.M. Frijhoff, "Crisis of modernisering?", *Holland* 17 (1985) 37-56.
40. A comparable discussion deals with the decline of the Dutch East India Company in the eighteenth century; the foremost critic was W.M.F. Mansvelt, *Rechtsvorm en geldelijk beheer bij de Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Amsterdam 1922); K. Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade 1620-1740* (Kopenhagen/Den Haag 1958) tried to meet much

of his criticism. The subject of the trade companies and the commercial expansion into America and Asia and of Dutch international trade in general is not dealt with in this article because of its highly specialist nature.

41. J. de Vries, "An Inquiry into the Behaviour of Wages in the Dutch Republic and the Southern Netherlands, 1580-1800", *Acta Historiae Neerlandicae* X (1978) 79-97.
42. J. Mokyr, *Industrialization in the Low Countries 1795-1850* (New Haven 1976).
43. J. Lucassen, *Naar de kusten van de Noordzee* (Gouda 1984).
44. M.H.D. van Leeuwen & F. Smits, "Bedeling en arbeidsmarkt in Amsterdam in de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw", *Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis* 13 (1987) 431-457; N. Siffels & W. van Spijker, "Haarlemse paupers", *idem*, 458-493; a summary of the discussion in L. Noordegraaf, "Arbeid en arbeidsmarkt", *idem*, 357-372.
45. J.M.M. de Meer, "Daglonen in België en Nederland in 1819 — een aanvulling", *Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis* 6 (1980) 357-385; J.L. van Zanden, "Kosten van levensonderhoud en loonvorming in Holland en Oost-Nederland 1600-1850", *Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis* 11 (1985) 309-323.
46. A review of the debate is found in J.H. van Stuijvenberg, "Economische groei in Nederland in de negentiende eeuw: een terreinverkenning", in: Klein, ed., *Van Stapelmarkt*, 52-74.
47. De Jonge, *De industrialisatie*.
48. J. Mokyr, *Industrialization in the Low Countries, 1795-1850* (New Haven 1976); a critical review of his work is Ph. Kint en R.C.W. van der Voort, "Economische groei en stagnatie in de Nederlanden 1800-1850", *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 43 (1980) 105-154.
49. R.T. Griffiths, *Industrial Retardation in the Netherlands 1830-1850* ('s Gravenhage 1979).
50. R.W.J.M. Bos, "Factorprijzen, technologie en marktstructuur: de groei van de Nederlandse volkshuishouding 1815-1914", *AAG-Bijdragen* 22 (1979) 109-137.
51. E.J. Fischer, *Fabriqueurs en fabrikanten* (Utrecht 1983).
52. H.W. Lintsen, "Stoom als symbool van de industriële revolutie", *Jaarboek voor de geschiedenis van bedrijf en techniek* 5 (1988) 337-354.
53. M. Bakker et. al., "Industrialiseren en innoveren in Nederland in de negentiende eeuw", *Jaarboek voor de geschiedenis van bedrijf en techniek* 5 (1988) 327-337.
54. G. Verbong, *Technische innovaties in de katoendrukkerij en -ververij in Nederland 1835-1920* (Amsterdam 1988); M. Bakker, *Ondernemerschap en vernieuwing* (Amsterdam 1989).
55. Griffiths, *Industrial Retardation*.
56. De Vries, *Barges*.
57. S. Boom & P. Saal, "Spoorwegaanleg en het beeld van de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw", *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 46 (1983) 26-44.
58. W. Fritschy, "Spoorwegaanleg in Nederland van 1831 tot 1845 en de rol van de staat daarin", *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 43 (1983) 180-227.
59. J.M.M. de Meere, *Economische ontwikkeling en levensstandaard in Nederland gedurende de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw* ('s Gravenhage 1982); Griffiths, *Industrial Retardation*.
60. J. Teijl, "Nationaal Inkomen in Nederland in de periode 1850-1900", *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 34 (1971) 232-262.

61. H.P.H. Nusteling, *De Rijnvaart in het tijdperk van stoom en steenkool 1831-1914* (Amsterdam 1974).
62. R.T. Griffiths & J.M.M. de Meere, "The Growth of the Dutch Economy in the Nineteenth-Century: Back to Basics?", *Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis* 96 (1983) 563-572; they also criticized J.H. van Stuijvenberg & J.E.J. de Vrijer, "Prices, Population and National Income in the Netherlands 1620-1978", *Journal of European Economic History* 11 (1982) 699-711.
63. H.J. Brinkman, J.W. Drukker & B. Slot, "Lichaamslengte en reëel inkomen: een nieuwe schattingsmethode voor historische inkomensreeksen", *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 51 (1988) 35-79.
64. J.L. van Zanden, "Economische groei in Nederland in de negentiende eeuw", *Economisch- en sociaal-historisch jaarboek* 50 (1987) 51-76.
65. De Meere, *Economische ontwikkeling*; R.T. Griffiths, *Achterlijk, achter of anders?* (Amsterdam 1979); J.L. van Zanden, *De industrialisatie in Amsterdam 1825-1914* (Bergen 1987).
66. J.L. van Zanden, *De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw in de negentiende eeuw, 1800-1914* (Wageningen/Utrecht 1985).
67. Griffiths, *Achterlijk*.
68. B. Kreukniet, ed., *De Nederlandse volkshuishouding tussen de twee wereldoorlogen* (Utrecht/Antwerpen 1947-52); literature on the period of the First World War is still very scarce; the most valuable work is H. Brugmans, ed., *Nederland in den oorlogstijd* ('s Gravenhage 1920).
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III

THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF COLONIAL INDONESIA: AN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY

by

J. Th. Lindblad

In the 1970s and 1980s, a marked revival of research into the economic history of Indonesia during the colonial era has taken place. In comparison to the two post-colonial decades, the frequency of publications has grown conspicuously and the range of themes has increased considerably. This survey identifies the main trends in the literature published during this revival. It is restricted to literature published after 1970 and, aside from several exceptions, only includes publications in English or Dutch. Our survey deals exclusively with the economic aspects of the colonial history of Indonesia, the former Netherlands East Indies. Political and social history, as well as the process of decolonization and economic development after 1950, fall outside the scope of this survey.¹

Our knowledge about Indonesia's colonial past has increased rapidly since 1970, but few studies provide a general synthesis of the economic history of the colony. In fact, Burger's survey which was written in 1955 and only published in 1975, is still the most recent textbook.² Much effort has been devoted to supplying scholars with building-materials for further research. An important stimulus for new studies both at home and abroad, is the continuing publication of primary statistical data in the series "Changing Economy in Indonesia".³ The data published cover a wide range of variables, including production volumes, investments in capacity, rice prices and capital and commodity flows during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The revival of economic and social history has been fostered by numerous international conferences on Indonesian colonial history. It began with five general Dutch-Indonesian historical conferences held alternately in the Netherlands and Indonesia between 1976 and 1986, including conferences in Noordwijkerhout (1976), Ujung Pandang (1978), Lage Vuursche (1980) and Yogyakarta (1983).⁴ At times the discussions centered around a common economic theme: for instance, middlemen throughout Indonesian history (1980) or agrarian change (1983). On occasion attention was also directed

towards new approaches or topics, including women's history in the Indonesian context.⁵

Another venture involving international cooperation resulted in a series of conferences held at the universities of Delhi, Leiden, Yogyakarta and Cambridge between 1985 and 1987. The four meetings aimed at a systematic comparison of the colonial experiences of India and Indonesia.⁶

In addition, smaller conferences and workshops have been organized at increasingly shorter intervals, especially in the 1980's. Two examples will suffice. In 1983, the Australian National University at Canberra launched its first conference on Indonesian economic history.⁷ In 1984, on the occasion of Professor H. Baudet's retirement, the University of Groningen organized a conference on economic growth and social change in Indonesia.⁸

The increasing flow of publications during the 1970s and 1980s has led the scholars concerned to discuss a wider range of topics. This survey examines three main fields of interest that have come to the fore during the historiographical revival. These fields show both the variety of themes and the successive shifts in emphasis which have occurred in the research carried out in this period. The fields of interest are the following: first, the era of the Dutch East India Company (V.O.C.), *i.e.* the Dutch presence in the Indonesian archipelago during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; second, the economic development of Java, particularly during the nineteenth century; and third, the rise of the Outer Provinces, especially in the first half of the twentieth century. It goes without saying that a concentration on these fields of interest does not preclude other research from being touched upon in passing.

1. *The company era (1600-1800)*

In this survey a distinction is drawn between two points of departure in studying the history of this era: namely studies which explore the history of the V.O.C. as a business enterprise and those which analyze economic life in the company's domain. Both approaches have recently resulted in a number of interesting publications, mostly in Dutch. In addition, a general introduction to the history of this era has been written by F. S. Gaastra.⁹

One of the oldest questions in the historiography of the V.O.C. concerns the rationality of the firm's employees and directors. The late Mrs. M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofs, renowned for her path-breaking history of early Dutch-Asiatic trade, analyzes the low salaries paid by the V.O.C. and claims that, in this respect, the Company never surpassed a pre-modern stage.¹⁰

An important year for the history of the V.O.C. was 1984. In that year two books appeared on the accounting practices of the V.O.C.: a monograph written by J. P. de Korte and a dissertation defended at the University of Leiden by J. J. Steur. The issue at stake is whether or not the company

directors pursued the correct policy when the V.O.C. faced serious problems during the latter half of the eighteenth century.

De Korte, a retired accountant, rearranges and lists the V.O.C.'s main accounts for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He disagrees with Mansvelt, who already in 1922 stated that the accounts fail to give a proper insight into the V.O.C.'s affairs. According to De Korte, the V.O.C.'s accounts were good enough to form an appropriate company policy. Nevertheless, he remains very cautious in passing a final judgment on the directors' policy. He maintains that his task is that of the accountant, and not to establish whether or not the right decisions were made in the past.¹¹

Steur is far bolder. He reconstructs profits and losses according to modern methods of evaluation. He thinks that the directors were too optimistic. They should have known better, especially after the increasing rivalry in intra-Asian trade after 1760. Steur reaffirms the view that the collapse of the V.O.C. was made inevitable by the calamities of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784).¹²

In the prewar tradition initiated by J. C. van Leur, Dutch historiography argued that the V.O.C. only had a very limited impact on the Indonesian economy and society because it affected only ports and princes. Yet this generalization has increasingly proved to be in need of refinement and modification, both with respect to the regions for which the hypothesis holds and the regions (such as the Moluccas) where the V.O.C.'s presence must have had a profound impact.¹³

In an abrupt departure from the traditional interpretation inspired by Van Leur, R. Needham demonstrates that the V.O.C.'s slave trade transformed Sumba's economy in the eighteenth century. The V.O.C.'s participation in the slave trade swiftly established Batavia as one of the foremost slave markets in Asia during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.¹⁴ Similarly, M.C. Ricklefs ascribes the continuous disintegration of the Javanese village economy after 1750 to the intervention of the V.O.C. without however entirely ruling out the possibility that other external factors simultaneously influenced the process of disintegration.¹⁵ Finally, Mrs. H.A. Sutherland shows that the urban society of Macassar (Ujung Pandang) changed greatly during the rule of the V.O.C.¹⁶

Ambon, the major exception to Van Leur's generalization, has found its historian in G.J. Knaap. He asserts that the island's permanent dualistic structure was the result of the V.O.C.'s monopolization of the clove culture after 1656. The V.O.C.'s heritage consisted of the production of two types of cloves: one for export and one for subsistence, dominated respectively by immigrants and indigenous dwellers.¹⁷

Future quantitative research on the V.O.C.'s activities will be greatly facilitated by the recent publication of a complete list of the company's ships which sailed between Europe and Asia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Between 1602 and 1795, there were 4,722 voyages from the

Netherlands to Indonesia and 3,559 return voyages.¹⁸ In the meantime, Sutherland provides a useful framework for a systematic statistical treatment of the V.O.C.'s trade data.¹⁹ We may expect that in the near future research on the V.O.C. era in Indonesian history will gain an increasingly quantitative character.

2. *Java in the nineteenth century*

There are several partially overlapping debates about the nature of Java's economy during the nineteenth century. One debate concerns the Cultivation System (1830-1870); another concerns involution in Javanese agriculture; while yet another concerns the relationship between economic change and population growth throughout the century. How detrimental was the forced cultivation of commercial crops? Was there really a disadvantageous ecological symbiosis between rice and sugar? How modern was Java in 1900? Was the standard of living in 1900 higher or lower than in 1800? Fortunately, a number of regional case studies have recently been published which advance our knowledge about Java's economy at that time.

C. Fasseur's dissertation written at Leiden University is the standard work on the Cultivation System. He focuses on the years between 1840 and 1860, and concludes that the system was most profitable precisely at the time when it was so heavily criticized that its abolition became inevitable. Changes in the political mentality in the Netherlands brought the system to an end, not changes in the economic reality in Indonesia. By implication, it is most unlikely that this system of exploiting Java's natural riches would have nonetheless disappeared due to the increase in private capital investments.²⁰

Fasseur's conception of the Cultivation System is supported by other scholars' research. R.E. Elson, for instance, points out that the sugar planters had great difficulties in finding enough laborers in the 1870's. The transition to "free labor" in 1870 was not favorable to the planters. A surplus of labor in Java only came about later when the population grew faster. The relationship between labor control and Dutch colonial policy at large is stressed by A.M. Djuliaty Suroyo.²¹

The effects of the Cultivation System have been studied for several individual regions.²² According to Ong Hok Ham, the social structure in Madiun was less diversified in 1870 than in 1830. Elson has shown that the lines of social stratification in Pasuruan were reinforced by the creation of a small, wealthy elite, who profited from the Cultivation System. According to G.R. Knight, the farmers in Pekalongan switched from rice to sugar and secondary commercial crops. According to M.R. Fernando, the forced cultures in Cirebon did not lead to the commercialization of agriculture elsewhere. In Semarang, studied by Dj. Suryo, the commercial crops brought a higher degree of vulnerability and eventually also much social distress.

According to Suhartono, rice in Klaten was dislocated to less fertile lands. Finally, existing tendencies towards commercialization in Madura were reinforced by the intervention of colonial taxation policy.²³

The detrimental effects of the Cultivation System have also been traced in the political sphere. In Pasuruan, discontented peasants burnt the cane. In Semarang, according to Elson, the inadequate response of the local authorities to the unfortunate weather conditions which caused the famine of 1849/50 may be ascribed to a serious disruption of the local power structure.²⁴ More generally, J.I. Bakker and R. van Niel conclude that the Cultivation System retarded modernization in Java. The Javanese peasant missed an opportunity to produce more for exports, and this would have had consequences for social values.²⁵

Clifford Geertz' concept of agricultural involution in Java, published in 1963, appealed strongly to an entire generation of scholars. Geertz depicts a strange combination of agricultural intensification, stagnation and petrification stemming from the Cultivation System. This theory has been severely attacked in recent years. The criticism concerns two specific points: first, the causal link with the Cultivation System and, second, the generalization of involution to Java as a whole.²⁶

The best test for establishing the validity of a link between the Cultivation System and involution is to look at the data for individual regions, comparing regions which had forced cultivation with those lacking such a heritage. According to F. Hüsken and B. White, the relationship suggested by Geertz between a high population density, much sawah land and low productivity levels can only be found for Surakarta and Yogyakarta where the Cultivation System was never introduced.²⁷ In a comprehensive survey, T. Svensson has unsuccessfully attempted to link the Cultivation System and agricultural involution. F. Tichelman even questions whether the relative stagnation of Javanese agriculture had anything at all to do with the unique Dutch brand of colonialism.²⁸

With respect to specific regions, Elson finds no traces of involution in Pasuruan, whereas Knight even suggests a tendency in the opposite direction in Pekalongan: namely, an integration of the villages in a capitalist mode of production. The most comprehensive test of Geertz' involution hypothesis is found in A. van Schaik's dissertation. Van Schaik examines the regions of Tegal and Pasuruan, and concludes that Geertz reaches the wrong conclusions through projecting the statistics of 1920 backward into the nineteenth century. Van Schaik disputes whether agricultural involution even ever existed in nineteenth-century Java.²⁹

As a result of the generalizations about the Cultivation System and agricultural involution, scholars have too often been inclined to view Java as consisting of countless, but homogenous villages. J. Breman was one of the first to explicitly challenge the implicit homogeneity hypothesis. He demonstrates the existence of considerable internal differentiation, both

before and during the Cultivation System.³⁰

In his monograph on Cirebon, Breman shows how colonialism after 1870 legitimized an agrarian policy which served the interests of the rulers and private capital owners. Even the land reforms of the early twentieth century had a limited impact in Cirebon, both because of the unconditional support received by the village elite from the authorities and because of the continuous demand for labor on the sugar estates.³¹

The widespread view that economic development did not occur in Java during the nineteenth century has been highly conditioned by the prevailing opinions about the Cultivation System and agricultural involution. It is often assumed that Javanese society barely had been touched by Western influences prior to 1830 and that the standard of living declined in the course of the nineteenth century, especially after 1870. Both assumptions have been challenged by recent research.

Using Bogor as an example, P. Boomgaard argues that Java was more modern before 1830 than has usually been thought to have been the case.³² Boomgaard also presents a new survey of Java's economy and society during the nineteenth century. In his dissertation, he reconstructs the interplay between the expansion of production and population growth. Relying on new estimates of the growth of Java's population, Boomgaard contrasts the slow rate of population growth in the first half of the century with the faster growth in the second half. At the same time, agricultural production increased: first slower than the population, then faster. As a result, per capita incomes at first fell in comparison to 1815, and then rose so that by 1880 the level of 1815 had been restored. Boomgaard depicts Java's economy as much more dynamic than the one plagued by involution, dualism and stagnation portrayed in the literature.³³

The more dynamic view of Java's economy is supported by Mrs. A. Booth, who calculates a considerable increase in total rice output between 1850 and 1880. She even suggests that the population grew during the early twentieth century, at least in part in response to better economic conditions.³⁴ The revision also applies to the changes in the levels of purchasing power, as recently reported for Cirebon, Pasuruan and Pekalongan.³⁵ The agricultural development of Java during the nineteenth century is becoming a very exciting area of research.

Booth provides a comprehensive treatment of agricultural development in Java since the Cultivation System. She identifies a phase of rapid extensification which lasted until about 1920, and was then followed by a phase of intensification, which also contained elements reminiscent of Geertz' involution. Up to the 1920s, population growth in Java was accompanied by a continuous increase in the area of land under cultivation. It was an agricultural change favoring individualization and small, owner-cultivated holdings. According to Booth, the scant evidence available suggests a similar type of agricultural development outside of Java as well.³⁶

Booth's second phase of agricultural intensification, running from the 1920s until well after independence, stresses higher yields and better irrigation facilities, but also smaller holdings and deteriorating standards of living. This general argument is borne out by studies of individual regions and crops made by A.G. Anderson and J.A.C. Mackie.³⁷ Booth's conception is likely to form the logical point of departure for future studies of Java's agrarian history.

Although agriculture and the dramatic changes which occurred during the nineteenth century have played the leading role in the recent historiography of Java's colonial economy, other themes have not been altogether neglected. There is also an increasing interest in Dutch colonial policy with respect to Java, both prior to the Cultivation System and afterwards. T. Stevens sketches the economic and political ambitions reflected in Dutch policy just before 1830, whereas Mrs. E.B. Locher-Scholten discusses some aspects of the Ethical Policy launched around 1900.³⁸ For Priangan, Svensson demonstrates how the colonial authorities eventually turned against the wealthy village leaders who responded by supporting Sarekat Islam in its formative period during the second decade of the twentieth century.³⁹

There is little doubt about the dynamic character of the private western firms which replaced the forced government cultivations in Java after 1870. Yet, remarkably few serious studies of these enterprises have been made. R. J. Kamerling's monograph on the *N.V. Oliefabrieken "Insulinde"* is a notable exception. This copra company developed into the single largest firm in Java during the First World War, only to go bankrupt shortly after 1920. Kamerling thoroughly analyzes the firm's balance sheets and profit-and-loss accounts, and arrives at a hard verdict on management policy. Too many mistakes were made by the less capable successors of the original founder who died when the company was at the apex of its expansion.⁴⁰

With respect to western enterprises operating in Java during the last half-century of colonial rule, several new themes may be discerned. The empirical foundation for studying the few successful attempts at industrialization in Java during the early twentieth century is rapidly improving, as both brief histories of individual firms and series of relevant statistical data are being published.⁴¹ J. Ingleson's analysis of unionism in Java suggests a useful link between social and economic history, whereas the slender volume by H. Baudet and M. Fennema identifies the fate of Dutch firms on the eve of decolonization as an important and highly neglected field of research.⁴² In short, much work still remains to be done in completing the picture of Java's economic development during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the near future, I expect a stronger tendency towards studies which provide a synthesis of the developments in agriculture and the scope of research to broaden and include non-agricultural topics as well.

3. *The Outer Provinces in the early twentieth century*

In the historiography of Indonesia, Java has usually been favored at the expense of the other islands. This is slowly changing. In the economic and social history of the Outer Provinces, we may distinguish two major themes: first, the economic aspects of the political expansion that was completed by about 1900; second, the changes in the economic structure of the islands brought about by export-led growth after the turn of the century. A general introduction to the economic history of the Outer Provinces is being prepared by A.H.P. Clemens and J.T. Lindblad.⁴³

The discussion about the character of Dutch imperialism was revitalized at a conference organized by the Dutch Historical Society in 1970.⁴⁴ Since then, two traditions have emerged. One tradition stresses the predominance of political factors, while the other attempts to link political expansion with economic interests. The most elaborate study in the first tradition is M. Kuitenbrouwer's dissertation, written at the University of Utrecht. He states that in the period between 1870 and 1914, Dutch expansion outside of Java did not differ in principle from the imperialism of other European nations: only the timing was different. A more aggressive and determined Dutch imperialist policy only took shape after the Lombok expedition in 1894.⁴⁵

The economic argument has been advocated by Lindblad who differentiates between micro and macro levels of intertwining political and economic interests. According to Lindblad, the predominance of the economic factor does not necessarily imply the conventional chain of causation as prescribed by Hobson and Lenin.⁴⁶ At the regional level, R. Lenstra discusses Aceh, while P. J. Jobse looks at Flores. Lenstra relates the intensification of the war on Aceh in 1898 to oil discoveries in East Aceh, whereas Jobse stresses the importance of the myth of Flores tin.⁴⁷

The macro-economics of imperialist expansion centers on the processes of colonial state formation and economic integration, both internally and with respect to the world market. C.J.M. Potting shows how the integration of the Outer Provinces into a colonial state was furthered through the reforms in the monetary systems of East Sumatra and West Kalimantan at the beginning of the twentieth century, whereas J. à Campo sketches the gradual evolution of a network in the archipelago serving both maritime and administrative functions.⁴⁸

Just as Java has been favored above other islands, so East Sumatra occupies a privileged position among the Outer Provinces. The main work on the economic expansion of East Sumatra has been written by Thee Kian Wie. He depicts East Sumatra's economy as a typical plantation economy, with weak linkages to self-sustained economic growth. He defines the essential problem in the economic history of the Outer Provinces as the dichotomy between an unprecedented capacity to earn export revenue, and an inability to create an economic structure appropriate for balanced long-run growth.⁴⁹

W.J. O'Malley's comparison of the hardships suffered by Deli and Yogyakarta during the Depression of the 1930s, highlights the greater vulnerability of East Sumatra's economy, which was a result of its extreme dependence on foreign markets.⁵⁰

The conditions of pioneering in East Sumatra, with its abundance of land and scarcity of people, gave rise to peculiar land and labor relationships that strongly favored the interests of planters and employers above those of local peasants and employees on the estates. The land relationships are studied in detail by K.J. Pelzer whereas the planters' far-reaching prerogatives under the Coolie Ordinance are once again becoming a controversial subject of historical research, particularly in the Netherlands.⁵¹

In her dissertation, Ms. A.L. Stoler analyzes the planters' labor control policy and the protests against it. She also pays special attention to the position of the Indonesian woman on the tobacco estates. She establishes a direct link between the strict control of labor and the profitability of the western firms. In her opinion, the shift from coolie to "free" labor in the early 1930s did not alter the position of the indigenous laborers. On this point she disagrees with H.J. Langeveld, who states that the economic conditions of the laborers on the East Sumatra plantation improved significantly between 1920 and 1940.⁵²

Breman has also examined legalized coercion by employers. In one volume, he combines a reprint of the secret report made in 1903 by the public prosecutor Rhemrev regarding the abuse of laborers in that year in East Sumatra with a full-fledged analysis of the plantation economy. He concludes that the abuses were a logical consequence of the legal power held by the planters and that the Dutch authorities succeeded in covering up the scandal. In his opinion, the installation of the Labor Inspection in 1904 brought about little change in the situation on the estates, but this view has been disputed by A. Kamphues on the basis of statistical evidence for the subsequent period.⁵³

Regions other than East Sumatra are gradually attracting attention among scholars working on the Outer Provinces. In his book about Lombok, A. van der Kraan scrutinizes the relationship between Dutch colonial rule and the lack of economic development on the island. Despite an increase in production, standards of living on Lombok declined.⁵⁴

In his monograph on Southeast Kalimantan, Lindblad analyzes the two foundations of the region's economic growth: oil, dominated by western capital, and rubber, dominated by indigenous cultivators. There was rapid economic expansion in the region and a fundamental dualism between western and non-western economic sectors. The dualism was, at least in part, responsible for the substantial drain of profits away from Kalimantan. This argument is substantiated through the use of regional statistics and a formal macro-economic model.⁵⁵

In a more general perspective, attention is increasingly being devoted to

the trade-induced expansion of Indonesia, as a whole, and of the Outer Provinces, in particular, during the first three decades of the twentieth century. W.L. Korthals Altes analyzes the depreciation of 1936 in depth and is also responsible for providing an increasingly solid statistical foundation for the time series analysis of Indonesian foreign trade. B. van Ark describes the main shifts in export price levels over time, and also makes several alternative index calculations.⁵⁶

Current foreign trade analysis focuses on the size and cause of Indonesia's surplus on the balance of trade. Booth asserts that the colony's trade performance was impressive by any standard, but that much of the possible gains from growth failed to materialize because of what she calls a "double drain": one to foreign countries via the western firms and the other inside the archipelago via Chinese traders.⁵⁷ In an analysis of the bilateral trade between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies, Lindblad identifies crucial shifts in the commodity composition of exports and volume enlargements that brought about the faster expansion of exports than imports. Significantly, the growth of trade in the colony was not conducive for closer ties with the mother-country, at least not on the level of commodity exchange.⁵⁸

Research on the Outer Provinces is likely to increase in the near future, extending to more regions and highlighting both the variety outside Java and the fundamental differences as compared to Java.

4. *Conclusion*

Thee Kian Wie, Nestor of Indonesian economic history, has formulated the three most urgent needs in the study of the economic and social history of Indonesia: a methodological renewal inspired by the "New Economic History", more regional case studies pertaining to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and more comparisons with other non-European histories of economic growth.⁵⁹ The first two needs are indeed increasingly being met at the moment and the third one is likely to follow in the near future.

The need for a methodological renewal, stressing analysis above description and relying increasingly on quantitative assessments, applies equally to the study of the V.O.C. era, Java's agricultural development in the nineteenth century and the rise of the Outer Provinces in the early twentieth century. The greater attention for the diversity of regional patterns applies specifically to Java in times of forced cultivation and involution. Generally, there is a growing tendency at present to extrapolate from in-depth studies concerning individual regions. Thus the blanks on the historiographical map of colonial Indonesia are increasingly being filled in.

Yet the revival of this field of research since 1970 also makes it clear that our needs extend beyond the publication of more case studies. The time is

ripe for a modern synthesis of the information which has already been gathered. We know a great deal more than before, but our insights have to be put together into a consistent panoramic view. In short, we need a new handbook on the economic and social history of Indonesia during the colonial era.

NOTES

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IV

DEARTH, PLAGUE, AND TRADE: ECONOMY AND POLITICS IN THE NORTHERN NETHERLANDS, FIFTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES.

by

L. Noordegraaf

Civil authorities in the Northern Netherlands in the late Middle Ages and early modern period cannot readily be ascribed just as having as active and basic an involvement in the economy as the Dutch government of today. Yet, no one will dare to assert that the government did not play a role in the economy at all. To endorse these judgments it is not necessary to carry out a comparative study of the economic policy pursued then and now or to reopen the discussion of the extent to which there was a mercantilist policy before 1800. There was governmental involvement with the economy; of that there is doubt. That does not have to be doubted. The closely intertwined military and fiscal reality alone compelled both local and provincial administrators and the highest authority to concern themselves with many facets of material existence.¹

The relationship between the economy and politics also clearly comes to the fore in studying the social crises caused by shortages of food and contagious diseases. The government's reactions to these phenomena and their consequences had a considerable impact on the economic activities of everyone involved. I want to illustrate this by illuminating the government's intervention in trade and transportation during famines and epidemics. It is not so much my intention to treat the factual events and developments in detail, but rather to highlight the policy, interests, motives, and ideas of a number of actors in the economic and political drama. I do this intentionally, because in the past few decades research has concentrated primarily on the collection and analysis of serial macroeconomic data. The spotlight has not, or only incidentally, been focussed on the actions and especially on the thinking of the different parties involved. I will not give an explanation for this, but it is certain that in the past few decades the role of the individual has not been a subject of continuing concern in the Dutch economic historiography of the preindustrial era.²

By directing the spotlight on the actions and thoughts of the different

parties and groups, I first of all want to arouse interest in the significance of motives, the weighing of interests, and ethical and political norms and decisions in economic and historical developments, including the extremely complicated interaction or dialectic between people and their environment. With this appeal for an economic history with a human face, I secondly want to present a perspective of a historiography in which there will be a place for the significance of unconscious motives, feelings, and intuitions. I expect that insight into that which is not consciously well thought through and is unstated offers a key for understanding the way in which economic activities are expressed and acquire form. This article does not give a sketch of what at this moment, possibly somewhat fashionably, is called history of mentalities (*histoire des mentalités*), but it does want to invite the writing of an economic history in which this problem also in the Netherlands receives a place in theory and in practice.³

1. Dearth

The history of prices and wages in the Northern Netherlands shows the following development between about 1450 and the beginning of the nineteenth century.⁴ Viewed over the long-term, a notable increase in prices occurred between 1450 and approximately 1650: the well-known price revolution. During roughly the next century (with a break of several decades around 1700) a decline in prices followed. This in turn was followed by an increase in prices in the second half of the eighteenth century. Insofar as incomes are concerned, nominal wages changed little between circa 1450 and 1540. In the following period, which lasted until about 1635, wages began to rise. Subsequently, they remained more or less at the same level for more than two centuries.⁵

Due to rising prices, purchasing power eroded in the second half of the fifteenth century, and this continued through roughly 1580. For this period, however, strong local and regional differences must be taken into account. For the province of Holland, at any rate, there are several series which point to an increase in purchasing power shortly after 1500 and especially in the period between 1535 and 1565. Between 1580 and 1770 purchasing power developed favorably, and certainly in comparison with what occurred elsewhere in Europe. After 1770 the situation deteriorated. The regional differences must also not be underestimated for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁶

A further examination of purchasing power during these centuries brings to light that from time to time, in both the upward and declining phases of the secular trend, disposable incomes could fall steeply during one or more years. The cause of this lies in the sudden, marked rise in the price of primary necessities and especially in the price of grain, the most important foodstuff

in the preindustrial era. These short-term price increases must be explained by acute crises in the supply of food; a scarcity which can be traced to the appearance of phenomena, such as crop failures, floods, political and military events, and business practices which drove prices up.

The consequences of this are predictable: famine; increased mortality; a decline in the number of marriages and fertility; an increase in the number of paupers, beggars, and vagabonds; a rise in criminality; market crises, especially in the industrial sector; declining tax revenues; and food riots.⁷ In the period 1450-1850 a number of such *crises de subsistance*, whether or not in combination with *crises de type ancien*, occurred in and around the following years: 1456, 1480, 1490, 1502, 1516, 1520, 1530, 1545, 1551, 1556, 1565, 1570, 1587, 1595, 1623, 1630, 1652, 1662, 1672, 1698, 1709, 1740, 1757, 1771, 1789, 1795, 1800, 1812, 1817, and 1847.

Not much is yet known about the reactions of the various population groups to such crises. While this must surely be ascribed to the available source material, there is at least one equally important reason. In the dominant, quantitatively oriented historiography of the moment, we also have not often enough posed questions about the policies, interests, motives, let alone the thought patterns which played a role in hunger crises. Using the measures taken by the government in periods of dearth as my point of departure, I want to attempt to pursue the policy discussions and explore the underlying range of ideas.

a. Measures and motives

Measures were taken in periods of dearth to realize two related objectives: the restraint of extreme price increases and the prevention of starvation. A wide range of solutions to these problems were devised and carried out.⁸

The control of prices was pursued through establishing ceilings. The maximum could not be exceeded, especially in the purchase and sale of grain. As an extension of this, we must also include the measures taken against speculation, practices which drove prices up, and monopolization among merchants. Bakers and retailers who sold bread were also required to observe the established bread prices. Unfair competition, such as the free delivery of cake and rusk, was not allowed. Fraud and corruption in the measurement of grain were also not tolerated. Compulsory price reductions took place more than once. Creating food stocks with the intention of profiting from the spiral of scarcity and price increases was prohibited. Those who were thought to have too much grain at home were required to sell it. On the other hand, particularly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it also happened that the more well-to-do burghers were required to lay in a supply of grain, albeit with the explicit prohibition of using it to drive up prices during shortages. Later the city governments themselves purchased grain which they then sold (sometimes through shopkeepers) to the poor at a special, low price or else distributed freely. "Creative bookkeeping" and increased

taxation were the counterpoints for those who were thought to be able to afford it. Sometimes the stocks were so small that consumers were put on rations. Brewers, starch manufacturers, geneva distillers, and all other producers who needed grain for products other than bread were faced with prohibitions forbidding the purchase or the processing of raw materials. Last but not least, merchants were also prohibited from exporting grain in many years in which grain prices were high.

Various motives underlie the measures and objectives. The scourge of hunger experienced by needy fellow citizens was often stated, in every conceivable way, as the reason for dealing with the problem. Overcome with suffering, people expressed compassion and charity. The want had to be alleviated. And, the care of the poor was experienced as a Christian duty. Especially after the second half of the eighteenth century, the idea of charity was vividly expressed.⁹

However, there were also unselfish actions before then, in which care for one's fellowman resound. Other, more or less commercial motives are, of course, not excluded by this: fear for a decline in the areas of consumption and production; for falling tax revenues; for mass mendicancy and vagabondism; for the outbreak of epidemics; and, not in the least, for riots and revolts. The fear for these disruptions was, for that matter, not without a basis. As mentioned above, these threats appear to have been real more than once. This was all the more reason for a stringent policy in periods of dearth.¹⁰

Of utmost importance was how the viewpoint was determined regarding the commercial measures which were to be taken. In mapping out this policy, conflicts developed between the various interest groups, which held divergent viewpoints. Normally there was a large measure of agreement between the merchants and the authorities about the policy which was to be followed. Trade was to be left as free as possible. Yet, in exceptional circumstances, as in cases of extreme scarcity and impending starvation, the idea took hold that export prohibitions were appropriate in countering the grain crises. The thought behind this was that through the continuation of "free trade", in this case the absence of governmental intervention, shortages would continue to grow.¹¹ In 1623 and 1698-99 some people ascribed the high prices to the export of grain and the ensuing shortages which it caused.

Not everyone, however, could agree with the position that trade should consequently be restricted. Harmony about the intended policy was broken with the issue of export restrictions. Proponents and opponents of this policy came to stand in opposition to each other. Endless deliberations and discussions followed, which resulted either in complete, partial, or no measures. Here we first of all, naturally think of the conflicting interests and responsibilities of the government and the merchants. However, given the fact that merchants in Amsterdam pressed for export prohibitions in 1698, it appears that it is incorrect to draw too sharp a distinction between the viewpoints held by bureaucrats and by merchants. The difference of opinion

could occur within both of these groups. This comes to the fore in the attitude of the *Raadpensionaris* of Holland in the aforementioned year. He reluctantly introduced the export prohibition proposed by Amsterdam before the Staten van Holland.¹² The question remains whether altruistic motives can simply and solely be ascribed to the merchants' initiatives. It is also quite possible that the conflicting interests and viewpoints held within this group led one of the parties to pay a visit to the city government.

An example from Amsterdam in 1565-66, a year of dearth, demonstrates that such an opposition of interests could take place within the group of merchants. From the complaints of grain merchants, it appears that a number of their colleagues had been informed by their friends in the city's administration of a general prohibition on grain exports just before it went into effect; consequently, they were able to ship their grain out of the city just in time.¹³ It is possible that some government officials had an indirect or direct interest in the grain trade. Political, social, and familial relations between trade and government made a decisive and consistent policy difficult. Which or whose interests were to have priority?

The merchants' activities were in general not positively judged. There are numerous statements made by contemporaries in which their practices were clearly denounced. These complaints usually can be classified under the category of driving up prices. In order to understand the thought world of that time, the creation of such an image is of great importance. Brochures, pamphlets, and contemporary historiography can to an important degree clarify our understanding of the views held by governmental authorities and merchants; and they can be a key in appraising the true value of the discussions conducted within government circles.¹⁴

Other tensions also become apparent in the negotiations, viewpoints, and conflicts. The city governments and the provincial authorities also clashed with each other about the policy regarding foodstuffs. Further, in the States General there were conflicts between cities and the countryside and discussions between cities and provinces. Behind all of these conflicts and decisions there lies a world which is largely unknown to us, in which feelings of local and provincial chauvinism, dawning "national consciousness", and every conceivable consideration of status and prestige played their role. A city or region could, of course, retain grain or intercept grain shipments in transit, but this meant that there was less grain to consume elsewhere. Was a city or region able or permitted to pursue an autonomous policy in this respect? The age-old strong urban and provincial particularism, so typical of Dutch political relations for centuries, led in economic and political practice to a local protectionism which gave rise to the aforementioned tensions. The extent to which this protectionism and the views which lay at its basis, especially at the urban level, changed in the course of the eighteenth century is an unresolved question.¹⁵ Nonetheless, this does not lessen the necessity of additional research on the relation between action and thought in the political

and economic spheres.

Similar debates, for that matter, were waged regarding exports with the question of whether or not the production of starch and geneva were to be prohibited. The debate regarding the baking of white bread and the mixing of wheat and barley also takes us into a world in which people often thought along different lines than is the case in the world in which we live.¹⁶

Against which background must the thinking regarding this export policy now be seen? As already stated, in general, trade was rarely hindered. But in periods of high prices, the authorities were faced with a difficult question with far-reaching consequences. Should the grain which was on hand be retained? In other words, should the government use export prohibitions to force the merchants to sell their stocks of grain within a well-defined area (city, region, or country) and offer it for sale at prices set by the government?

On the surface this seems to be a good solution to prevent or fight famine. But on further reflection, this appears not to be the case. While the availability of food was indeed improved, with continuing scarcity the danger was present that new shipments would not arrive as a consequence of the export prohibitions. With the knowledge that trade was restricted, merchants might possibly divert their cargoes to ports with more liberal policies.

The government was consequently faced with a difficult, if not unsolvable dilemma. If they did not regulate the trade, then the grain threatened to flow to the market with the highest price, with all possible social consequences. But, if the sale of grain was forced, the government expected that the grain would be shipped to other ports where the merchants thought they would receive a better price. Consequently, the scarcity would continue, and even be aggravated. In this case too, the specter of social instability loomed. In short, with free trade the masses threatened; while with export prohibitions the relations with merchants were disturbed. No matter which of these policies was followed, tensions could not be avoided.

It is this dilemma which gives the policy its inconsistent and ad hoc character. With the always questionable weighing of numerous and dissimilar interests, it was also unbalanced and, judged by modern standards, unjust. In our eyes it also has something peculiar and difficult to grasp: even in times of scarcity there was trade with the Spanish enemy during the Dutch Revolt. While it is indeed a subject of discussion, it is also a reality in which the unprincipledness of Dutch economic and political policy is succinctly expressed.¹⁷ Finally, through the endless debates and negotiations, with the continuous moves and countermoves of the different parties, we see the decisiveness of the policy continually undermined. May one, putting it less negatively, consider the indecision to be a healthy realism, yes, even presume it to be a healthy opportunism?

b. Economic history as a social problem

The example of the grain trade policy illustrates that economic history is

ultimately concerned with the social problem of allocation. While relating prices and wages to each other in the form of aggregated purchasing power indices is indeed a first step in getting an impression of how welfare developed, without differentiating according to geographical region, political center, and social group in how the scarce means were divided, much in history remains hidden from view. Research on the standard of living that is limited to the construction of undifferentiated indices can count on the same type of criticism that has been leveled against research on secular trends, such as in the so-called neo-malthusian approach. There the population is also regarded too much as a homogeneous mass and is not sufficiently specified according to social categories.¹⁸

When one starts with the presupposition that the appropriation and division of goods and services are dependant on the relations between groups with divergent social, economic, and political, power interests, then the relation between thought and action becomes much more important in gaining an insight into economic processes than has been the case until now. Stocks, of course, are divided through the process of price formation within the limits of the available output and geographical constraints, but allocation ultimately occurs on the basis of social, economic, and political interests and motives.

Does the small amount of interest for the aforementioned relation in the current economic historiography arise out of the implicit conviction that economic processes are more or less "autonomous" and that the freedom of the individual to act within these processes is nearly absent? The serial analyses carried out on macroeconomic data, in any case, all too often evoke the impression that people are only at the mercy of changes in the size of the population, wages and prices, and output and consumption or that they behave as marionettes according to the laws of the market.¹⁹

2. *Plague*

Similar considerations and thought patterns came to the fore in mapping out a commercial policy during plague epidemics as in periods of famine.²⁰ This policy was embedded in an entire package of measures that by and large had the goal of preventing the plague and if that did not succeed, of countering its further spread.

Government intervention with this sickness was not incidental. During the period 1450-1668 (the last year in which the Republic was visited by "the gift of God"), the province of Holland was struck by the plague in 107 out of the 219 years. Especially after 1550, a sizeable epidemic can be identified in almost every decade.

Socially the epidemics had far-reaching consequences. Barely a single aspect of life remained unaffected. First, there were demographic

consequences. An estimated mortality of 1.5 to 2 times as high as in "normal" years (35 to 45‰) is on the safe side. On occasion the mortality rate was much higher. An absolute catastrophe occurred in 1635 when about one out of three of Leiden's residents lost their lives. The influence of the plague can also be demonstrated in the areas of marriage, fertility, and migration.

The mortality rate did not even have to be that high for the plague's impact to be noticeable on the government, the economy, cultural life, and religion. The sources overflow with examples of all kinds of social disruption, of which fights for coffins and biers speak much to the imagination. In the experiential world of a society stricken by the plague, feelings of fear, panic, sadness, apathy, guilt, and sorrow struggle for primacy.

The government's intervention in the economy, and especially in the area of commerce, must be seen against this background. It is understandable that it was precisely this sector which demanded attention. The authorities realized that the plague was contagious and that it could be transmitted through commerce and transport over long distances.

a. Measures and motives once again

Just as in periods of dearth, government officials brought an entire arsenal of measures to bear. A number of illustrations: contaminated residences had to be isolated and ventilation was only permitted at night. After the sick had died or were taken to special hospitals for those stricken by the plague, the houses had to be disinfected. House pets — they were thought to spread the plague — had to be locked up or killed. To purify air which was thought to be infected, the authorities had barrels of burning pitch placed on public roads. Numerous measures in the area of hygiene were taken, such as cleaning up dunghills and garbage heaps. The vomit, excrement, and blood of plague victims was not allowed to be thrown outside. That also applied to plasters, bathwater, and bedstraw. Street gutters had to be cleaned. A wide variety of funeral practices considered to increase the danger of infection were prohibited. At the same time, there was far-reaching governmental intervention in the economy which hindered many individuals in carrying out their trade or occupation and created conflicts between different interest groups. It became especially difficult for merchants and transporters.

The government, in principle, could suspend all commerce and traffic, but that would quickly land the society in considerable problems. A city, for example, could keep its gates closed, but this could not last too long. A perforce incomplete, yet hazardous solution was devised: be selective in the admission policy. Attempt to find out if the merchants and goods come from suspect or infected regions. If so, then intervene. Yet, this was only a partial solution. Given the state of communication in this era, information was poor, incomplete, or incorrect. Rumors were as contagious as the plague itself. In the case of the major epidemics, which appeared roughly once a decade after the middle of the sixteenth century and became manifest almost

simultaneously inside and outside of Europe, all trade routes were suspect. Further, if a city sealed itself off completely, indispensable goods would pass it by. Attempts to be selective were not only made on the basis of the region of origin, but also according to product. Because the true cause of the plague was unknown and there were all kinds of conflicting opinions about it in circulation, a consistent policy on this point also appeared to be an insoluble problem. Moreover, could one refuse admission to one's own merchants and shipmasters who returned after a long absence? Which authority would dare to refuse a returning fleet from the Levant — a pre-eminent nidus of the pest? Who would leave the grain laden ships from the Baltic — commerce which was called the "mother-trade" with good reason — to the competition? Even for specific goods and for short periods of time, Amsterdam could not afford the staple market to be closed. An ingenious solution was conceived: the quarantine. This applied especially to shipping, but overland transport was probably also confronted with it.

Quarantine was first applied at the municipal level. The first example known to me dates from 1563, when Amsterdam determined that ships which came from infected places in England had to lie at anchor for fourteen days before they could enter the city. The crew had to stay on board during the entire period. That the cities took the lead and that each acted for itself without deliberating at a higher level is not so surprising. We are, for that matter, in a period in which the central authority of the state was weakly developed and the city had a large measure of autonomy. The policy was in the first place given form through and within the local community. Although the sovereign authority of the Burgundians and Habsburgs gradually grew in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth century, the policy of centralization which was pursued as yet knew other priorities than combatting the plague. With the Revolt this process was once again rigorously broken down, especially in Holland, and almost all of the power came into the hands of the cities, each of which continued to follow its own course. The provincial estates and the States General did not get much further in the first half of the seventeenth century than proclaiming common days of prayer or prohibiting long mourning robes, hanging baizes and cloths in the death-room, and serving wine and beer at the funeral.

The necessity of working together was possibly also less compelling before 1550, because in contrast to later, the plague was not as clearly concentrated around specific years and popped up first in one place and then in another. After the arrival of the major epidemics in the middle of the sixteenth century, in which the concentration is much more apparent and the plague appears to have been spread over a wider area at the same time, we however also scarcely notice any coordination at the inter-municipal, provincial, or central level. The absence of a strong central state, and especially a way of living and thinking which barely extended beyond the city wall, consequently affords a better possibility for explaining the lack of cooperation.

It is remarkable that a central policy becomes increasingly visible after 1650, despite the fact that the political framework does not show any change in this respect. It is not unlikely that the policy pursued by foreign powers towards our ships brought the authorities in this country to the idea that the effectiveness of the fight against the plague was aided through coordination and a uniform approach to the problem.

Abroad the tradition often already existed of boycotting, isolating, and quarantining everything and everybody who was suspected of carrying the plague. Especially during the epidemics in the 1650s and 1660s, Dutch merchants and shippers were confronted with this by different powers with a stronger central authority. In the fifties they were faced with a dangerous international boycott. France, England, and Scotland prohibited the import of all manufactures from Holland. Only when passengers and witnesses from the municipal governments involved declared that the goods came from uninfected places were they allowed to be landed forty days later. The Staten van Holland reacted by providing ships which sailed abroad with "health certificates", meant to guarantee that they were plague free. With this, a step forward was clearly taken towards a supra-local approach to the plague. Less than ten years later, commerce was once again directly struck. Spain, Portugal, France, and England, among others, refused to allow our ships to enter their ports. Ships which put into port were held in quarantine for 30 to 80 days. Boycott and quarantine first applied only to Amsterdam, but the cities along the Maas and in Zeeland were also quickly confronted with the consequences of this policy. In August of 1664 the Republic was affected through a decision taken by the French Parlement, in which French trade and shipping was prohibited with the entire Northern Netherlands because of the plague in the province of Holland.

As stated, it is quite possible that these and other foreign experiences led to the development of coordination at higher administrative levels. This is not to say that this policy only arose out of esteem for the large-scale approach employed outside of the Republic. The plague related measures directed against Dutch merchants were frequently explained as a pretext for ruining our commerce. Consequently, there was pressure for retaliatory measures in the Estates. This viewpoint was not completely without a basis. As is well-known, the commercial prosperity of the Seven Provinces aroused great jealousy elsewhere. The political situation was very strained and in 1665 the Second Anglo-Dutch War broke out. Everything seems to indicate that the new supra-local approach was also born out of the negative measures taken by the surrounding powers.

We see the coordination acquire form in two ways. First, at the provincial level. In 1664, for example, the Zeelanders had the Estates of their province promulgate a quarantine measure against ships from Utrecht and a number of cities in Holland. Second, at the "national" level. On the initiative of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht, the States General went a step further on 31

July 1664 than they had in 1637. A number of articles were added to the provisions of the edict which was then proclaimed, and which were more substantial than those enacted thirty years earlier. The measures explicitly went so far as to include checking and refusing admittance to sick travelers and their baggage and to travelers without a health certificate.

In this way, after the 1650s, the policy was also expressly molded at the "national" level. In addition to the imitation of examples given elsewhere in Europe, this policy change was also related to the changing views held in medical circles regarding the cause of the plague. There the insight developed that the plague could only really be effectively combatted if the same policy was pursued everywhere. This insight was fostered by the ground winning conviction that infection, the source of which was sought abroad, came about primarily through human contact.

In the provincial and "national" policy, the preventive measures were given the same form as at the local level. Only the scale differed. Boycott, embargo, confiscation, and quarantine were means which were now also applied by the highest authority. The consequences of this policy were the same as those which the municipal measures brought in their wake. In this case also with differences in scale: the damage which commerce suffered will have increased on account of it.

It is remarkable that the outbreak of the plague which raised the fight against it to the "national" level was also the last time God's gift visited the Northern Netherlands. Were the preventive measures, which for that matter were by far not limited to those mentioned above, so effective that in the future the plague could be kept outside of the country? After 1668 the plague bacillus did undertake a number of attacks on the Republic, throughout which the government had to remain alert. In 1679 the threat came from the Mediterranean; in the period 1709-1715 from the Baltic Region and the North German cities; during the period 1720-1722 first from Marseille and then from Provence and Languedoc, as well as the Levant, from which region danger again threatened in 1724 and 1728.

The climax in the policy against the plague occurred in 1720. In that year a major epidemic broke out in Marseille. The first news of this reached the States General in August through a letter written by the Dutch Ambassador in France. Although the epidemic was only mentioned in passing, the States General reacted quickly and dealt energetically with the matter. They immediately called in the Admiralty Colleges and, in cooperation with them, promulgated a series of measures which became known as "Precautions Against the Plague". The first edict was already promulgated on 18 September. In it the following measures were announced. With the exception of the Balg near Texel and the Vlie, all ports were closed to ships from Provence and Languedoc. Ships harbored in the Balg or the Vlie were not permitted to have contact with the land. In addition, commodities were divided into two categories: goods which were not suspected of carrying the

plague and goods which were, such as wool, linen, grain, and so forth. The goods which were included in the last category first had to be properly aired. If this was not done, the edict provided sanctions, including the death sentence and the confiscation of the ship and its cargo. On 12 November the States General promulgated a second edict. In this edict the French danger zone was extended. It was no longer limited to Provence and Languedoc, but was enlarged to include an area extending from Spain to Piedmont. The Levant was also considered to be a danger zone. If these regulations were not followed, this time the edict threatened with the destruction of the ship and the prosecution of the entire crew. After this, a number of edicts followed in which numerous restrictions, extensions, and modifications were made to the earlier regulations. The last edict made on account of this epidemic was enacted in October 1722. The observance of these edicts was strictly enforced. Military patrols, both on land and at sea, were used to prevent illegal landings.

The *Saint Louis* was the first ship which arrived from the suspect area. It had set sail from Marseille and reached Texel on 15 October 1720. It had a cargo of wool, a highly suspect material. Therefore, the States General ordered the ship and the cargo to be burnt and the crew to be brought to land naked and held in quarantine for thirty days. A conflict arose with the Staten van Holland, which wanted to save the cargo on account of commercial interests. A compromise was reached and it was agreed that the ship would be sent back to France. This plan, however, fell through when the ship was struck by a storm and sunk along with two other suspected ships which were also at anchor in the Balg. The thoroughness of the States General's actions can also be gathered from the events surrounding the *Moignon*, which also had departed from Marseille and arrived in Texel at the end of November in 1720. Against the wishes of the merchants in the Republic, the States General ordered the ship and its cargo burnt.

The same conflict of interests between the business world and the "national" government becomes visible with the quarantine policy of the States General, a clash we also encountered in the enactment of municipal policy. When the merchants wanted to prevent the burning of the *Saint Louis*, the States General nonetheless thought to go ahead, arguing that it was better to do too much, than not enough. However, examples can also be given in which the government's policy comes to the fore as inconsistent or half-fledged. Could it be otherwise? The dilemma was painfully felt at all administrative levels.

Opposition to the "Precautions" came not only out of business circles. Local governments and their citizens could also resist parts of it. This resistance was directed towards the construction of quarantine stations for airing suspected goods and the accommodating of crewmen thought to be infected. When the Admiralty of Amsterdam designated the Island of Wieringen for this purpose, the Island's administration refused to grant

permission for construction. There was also opposition elsewhere. Texel, for example, also refused to permit the construction of quarantine sites. Ultimately the construction of these stations began on Goeree and Terschelling. The result of this opposition, however, was that it took too long for the stations to be built.

Using the examples given above as a point of departure, I want to attempt to sketch the dilemma which the government was confronted with in taking a standpoint, a quandary similar to the one it faced in periods of dearth. The role which they played on the economic stage in the case of the plague has something of a dubious double role. To prevent and keep the plague in check, a wide variety of measures were taken restricting trade and transportation and impeded the conduct of businesses and occupations. With the omission of such measures it is certainly not inconceivable that the plague would have taken on greater proportions than was already the case. Considered on their own, however, the measures had a negative effect. The economy, already under pressure through the high mortality and emigration rates, was further paralyzed with the consequence that earnings and employment opportunities deteriorated even further for large segments of the population.

Thus the government's policy showed two faces. On the one hand, the authorities set themselves the goal of combatting the plague in every manner possible — thus also through economic do's and don'ts. On the other hand, there was the goal of pursuing a "welfare policy", which it is true was not always effective, balanced, or just according to our standards, but which also did not tolerate the commercial impediments and business restrictions as they were dictated by God's gift. What was to weigh the heaviest in this clash of goals? The tension between the two will have been especially noticeable in years in which the pest was accompanied by dearth, unemployment, and other catastrophes with negative economic consequences.²¹ Given this unsolvable contradiction, which course of action was to be taken? Give those measures priority which would have the most or best effect in the long run. Aside from the fact that a viewpoint in which a distinction is made between a long and a short run is presumably too anachronistic, such a line of reasoning does not offer much of a solution. Both policies namely allow for arguments in which the realization of this effect is assumed.

In the first line of thought it is assumed that if measures were not taken, the plague would become even more severe and that the resulting higher rates of mortality would entail an even greater burden for the economy. A society that leaves the plague unfettered, offers economic havoc every opportunity.

In the second line of reasoning it is assumed that the greatest economic problems would arise through restricting commerce and transport and through limiting enterprise. The most vivid example is afforded by international trade, held by many to be the pivot of the Dutch economy. Import and export prohibitions would rigorously cut this trade off. The staple market would languish, with all of the ensuing. Who could guarantee

that this market function would not disappear and that competing port cities would not continue to attract the transit? The plague is of course an inconvenience, but a passing inconvenience. A society which restricts trade will pick truly bitter fruits.

The dilemma is obvious. We see it expressed in the measures which were taken. The policy wavered more than once. It was of necessity often half-fledged and inconsistent. The legislation was passed *ad hoc*. Running with the hare and hunting with the hounds: that is the impression which arises.

3. Conclusion

With the aforesaid, of course, the final word on the relation between measures, motives, and viewpoints has not been said. On the contrary, the above is an attempt to get an impression of the considerations and thought patterns which lay at the basis of the economic and political actions of certain interest groups and the related discussions.²² In light of what has been attained elsewhere in this area of the historical sciences, I certainly do not have the illusion that my searching and groping merits the designation of history of mentalities (*histoire des mentalités*).²³ I have, however, become convinced that this perspective can add to our knowledge of preindustrial relationships through research in sources which the dominant serial historiography has largely ignored and through asking other questions than is customary in economic history.

Formulated in this way, this plea for such an approach to the economy implies that this research must be carried out in close connection with the macroeconomic studies directed towards the secular processes, that have yielded so many results in the past decades.²⁴ Likewise, a *verstehende* approach at the level of the firm can not do without the quantitative and non-quantitatively oriented business history. The rationale of actions and decisions taken in an entrepreneur's firm only receives sufficient relief against the background of "factual" developments and changes.²⁵

Third, there is finally yet another — here undiscussed — method which can aid the results achieved in this type of historiography. In this area the historian of the late Middle Ages and the early modern period will also be able to profit from the theoretical ideas concerning action and thought developed in other social sciences.²⁶ From these sciences we get the theories and instruments passed along that in combination with hermeneutic empathy (which has always remained methodologically vague, but nonetheless opens such vistas) bring history closer by.

The aforesaid cannot be denied optimism, still I cannot close my eyes to the time-honored theoretical problems which this integration of various approaches will encounter in practice, problems which for that matter stand more than ever in the center of attention in the methodology and philosophy

of history in the Netherlands.²⁷ My program, in essence, embraces a reconciliation of the oppositions which are embodied in the catchall concepts of positivism and hermeneutics.²⁸ The unclear and complicated discussions around these poles must entail modesty. In light of the many forms which this *Methodenstreit* has assumed in the course of time, this contribution is then perhaps only a new shoot on the tree of epistemological naivete, under which many a simple professional historian has succumbed in the past.²⁹

Translation: Richard Yntema

NOTES

1. Compare M.C. 't Hart, *In Quest For Funds; Warfare and State Formation in the Netherlands, 1620-1650* (Leiden, 1989). P. W. Klein, "Het mercantilisme", in: H. Baudet & H. van der Meulen, eds, *Kernproblemen der economische geschiedenis* (Groningen 1978) 117-127.
2. In the economic historiography of the period after 1850, and especially in business history, there is a growing interest for the entrepreneur and entrepreneurial behavior. In the Netherlands there is not, or only scarcely, a tradition in this field (compare *NEHA-Bulletin* 3 (1989) 49). Also see footnote 15 below. In the Netherlands business history is still "a young discipline", as a leading business historian recently put it (J.F.E. Blasing, "Bedrijfs geschiedenis in het spanningsveld tussen opdracht en wetenschappelijk onderzoek", *Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek* 52 (1989) 2,8).
3. See D. van Lente, "Mentaal-culturele geschiedenis van industriële samenlevingen: een historiografische verkenning", and W. Frijhoff, "Impasses en beloften van de mentaliteits geschiedenis", *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis* 8(1982) 359-388; 10 (1984) 406-437.
4. J.A. Faber, "Times of dearth and famines in pre-industrial Netherlands", *The Low Countries History Yearbook. Acta Historiae Neerlandica XIII* (1980) 51-64. L. Noordegraaf, *Hollands welvaren? Levensstandaard in Holland 1450-1650* (Bergen 1985) (with an English summary). H. Nusteling, *Welvaart en werkgelegenheid in Amsterdam 1540-1860* (Amsterdam/Dieren 1985).
5. This applies at least to wages in the craft industries. At the present the awareness is growing that the use of wages from this sector gives a one-sided picture. For other sectors, such as the non-craft industries, greater fluctuations in (day) wages must be taken into account because of economic cycles (see L. Noordegraaf, *Daglonen in Alkmaar 1500-1850*, (z. p. 1980) 117/118; P. Nagtegaal, "Stadsfinanciën en stedelijke economie. Invloed van de conjunctuur op de Leidse stadsfinanciën 1620-1720", *Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek* 52 (1989) 101, 136). On the basis of the current discussion concerning per capita income it can be concluded that the value of wages as an indicator at all is limited (see J.L. van Zanden, "De economie van Holland in de periode 1650-1805: groei of achteruitgang? Een overzicht van bronnen, problemen en resultaten", *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 102 (1987) 562-609).
6. L. Noordegraaf, "Sociale verhoudingen en structuren in de Noordelijke

- Nederlanden 1770-1813", *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 10 (Haarlem, 1981) 368-383. Also in reference to note 5, this means that the final word has not been said about the secular trend sketched here.
7. In comparison with what occurred elsewhere in Europe, the period 1580-1770 was characterized by a favorable development, see Faber, *Times of dearth*. In a broad perspective: K. Davids, J. Lucassen, J.L. van Zanden, *De Nederlandse geschiedenis als afwijking van het algemeen menselijk patroon* (Amsterdam 1988).
 8. The following is primarily based on L. Noordegraaf, "Levensstandaard en levensmiddelenpolitiek in Alkmaar vanaf het eind van de 16de tot in het begin van de 19de eeuw", *Alkmaarse Historische Reeks* (1980) IV, 55-100. This article includes references to the literature which had then been published on this subject. Also see L. Noordegraaf, "Dearth, famine and social policy in the Dutch Republic at the end of the sixteenth century" in: P. Clark, ed., *The European crisis of the 1590's. Essays in comparative history* (London 1985) 67-83. In the context of a major study on uprisings in Holland, important observations have been made by R. Dekker, *Holland in beroering. Oproeren in de 17de en 18de eeuw* (Baarn 1982) 122-129. In addition to the references included in note 4, see: J.G. van Dillen, *Duurtemaatregelen te Amsterdam in de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam 1915); *Idem*, "Dreigende hongersnood in de laatste jaren der zeventiende eeuw," in: *Mensen en Achtergronden* (Groningen 1964) 193-226; A. Friis, "An inquiry into the relations between economic and financial factors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, The two crises in the Netherlands in 1557," *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 1 (1953) 193-241; W. Koppers & R. van Schaik, "Levensstandaard en stedelijke economie te Zutphen in de 15de en 16de eeuw," *Gelre. Bijdragen en Mededelingen* 72 (1981) 1-45; P.H.M.G. Offermans, *Arbeid en levensstandaard in Nijmegen onstreeks de Reductie (1550-1600)* (Zutphen, 1972); R. van Schaik, "Prijzen en levensmiddelenpolitiek in de Noordelijke Nederlanden van de 14e tot de 17e eeuw: bronnen en problemen," *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 91 (1978) 214-255.
 9. Contrasting viewpoints in which the poor are criticized for being work-shy and taking advantage of social welfare are for that matter easy enough to find. Both views recur especially in the extensive oeuvre of H.F.J.M. van de Eerenbeemt (see for example his "Armoede in de "gedrukte optiek" van de sociale bovenlaag in Nederland 1750-1850", *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 88(1975) 468-500; *Idem*, *Armoede en arbeidsdwang. Werkinrichtingen voor "onnutte" Nederlanders in de Republiek 1760-1795* ('s-Gravenhage 1977).
 10. In the broader context of the government's policy concerning poverty and poor relief, the change in the way of thinking about charity must be pointed out and, in this context, the regulation of the labor market and forced labor (for a wide ranging treatment see C. Lis & H. Soly, *Poverty and Capitalism in pre-industrial Europe* (Hassocks 1979); H. Soly, "Economische ontwikkeling en sociale politiek in Europa tijdens de overgang van middeleeuwen naar nieuwe tijden", *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 88(1975) 584-597; M.H.D. van Leeuwen & F. Smits, "Bedeling en arbeidsmarkt in Amsterdam in de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw", *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis* 13 (1987) 431-457.
 11. Free trade in the sense of a policy which hindered access to the staple market as little as possible, and not in the modern sense which is colored by the nineteenth century. A principal opposition in their way of thinking between free trade and "protectionism" as such, in what are thought to be exceptional circumstances, is

out of the question. It is difficult not to anachronistically typify and understand the views then held (compare Johan de Vries, *De economische achteruitgang van de Republiek in de achttiende eeuw* (Leiden 1968) 45-57; Klein, *Het mercantilisme*).

12. Van Dillen, *Dreigende hongersnood*, passim.
13. J.C. Breen & A.J.M. Brouwer Ancher, eds, "De doleantie van een deel der burgerij van Amsterdam tegen den Magistraat dier stad in 1564 en 1565", *Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* 24 (1903) 68.
14. A number of examples are included in Noordegraaf, *Hollands welvaren?*, 48-51.
15. More about the relationship between centralism and local or regional autonomy and the changes in this follows in the section on the plague. For further studies on the process of state formation in the Republic see 't Hart, *In Quest of Funds* and R.M. Dekker, "Politiek geweld" en het proces van staatsvorming in de geschiedenis van de Nederlanden", *Sociologisch Tijdschrift* 10 (1983) 335-352.
16. W.S. Unger, *De levensmiddelenvoorziening der Hollandsche steden in de middeleeuwen* (Amsterdam 1916); Idem, "De Hollandsche graanhandel en graanhandelspolitiek in de middeleeuwen", *De Economist* (1916) 243-269, 337-386, 461-507.
17. J.H. Kernkamp, *De handel op den vijand 1572-1609* (Utrecht 1931-1934) 2 volumes. Also see note 11.
18. Compare M. Prak, "Sociale geschiedschrijving van Nederlands ancien régime", *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis* 14 (1988) 137-142; H. Soly, "Proletarisering in West-Europa, 1450-1850", in: F. van Besouw, et. al., eds, *Balans en perspectief. Visies op de geschiedwetenschap in Nederland* (Groningen 1987) 101-118.
19. It is of course not my intention to reintroduce the equally one-sided traditional history, which the "serialists" have turned against so successfully since the end of the 50s. For a sharp, simplified, but oh so obviously effective attack on the traditional philological and literary approach see Z.R. Dittich & A.M. van der Woude, "De geschiedenis op de tweesprong", *Mens en maatschappij* (1959) XXXIV, 361-380.
20. Danielle Bourgois, "Les Provinces Unies, les mesures contre la peste et le commerce dans la région baltique, 1709-1715", W.G. Heeres, L.M.J.B. Hesp, L. Noordegraaf, eds, *From Dunkirk to Danzig. Shipping and Trade in the North Sea and Baltic, 1350-1850* (Hilversum 1988) 191-202. L. Noordegraaf & G. Valk, *De gave Gods; De pest in Holland vanaf de late middeleeuwen* (Bergen 1988). Specifically about the relation between municipal and regional policy concerning the plague: S. de Jongh, "De ontwrichtende pest?", *Skript* 11 (1989) 109-111, and L. Noordegraaf & G. Valk, "Rotterdam in de zeventiende eeuw: de navel van de wereld?", *Skript* 11 (1989), 174-177.
21. For the relation between dearth and the plague, phenomena which often occur together or immediately following each other, see Noordegraaf & Valk, *De gave Gods*, 78-82.
22. Research on the question of in how far measures against dearth and the plague were effective (and which is not considered here) will also illuminate what is needed about ideas and mentalities.
23. Compare P. Spierenburg, *De verbroken betovering. Mentaliteitsgeschiedenis van preïndustrieel Europa* (Hilversum 1988).
24. A.M. van der Woude, "Dertig jaar Afdeling Agrarische Geschiedenis", *A. A. G. Bijdragen* 28 (1986) 1-42 (with an English summary). I developed my ideas while writing a local study on the consequences of the Great Depression in relation to

modernization processes in the agricultural sector. The fact that my inspiration was derived from a monograph in the "serialist school" already indicates that I am concerned with an integration of divergent approaches. The intended monograph, a high point in Dutch historiography: H.K. Roessingh, *Inlandse Tabak. Expansie en contractie van een handelsgewas in de 17de en 18de eeuw in Nederland* (Wageningen 1976) (with an English summary). The intended local study: D. Damsma & L. Noordegraaf, "De "Grote Depressie", 1875-1895", *Holland* 18 (1980) 193-208. Compare Damsma & Noordegraaf, "Uitgevlact en uitgevloegen. Sociale gevolgen van de crisis in de vlasserij op de Zuidhollandse eilanden, 1875-1900", in: P. Boomgaard, L. Noordegraaf, H. de Vries, W.M. Zappey, *Exercities in ons verleden* (Assen 1981) 65-88 (especially 79).

Steps towards a more human history out of the serial approach can also be found in J.A. Faber, "De oligarchisering van Friesland in de tweede helft van de zeventiende eeuw", *A. A. G. Bijdragen* 15 (1970) 39-64. Also see P.C. Jansen, "Verraad in Holland", *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis* 3 (1977) 295-298.

25. A high point in this too infrequently practiced genre: P.W. Klein, *De Trippen in de 17de eeuw. Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt* (Assen 1965) (with an English summary). It is regrettable that this type of historiography, elaborating on a tradition of commercial historiography which originated in the nineteenth century, has scarcely been followed. One swallow does not make a summer: J.W. Veluwenkamp, *Ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt in de tijd van de Republiek. De Amsterdamse handelsfirma Jan Isaac de Neufville en Comp. 1730-1764* (Zwolle 1981). Also see note 2 above.
26. See for example, H. W. de Jong, "Ondernemerschap in Nederland 1840-1940," *Jaarboek voor de geschiedenis van bedrijf en techniek* 5 (1981) 53-71. For a concrete application of Schumpeter's insights, Klein, *De Trippen*.
27. C. Lorenz, *De constructie van het verleden. Een inleiding in de theorie van de geschiedenis* (Meppel/Amsterdam 1987) (with English summary). Confer P.H.H. Vries, "Unzeitgemäße Betrachtung. Een pleidooi voor een historische sociale wetenschap", *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 103 (1988) 399-407.
28. The only explicit attempt in Dutch historiography towards reconciliation at a non-theoretical level known to me, and in the area of urban history, is the stimulating article by B.M.J. Speet, "Het gebruik van stadsplattegronden bij stadsvergelijkend onderzoek. De toepasbaarheid van twee analytische verlaringsmodellen", P.J. Margry, P. Ratsma, B.J. M. Speet, eds, *Stadplattegronden. Werken met kaartmateriaal bij stadshistorisch onderzoek* (Hilversum 1987) 65-86.
29. For a philosophical and methodological critique of "serialism" see W.J. van der Dussen, "De nieuwe AGN: een speculatieve totaalvisie in een eigentijdse verpakking?", *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 97 (1982) 1-18.

V

CRIMINALITY AND ITS REPRESSION IN THE PAST QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES: A SURVEY

by

H. Diederiks

The birth of criminology and of social statistics in the nineteenth-century were two sides of the same medal.¹ Quetelet not only introduced quantification in the social sciences in general, but also in the study of criminality. In that way he created a "scientific" approach towards criminality. Various departments of the Dutch government also started to collect quantitative data on criminality: about the criminals, the judicial activities and the police.² On the occasion of the centennial of the Dutch penal code of 1886 which replaced the French code penal of 1811, the Central Bureau of Statistics published a selection of data for the period between 1886 and 1986.³

In the past twenty years, social historians have also turned to the history of criminality and criminal justice to enrich our knowledge about social life and societal structure in the past. The new approach to the history of crime and criminal justice was undertaken by social historians who were also familiar with quantification.⁴ In the meantime, J. Sharpe concluded in 1982 that "the statistical analysis of past criminal records has produced a number of studies, which have made important contributions both to our understanding of methodological issues and to our sum knowledge of crime and punishment".⁵ The quantitative, serial approach has taught us much about the development of crime patterns and the reactions of authorities and society at large that was hidden until now under layers of anecdotal evidence. Since this revival, a lot of ink has been spilt on topics such as the increase in criminality; the amount of urban violence; the violent character of some societies as measured by the amount of murder and manslaughter; the so-called modernization of crime, which involved a change from violent crime to property crime; and the "spectacle of suffering", which has also been described in quantitative terms.

In this contribution we will try to present some of the findings of recent quantitative research in the history of criminality and of criminal justice. We will focus primarily on the Dutch Republic; this implies both a geographical

and a chronological restriction. We have to be aware of the fact that we are dealing with a rather small country which had a population of one million around 1500 and of two million around 1800. It was also the most densely and urbanized part of the western world. These facts bear heavily on patterns of criminality and criminal justice.⁶ Another characteristic of Dutch society before the nineteenth century was the influence of immigration; the Netherlands was a country which attracted many immigrants.⁷

An important feature of the Dutch judicial system was the autonomy of the local courts. Although there was a growing tendency towards a more uniform use of rules and laws, local courts possessed the power of high jurisdiction until the end of the ancien régime. This meant they could pass the death sentence. In accordance with the saying *confessus non appellat*, those who confessed had no right of appeal. In order to be able to draw the right conclusions, these special features have to be considered when reflecting on the patterns of criminality, criminal justice and punishment.

While the nineteenth century saw the birth of official crime statistics, the historian of earlier periods has to reconstruct statistics through compiling data from different sources. He has to use sentence books, case files, registers of examinations during the procedure, and the registration of prisoners. Police forces were unknown or rather underdeveloped before the nineteenth century. While police archives are very incomplete for more recent periods, this kind of information is entirely lacking for the early modern period. Various opinions are held regarding the statistics of the nineteenth century. The most forceful denial of the usefulness of "official" criminal statistics for the historian of crime is that of J. J. Tobias. But his negative opinion has evoked some more positive reactions among other British historians.⁸

In the following we will deal with some of the main findings regarding crime and criminal justice in the Dutch Republic in which the use of statistics has played a role.

1. *Crime rates as reflection of the level of criminality*

There is a discussion concerning the amount of criminality during the early modern period. In comparison with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the official level of registered criminality is rather low. A number of reasons have been brought forward to explain the low incidence of official crime. In societies characterized by face to face relations, judicial authorities were not the only agents of social control. Other means of social control were also present. Churches, public notaries and neighborhood organizations also maintained peace and order.⁹

How far can quantitative research and its results provide an answer to this question? In the 139 years between 1316 and 1455, a total of 5,568 criminal acts were reported in the city of Utrecht: most of them with certainty, some

of them with a degree of probability. This indicates an average of 40 acts per year. Although exact population figures for Utrecht during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are not known, it is estimated that there were about 20,000 inhabitants in 1500. If we assume that Utrecht also numbered 20,000 inhabitants during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, this indicates a crime rate of 200. However, the way the researcher made his calculations may raise questions; for example, if a person killed two people, he counted it as two criminal acts.¹⁰

Table 1 *Crime-rates in some Dutch Towns 14th-19th centuries*

Town	period	crimes per 100.000 population
Utrecht	1316-1455	200
Amsterdam	1680	253
	1730	71
	1800	83
Leiden	1600-1650	70-84
	1651-1675	23
	1676-1700	55
	1701-1750	60-57
	1751-1800	30
Delft	1600-1650	250
	1651-1675	100
	1676-1700	55
	1701-1725	42
	1726-1775	20
Haarlem	1740-1795	42

Sources: for Utrecht see note 10; for Amsterdam see note 15; for Leiden see note 11; for Delft see note 13; and for Haarlem see note 12.

For Leiden, the most important industrial city of the Dutch Republic, we have figures for the number of condemnations from the late fifteenth century until the end of the eighteenth century.¹¹ During the seventeenth century, Leiden's population increased from about 45,000 in 1622 to about 70,000 around 1670. After that date the population declined until the beginning of the nineteenth century when Leiden numbered about 28,000 inhabitants. Around 1750 there were 35,000 inhabitants. A total 4,784 sentences for more or less serious crimes are included in the sentence registers for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The calculated crime rates were the highest in the first half of the seventeenth century where we find rates of 70 to 84 per 100,000 people. During the period of the greatest economic expansion, 1650-1675, the crime rates drop to about 23. During the period when the population and the textile industry declined, the rates also dropped: 55

during the period 1675-1700, 60 in the next quarter century, 57 during the years 1725-1750, and about 30 during the second half of the eighteenth-century.

There were 536 cases in the city of Haarlem between 1740 and 1795, or an annual average of nearly ten cases. Along with a decline in output, the population of this industrial center declined from about 26,800 in 1748 to 21,227 in 1795. The average population in this period amounted to 24,000.¹² This implies a crime rate of about 42 per 100,000 inhabitants.

We also have a long series of data on the criminal sentences passed in Delft, another industrial city in Holland.¹³ Delft numbered almost 17,500 inhabitants in 1600. This figure increased to 24,000 around 1680, after which a decline set in. There were only 14,000 inhabitants at the end of the eighteenth century.¹⁴ Crime rates were high in Delft at the beginning of the seventeenth century: about 250 for the first half of the century. After 1650 the rate fell to 100 in the period 1650-1675 and to 55 in the period 1675-1700. The over-all crime rate was very low throughout the eighteenth century: 42 in the first and last quarter of the century and about 20 in the fifty years between 1725 and 1775.

For Amsterdam, the most populous city of the Dutch Republic, we have various figures which provide a measure of criminality in the period 1680-1811.¹⁵ Faber, who mapped criminality and criminal justice in Amsterdam using the computer, analyzed the examination books (giving evidence on 3,305 persons), the accounts of the prison ward (providing information on 7,514 delinquents), a contemporary source which includes 1,542 criminal sentences involving 1,870 criminals in the period 1795-1807 and which gives biographical information on the delinquents, and the register of the bailiff. The variety of sources alone exemplifies the problems regarding the construction of a reliable time series for this pre-statistical period. Does Faber draw any conclusions concerning the general crime rate for Amsterdam during the period 1680-1811? On the basis of his figures of the number of persons who were arrested in the sample years 1680, 1690, etc., and an estimated average population of 220,000 during this period, we can calculate some general crime rates. For 1680 this leads to a general crime rate of 253. The rate started to decline in the beginning of the eighteenth century and a low point of 71 was reached in 1730. The rate remained low until 1780, whereafter the rate gradually rose to about 83 in 1800.

What can we conclude from the relatively high crime rates between the fourteenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the decline in the crime rates after about 1700? Does the decrease indicate changes in the pattern of crime, or only in the way the judicial apparatus was run? Compared to the statistics for the nineteenth century, the figures for the ancien régime are low. Consequently, we may wonder whether criminality was indeed low, or if the judicial apparatus was inefficient.

2. *Crime rates and judicial activities*

This brings us to the problem of the nature of the judicial apparatus and its impact on society. What can we do with "historian-made" crime statistics? Minimally they reflect the activities of the public in bringing forward an accusation, of the police, of the public prosecutor, and of the courts. In the discussion concerning the degree to which the crime statistics reflect real crime, the crime known to the police is accepted as the figure nearest to "real criminal life".¹⁶ But for the period before the mid-nineteenth century there is no archival material from the police. Consequently, we have to rely almost entirely on records such as sentences. In this section, I will first deal with the question of how a delinquent came in touch with the judicial authorities. Is there a link between the level of the crime rate and the activities of prosecuting agencies?

The apprehension of a "criminal" was not absolutely necessary for the person to play a role in the crime statistics. An accused person could also be sentenced in his absence. In the research project covering a variety of jurisdictions in the Dutch Republic during the eighteenth century, 16 percent of the cases in the entire sample involve a sentence given in the absence of the delinquent.¹⁷ In eighteenth century Amsterdam, these kind of sentences involved persons who had been in a fight which ended with the death of one of them and the flight of the other. A second category are the sodomites or homosexuals who fled from Amsterdam in the 1730's after the rumor was spread that they would be prosecuted.¹⁸ At the "national" level we also find a peak in the sentences passed on those in absentia by the Court of Holland (in The Hague) during the 1730's. This was also caused by the flight of homosexuals from the Court's jurisdiction.

In regard to the "witch-hunt" of homosexuals during the eighteenth century and the creation of "crime" by the judicial apparatus, the role of torture can be briefly discussed. Torture was part of the procedure and could only be used in cases with enough circumstantial evidence to prove the delinquent's guilt; only the full proof, the confession, was missing. In those cases, torture was allowed to obtain a confession.¹⁹ In cases of witchcraft and sodomy, torture not only led to a confession, but also resulted in the indictment of other witches or sodomites. In this way, one prosecution led to the accusation of others and to additional trials. In this sense the judicial system created its own clientele, thereby increasing crime rates. Is there data on the use of torture?

Data concerning the use of torture in the judicial procedure has been collected for Amsterdam during the second half of the seventeenth and eighteenth century and for the sample jurisdictions in the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century. For the years 1651-1683, torture was only used twice in a sample of 500 cases out of approximately 14,400 cases. The percentages

are higher for two following thirty-three year periods (1684- 1716 and 1717-1749), but they never exceeded 10 percent.²⁰ Faber found that torture also played a role in a low share of cases in Amsterdam throughout the eighteenth-century.²¹ Torture was only involved in 4 percent of the cases in the seven sample jurisdictions. Faber observed a decrease of the use of torture in the second half of the century, with the exception of the year 1787 when many patriotic plunderers were tortured. We may conclude that, except with the sodomy cases in the 1730's, the use of torture did not add criminals to the crime statistics and that generally the use of torture was very limited until it was officially abolished in 1798.

In relation to the creation of crime by the apparatus itself, another aspect of the judicial apparatus which will be discussed briefly is the number of policemen and other officials involved in prosecuting crime. We only have limited information about the police force in Amsterdam during the period in question.²²

We are informed about the activities of the police in the sample jurisdictions during the eighteenth century in only a few cases. In the small number of cases, 55.5 percent the delinquents were caught by a paid official, while 11.2 percent were apprehended by the victim. In 44 percent of these cases, apprehension took place in the act. In those cases the victims and the general public cooperated with the officials. The number of the officials was very small. In most towns only one bailiff was active with a few men. In a big city such as Amsterdam, there were five deputy bailiffs around 1600. In 1674 this number was increased to six. Every deputy bailiff had a number of men, in total twelve for the entire city. More important in numbers were the night watches. They numbered 480 in 1685 when Amsterdam's population stood at about 200,000. In general we may say that the police, given its numbers and subsequently its activities, could not have added much to the crime statistics through an active policy of apprehension.

3. *Crimes against the public order and political crimes*

The categories of crime against the public order and of political crime show some overlap, although the former is a broader category than the latter; nevertheless, the two are here considered together.

The analysis of the crowd in history and its role in riots owes much to the approaches and ideas formulated by G. Rudé concerning the "crowd in history".²³ His ideas have been tested for Amsterdam for the late seventeenth and eighteenth century. This analysis also involved statistics. During a riot in 1696 caused by the introduction of a new tax on burials, and for that reason known as the *Aansprekersoproer* (undertakers' riot), 48 persons were arrested. Twelve of them were sentenced to death. More than a third of the delinquents were sailors and about 17 percent textile workers. Most of the sailors came

from outside Amsterdam and only a third of the delinquents were natives of the city. This riot was definitely a riot of the lower class.²⁴ The participation of women was rather low; they accounted for only 10 of the 48 persons brought to court.

Around the middle of the eighteenth century, political developments occurred in the Netherlands which have left traces in the judicial archives. In 1748, unrest spread through most towns and the protests were directed towards the system of tax collection. The collection of the very high taxes on the primary necessities of life were farmed. This was one of the main reasons of the riots in 1748.²⁵ The authorities in Amsterdam reacted furiously and two rioters were hanged.

Only three persons were tried for a political crime around mid-century in Haarlem, an industrial city with some 26,000 inhabitants. In 1748 a tax riot with political undertones also occurred in Haarlem. The municipal authorities shared the rioters' opinions and they were not prosecuted. But when the excises were reinstated in 1750, a riot occurred even though the practice of farming the taxes was abolished. The restored stadtholder sent his troops into Haarlem. Two rioters were killed after they had fired at the troops. Although they were dead, a trial followed and the bodies were condemned to be publicly hung. The third person was an innkeeper and one of the leading protestors against the reintroduced taxation. He was condemned to ten years in the workhouse and eternal banishment from Haarlem. It was the heaviest penalty given for a political crime in Haarlem during the eighteenth century.²⁶

Between 1780 and 1800, 384 persons were arrested in Amsterdam for a political crime. Two categories of delinquents can be distinguished: the Orangists and the Patriots. All belonged to the lower classes and had no property and a low income. With the exception of the ship builders — who lived together on the north-eastern outskirts of Amsterdam and as became clear during the riots of 1748 and 1787, were predominantly Orangists — there was no special Orangist or Patriotic quarter in Amsterdam and the rioters in both camps did not belong to a specific occupational group. In 1787, 29 Patriots were sentenced. One of them received the death penalty. There were also 29 Orangist delinquents. None of them were sentenced to death. About 50 percent of the Orangist delinquents were born in Amsterdam, while 46 percent of the Patriots were born in the city.²⁷

The role of women in political crimes or disturbances of the public order was very limited; two of the Orangist and four of the Patriotic rioters were women. An analysis of riots by Orangists in 1787 in the Province of Zeeland, located in the south-eastern part of the Dutch Republic, shows that female participation also was rather low; of the 238 known rioters in the small city of Zierikzee, only 20 were female.²⁸ Insofar as the occupational composition of the rioting crowd is concerned, one can say that its composition reflected the occupational population as a whole. The lines of distinction were drawn

on the basis of political preferences, not on an economic or social basis.²⁹

We have a long series for the crime of disturbing the public order in the city of Delft. From 1591 until 1811, 975 sentences were passed for the crime of disturbing the public order. This category of crime made up more than 22 percent of all crimes. This share was rather great during the period 1591–1675: 27 percent during the last decade of the sixteenth century, 22 percent in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, and almost 44 percent during the second quarter of the seventeenth century. The number of crimes then started to decline, from ten percent during the years 1651–75 to less than four percent in the rest of the century and throughout the eighteenth century. As we have seen, the growth of Delft's population stopped after 1680 and a rather sharp decline started. We may wonder whether the quantitative changes in the total population of Delft also implied qualitative changes. The disturbance of the public order might have been a function of the total population and population density. Consequently, the decline in population could have brought about a decrease in the disturbances of the public order.

4. *Violence*

How violent was daily life during the ancien régime and were there changes over time? Was violent crime more common in the countryside than in the urban environment? In relation to long-term developments, the general figures for homicide in other countries — for example, England — point out at a fairly steady decline from the Middle Ages onwards.³⁰

As we have seen before, we have a long series of sentences for the city of Delft between 1591 and 1811 with a total of 4,419 sentences, or an annual average of about 20 sentences. The condemnations for violence made up 11.1 percent (490) of the total. An average of 2.2 cases of violence were brought before the court each year. When we examine the share of violent crimes in the total amount of crime throughout the era in periods of 25 years, we find that violent crimes made up about 14 percent of all crimes during the years 1591–1625, while during the years when Delft had its greatest number of inhabitants, the share dropped to 5.5 percent in 1626–1650 and 9.5 percent in 1651–1675. During the years when its population stagnated and declined (1676–1750), there was an increase in the share of violent crimes, from 17.5 percent in the period 1676–1700 to 22.5 percent in 1726–1750. The percentage dropped to 3.6 during the first decade of the nineteenth century. In absolute figures, the decline already started in the beginning of the eighteenth century. Thus, a stagnating economy and a decrease in population first brought about an increase in the relative importance of violent crime, even though the overall crime rates declined. We saw an interesting and almost parallel development with respect to cases involving an infraction of the public order brought before the court in Delft. The number of crimes

against the public order was almost twice the number of violent crimes: 975 cases out of a total of 4,419.

In general, many of the minor cases in which street violence was involved were dealt with directly by the bailiff and ended with an accommodation. This implied only the payment of a fine and not a criminal sentence. The public prosecutor in Amsterdam made up an annual account giving details about the nature of the payments made. These accounts are available for the years 1723 to 1732 and 1740 to 1810, with a total of 6,488 cases. Assault made up 11.5 percent of the total and disturbance of the public order 26.7 percent. When we analyze the developments from 1723 till 1811, we see that more than half of the cases occurred during the period 1723-1750. The share of minor violence in the total of the offenses which were fined by the public prosecutor dropped from the high figure of 50 percent at mid-century to only 4 percent during the first decade of the nineteenth century. We may conclude that minor violence declined in Amsterdam after 1750. On the other hand, in this period the number of fines paid directly to the bailiff followed another path. This type of minor criminality accounted for 54 percent of the fines during the period 1761-1790.³¹

Faber has introduced another instrument to measure judicial activities and the related criminality in Amsterdam. The data are derived from the bailiff's register (*schoutsrol*) which lists the persons summoned before the bailiff. Some of the cases were dealt with directly by the bailiff and resulted in a fine. Those cases are included in the financial accounts of the bailiff mentioned above. A total 891 minor crimes of aggression are found on the *schoutsrol* in the 14 sample years between 1680 and 1810, or an annual average of 64. Almost 28 percent of the minor crimes of aggression occurred in the period 1680-1720; 30 percent in the period 1720-1750; and the sample years 1760, 1770, 1780, and 1790 provided more than 36 percent. The two sample years of the nineteenth century only accounted for six percent of the 891 cases of minor aggression.³² We may conclude that there was a concentration of violent crimes during the period 1760-1790. This indicates that there might have been a change in the character of violence, from violent behavior dealt with by a simple fine to violence brought before the courts. On the other hand, disturbances of the public order were dealt with in a more lenient way in the same period. We find an increase of those cases in the bailiff's financial accounts in the period 1761-1790 and this indicates that most of those cases were accommodated.

Violent crimes brought before the court in Leiden and leading to a sentence were more numerous during the seventeenth century than during the eighteenth century. Violence accounted for 16 percent of all sentences in the period 1601-1624. Although this percentage dropped slowly during the seventeenth-century, it always remained above ten percent. The eighteenth century showed a different pattern. At the beginning of the century the percentage was seven, but by mid-century there was only a small amount of

violent crime — five percent. In the last quarter of the century there was a small rise to six percent.³³

Up to now we have used aggregate data for crimes against the person — violence — but we can also look in more detail at the persons accused of manslaughter or murder. In her study on the role of the sanctuary in the Dutch Republic, M. Gijswijt-Hofstra has pointed out that the number of persons seeking refuge in one of the sanctuary towns of the Dutch Republic after being accused of murder, decreased dramatically after 1750.³⁴ She wondered whether a general decline of this category of violence had occurred throughout the Dutch Republic. Some of the jurisdictions provide evidence for this suggestion, including apparently the city of Leiden. For other jurisdictions, however, a decline in the number of cases of manslaughter or murder is not clear.

Can we conclude something regarding the amount of violence in Dutch society? The figures for the jurisdictions at our disposal at this moment show a decline in violent crime during the eighteenth century, including manslaughter, murder and assault. The picture for Amsterdam is a bit confused. On the one hand, the bailiff's account books show that there was a decline of minor violent crime. On the other hand, in another register we found more violent acts which must have been of a more serious nature.

Another point must be raised: Was Dutch society during the Republic more or less violent in comparison to other countries? For some time there has been an ongoing debate about the extent and relative importance of collective violence in the long sweep of Dutch history. There is general agreement about the low level of violence in Dutch political history, but there is less certainty about the explanation for this. The absence of a centralized state power may be one explanation for the low incidence of violent political protest. During the revolutionary period of 1787 there was a threat of violence, but on the whole it was a rather calm revolution.³⁵ How far this year is representative for the commitment of the Dutch towards nonviolence in general is an open question.

R. Dekker has recently pointed out a different approach. In an article dealing with collective action and collective violence, he argues that one should be aware of the international context in order to understand collective violence. Much of the collective violence was related to international developments such as war. During periods of war, for example, the increase of taxation did not cause popular rising. On the other hand, in peacetime a much smaller rise of taxation led to violent protests.³⁶

5. *Property crimes*

In the discussion on property crime, the concept of "survival strategies" has been introduced. We will deal with this topic in the section on the criminality

of women. One of the conclusions drawn by John Beattie on the basis of his research in England (Surrey and Sussex) for the period 1660- 1800, is that both in the city and in the countryside annual fluctuations in property crime appear to be related to necessity.³⁷ When we look at the figures from the sample jurisdictions in the Netherlands for the eighteenth century and we first analyze the relation of property crimes to *all* crimes, we see a strong correlation. This is because the share of property crime is rather high. Secondly, taking the prices of rye as an indicator of the general price level, we see that an increase of these prices is sooner or later followed by an increase in property crimes. For the Dutch Republic during the eighteenth century, Beattie's observation for Surrey and Sussex is confirmed.

Taking the figures for Delft in the period 1591-1810, we find that the overall percentage of property crime was 35.9. During most of the seventeenth century, however, this figures remains rather low: 22.3 to 38 percent. During the last quarter of the century it rises to 47 percent, and then drops to 34 percent at the middle of the eighteenth-century. The share of property crimes then rises from 50 to 61.7 to reach almost 70 percent during the first decade of the nineteenth century.³⁸ This line is almost parallel to the development of the cost of living, which begins to increase at the mid-century and reaches its apex at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The development of the share of property crime in Leiden during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is different from that found in Delft and in the sample jurisdictions. In Leiden the figures are higher throughout the entire seventeenth century than in the eighteenth century. The overall percentage for the two centuries is 34, but during the second half of the seventeenth century — the heyday of textile industry and consequently of economic activity — there was an increase to about 42 percent. Most of the eighteenth century shows figures for property crimes below 30 percent.³⁹ These figures do not match those for Delft and the other sample jurisdictions. A more detailed analysis of the figures for Leiden might reveal the explanation. Nevertheless, for the moment the correlation of property crimes and of developments in the standard of living as measured by the price of rye can be maintained.

6. *Sexual crimes*

Here we will only briefly discuss the figures for sexual crimes in the cities of Amsterdam, Delft and Leiden. For the sample years in the period 1680-1810, Faber found that sexual crimes in Amsterdam accounted for around 21 percent of all the crime recorded in the registers of examinations and in the account books of the wards. The share of prostitution was very high in a port city like Amsterdam. But we also have to consider the policy of the public prosecution of adultery. While we find adultery as a crime in the sentence

registers before the middle of the eighteenth century, this crime disappears totally from the scene after 1750. Nevertheless, adultery could be a source of income for the public prosecutor through, for example, allowing the well-to-do visitors of brothels to accommodate their "crime" and to avoid scandal. They were always willing to do so.⁴⁰ Of course, those dealings were not recorded, although we sometimes find a bailiff as a delinquent before the Court of Holland because of the abuse of his function. This abuse sometimes involved "organized adultery".⁴¹ Adultery and prostitution were almost totally decriminalized during the second half of the eighteenth century. One of the explanations for this is that because the authorities had to establish priorities; they took more interest in property crime and they spent less time and money in prosecuting adulterers and prostitutes.

The average share of sexual crime – including prostitution, sodomy and adultery – was 13.2 percent in Delft and 15.9 percent in Leiden. The heyday of sexual crime in Delft occurred between 1676 and 1775. Sexual crimes accounted for roughly 27 percent of the crimes between 1726 and 1775, while they accounted for around ten percent during the period before 1676 and after 1776.

The city of Leiden confronts us with another picture. A high percentage of sexual crimes is characteristic of the sentence books throughout the eighteenth century. The figures for sexual crime are especially high in the second quarter of the century: about 40 percent of all crimes. This high rate can be explained through the prosecution of homosexuals in the 1730's. Nonetheless, during the second half of the century the share remained high: around 30 percent. The decline of textile industry, the increase of poverty, the decrease in immigration and subsequently of the total population may have changed the pattern of crime in Leiden. While the large number of immigrants caused violent crime to predominate during the seventeenth century, the eighteenth century witnessed growing "subsistence criminality", characterized by prostitution and property crime.⁴²

7. *The role of women*

We can discuss the specific role of women in the field of crime on the basis of figures. During most periods and in most regions or countries, the role of women in the criminal statistics is rather low. This implies percentages between 10 and 25.⁴³ What level do we find in the pre- statistical period?

Of the 2,750 cases in a sample of seven jurisdictions in the Dutch Republic in the period 1701–1811, 18.5 percent of the cases involved female delinquents. The sample regions include small towns, rural districts and the jurisdiction of the Court of Holland. The latter controlled part of The Hague was the court of appeal for the province of Holland and sentenced special persons like civil servants.

There is a large difference between male and female delinquents when we look at the various crimes involved. Men took the lion's share in crime involving assault. Only 3.1 percent of the women brought before the courts were involved in assault. Most of the political crimes were committed by men; women only played a role in 2.7 percent of the political crimes. On the other hand, the share of women was over 37 percent in moral crimes. They were also the most involved in cases of prostitution. In relative terms, the infraction of banishment was a female affair. While women only made up 18.5 percent of those banished in a sentence, they made up almost 34 percent of those returning to the territory from which they had been banished. Women were apparently sooner driven back home because they were unable to find a means of subsistence elsewhere. They were generally not caught for returning home, but because they once again committed a crime. Their earlier banishment aggravated the severity of the case and the punishment.

A high overall percentage is found for women in Amsterdam during the period 1680-1811. In that city the share of women was 35.2 percent.⁴⁴ This figure is much higher than that for the sample regions mentioned before. Cities, in general, had a surplus of women and in a seafaring city like Amsterdam many husbands were away for long periods of time. Harbor cities like Amsterdam were also centers of prostitution and we also find large concentrations of female domestic personnel. In the beginning of the nineteenth-century more than 12,000 female servants were counted.⁴⁵ We may call them a group at risk: they were young, unmarried, poor and unstable. In this group we find most cases of infanticide. Nevertheless, the officially registered cases of infanticide is rather low. For the period 1680-1811, Faber found only 24 cases in Amsterdam and we may assume a very great "dark number".⁴⁶ Faber has continued his research and he found another 10 cases for the seventeenth century and 40 for the nineteenth century. Amsterdam was a city of about 60,000 inhabitants around 1600 and from 1650 onwards till the 1880's the city counted between 173,000 and 250,000 inhabitants. In his research on infanticide in the rural province of Friesland, with about 80,000 inhabitants around 1500 and 158,000 in 1795, he found the following number of cases of infanticide were dealt with by the central court of Friesland, located in the capital of Leeuwarden: 9 cases for the sixteenth century; 17 cases during the seventeenth; and 48 cases during the eighteenth-century.⁴⁷ From these figures we may conclude that the discovery of infanticide might have been easier in the countryside than in the anonymity of a great city like Amsterdam. The crime of infanticide as a special female crime maybe rather under-registered in the official data and for that reason the share of women in criminality as a whole maybe too low.

When we compare the Netherlands with other countries, the same picture arises. We have data for the city of Stockholm, for eighteenth-century England and for Languedoc. From an analysis of court records of the city of Stockholm for the years 1475-1625 containing more than 3,300 criminal

sentences, only ten cases of infanticide have been registered.⁴⁸ For eighteenth century England, Malcolmson collected 350 cases, but they do not permit any significant degree of quantification.⁴⁹ Only one percent of the *grand criminels* in Languedoc in France during the period 1750-1790 involved infanticide, but this is certainly an under-registration. But how much?⁵⁰

Infanticide, illegitimacy, abortion and abandonment of children are related phenomenon. The rise of illegitimacy at the end of the eighteenth-century certainly caused an increase in the number of foundlings. The case of Amsterdam proves that. Contemporaries were also aware of a relation between infanticide and the number of foundlings. The city regents of Amsterdam, for example, ordered a lenient policy concerning the "crime of abandonment".⁵¹ It is almost impossible to make any reliable guess in regard to abortion and the related infanticide. Abortion practiced by doctors seems to have been reintroduced around 1800 in the Netherlands. Before the turn of the century abortion by physicians was officially taboo.⁵² How far midwives gave a hand to pregnant women in this respect is an open question.

The share of women in the criminal records of Amsterdam is in general paralleled by the figures for the industrial town of Delft. For the long period from 1591 to 1811, 36.3 percent of those sentenced in Delft were women. When we divide the periods into segments of 25 years, we see differences ranging from 28 percent during the first quarter of the seventeenth century to 47 percent during the years 1751-1775. In absolute figures the participation of women in criminal activities was much higher during the seventeenth than during the eighteenth century, but crime rates declined in general during the latter period. In comparison to Amsterdam and Delft, the number of women condemned in the industrial city of Haarlem between 1740 and 1795 was rather low. In this city, specializing in the linen bleaching industry, the condemned women only made up a quarter of the total.⁵³

The share of women in criminality during the *ancien régime* was certainly greater than at the end of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth century. From 1896 until 1940, the percentage of condemned women of all delinquents sentenced ranges from 8.4 to 11.2. Only the period during the First World War shows a relatively high figure of 15.4 percent.⁵⁴ An explanation for this can be sought in greater activities of women in "subsistence crime", including all sort(s) of illegal activities undertaken to stay alive. If this is true, we may assume a high level of "subsistence crime" among women during the *ancien régime*. Petty theft and prostitution may be considered as "survival strategies".

8. Punishment

As a last point in this preliminary survey of the use of quantification in the social history of crime and criminal justice, we will briefly discuss some

aspects of punishment in the Dutch Republic. The general "landscape" of punishment during the ancien régime is dominated by two characteristics: punishment was corporal and it was public.⁵⁵ On the other hand, the nineteenth century saw the abolition of public scaffold punishment and the arrival of punishment exclusively through imprisonment. Is this general picture in accordance with the quantitative evidence collected in recent historical research? For the sample jurisdictions during the eighteenth century we found 17.8 percent of the sentences required publicly executed corporal punishment, ranging from simple whipping, to whipping with marking, to mutilation; 6.9 percent concerned a publicly executed death penalty on the scaffold; 6.1 percent of the cases ended on the pillory. Together, publicly executed corporal punishments account for 30.8 percent of all punishments.

How did punishments change over time? Spierenburg states that confidence in public punishment began to crumble after the mid-eighteenth century. He sees a fundamental change taking place in the Netherlands at least as early as the 1770's, although total abolition had to wait another century. Faber also concludes that all types of corporal punishment occurred less frequently in the period between 1750 and 1790, while mutilation totally disappeared in Amsterdam in the same period.⁵⁶ Of the 155 death penalties in the sample jurisdictions, 82 occurred before 1730. Of the 73 other sentences, 42 concerned the gang of bandits (*Bokkerijders*) executed in the southern part of the Dutch Republic in the 1770's. Clearly, there was a steep drop in the use of the death penalty.

The figures of the cases in the sample jurisdictions involving corporal punishment also show a decrease during the period 1750-1780 and this parallels the situation in Amsterdam. However, during the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first decade of the nineteenth century, corporal punishment was sentenced in almost a quarter of the cases. The pillory lost its importance. During the first half of the century delinquents were sentenced to the pillory in 8 percent of the cases, but this dropped to 3 percent between 1750 and 1810.

What about the alternatives? The most important traditional punishment was banishment from the jurisdiction, or from the province, or even from the Dutch Republic. The effectiveness of this penalty can be measured on the basis of the data on the "infraction of banishment", or the return of the banished persons to the city or region before the term had expired. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, sentences for the "infraction of banishment" account for almost 12 percent of all sentences in Leiden.⁵⁷ The share of banished persons condemned in Amsterdam for returning too early to the city was about 6 percent between 1680 and 1810.⁵⁸

Finally, what role did the prison play in penal policy during the ancien régime? One of the characteristics of ancien régime patterns of punishment was its mixed character: scaffold punishment combined with confinement

followed by banishment was a rather common penalty. So when we deal with the prison, we have to be aware of the fact that it always played a role in combination with other means of correction. Spierenburg gives the following percentages of confinement in his "scaffold series": 17.4 in the period 1651-1683 and 20.8 in the period 1684-1749.⁵⁹ For the sample jurisdictions the total percentage of sentences containing a prison penalty is about 15, but there are considerable variations over time. The general tendency is an increase from about 5 percent at the beginning of the eighteenth-century to 30 percent at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Can we see the increasing use of the prison as a measure indicating the development of a more humanitarian approach towards the criminal? Especially Spierenburg relates the decrease of corporal punishment and the use of other means of correction, like the prison, to processes of state formation and subsequent changes in taste and mentality. Because of the increasing influence of the state, lower-class audiences attending the public executions are supposed to have felt a greater identification with the victims on the scaffold. This audience, therefore, developed a dislike of the pain inflicted on their fellow human beings. The elites also developed disgust for all forms of public and physical punishment, considering it to be "uncivilized".⁶¹ Although these explanations may be points for discussion, the quantitative evidence points in the direction of a diminishment in the traditional modes of punishment.

9. *Conclusion*

Finally, we may wonder how far quantification brought us in understanding crime during the Dutch Republic. We mentioned the optimism of James Sharpe who pointed out the new insights derived from the data collected by quantitative historians. In recent years, many historians have been working on the creation of serial databases covering total populations. This enables us to check stereotypes regarding crime and criminal justice which are derived from a selection of anecdotes.

First of all, this contribution has tried to present some data on the overall crime rates. They were much lower during the ancien régime than in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The small size of communities, other means of social control and a very small judicial apparatus kept officially registered crime low. In that way the crime rates reflect reality. This apparatus could create its own crime: we have pointed out the role of torture in this respect. Nevertheless, only the "witch-hunt" of homosexuals in the 1730's suggests that torture had some influence in increasing official criminality. In regard to specific crimes, we may conclude that violence decreased during this period and that property crime was related to standard of living. The rate of sexual crimes reflected the mentality and the willingness

of the authorities to prosecute, whether it were sodomites or prostitutes. In this contribution we have not included data concerning the delinquents: birthplace, age-groups, occupational groups, or gangs of bandits. We have limited ourselves to crime rates in general, several categories of crime and a few aspects of punishment. The creation of statistical data for a period without official statistics requires that the sources be cautiously used. The most reliable data are provided by the long series of sentences, but they reflect only the cases which went completely through the judicial apparatus: from apprehension, to the examinations, a confession, to the final sentence, and the execution of the punishment. Those figures give us an insight in the way the authorities dealt with deviant behavior. Crime patterns as a whole are more complicated, but this data nevertheless provides a starting point for such an analysis. In general, we may agree with Sharpe's remark: quantification has added considerably to our knowledge of crime in the past, and especially in the Netherlands during the ancien régime.

NOTES

1. See among others: W.A. Bonger, *Criminalité et conditions économiques* (Amsterdam 1905) 38-42.
2. For the history of Dutch statistics up to 1902, see: *Geschiedenis van de statistiek in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Bijdragen tot de statistiek van Nederland, nieuwe volgrees XIV, CBS) (Den Haag 1902) 117-135.
3. *Honderd jaar strafrecht in statistieken* (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek) (Den Haag 1986).
4. J.I. Inciardi, A.A. Block, Lyle A. Hallowel, *Historical approaches to crime* (London 1977) 134-141; a general survey of publications in Britain is given by J.A. Sharpe, "The history of Crime in England c.1300-1914, an overview of recent publications", *British Journal of Criminology* 28 (1988) 124-137.
5. J.A. Sharpe, "The history of crime in late medieval and early modern England: a review of the field", *Social History* 7 (1982) 189, 190.
6. For an introduction see: H.A. Diederiks, S. Faber, A.H. Huussen jr, *Strafrecht en criminaliteit, cahiers voor lokale en regionale geschiedenis* (Zutphen 1988). This guide provides several surveys, references to the standard literature and a survey of archival material.
7. H. Diederiks, *Een stad in verval, Amsterdam omstreeks 1800, demografisch, economisch, ruimtelijk* (Amsterdam 1982) 114-140; J. Lucassen, *Naar de kusten van de noordzee, trekarbeid in Europees perspectief, 1600-1900* (Gouda 1984).
8. J.J. Tobias, *Crime and Industrial Society in the Nineteenth Century* (London 1967) see especially "The statistics of crime" 14-21; a plea for the use of such data was made by: V.A.C. Gatrell & T.B. Hadden, "Criminal Statistics and their interpretation", in: E.A. Wrigley, ed., *Nineteenth Century society, essays in the use of quantitative*

- methods for the study of social data* (Cambridge 1972) 336-396.
9. A. Soman, "Deviance and Criminal Justice in Western Europe, 1300-1800: an essay in structure", *Criminal Justice History, an international annual* (New York 1980) I, 3-28.
 10. D.A. Berents, *Misdaad in de middeleeuwen, een onderzoek naar de criminaliteit in het laat-middeleeuwse Utrecht* (Utrecht 1976) statistics on 139-145.
 11. For the sentences see: H.M. van den Heuvel, *De Criminele Vonnisboeken van Leiden, 1533-1811* (Leiden 1977/78); the section Social History of the State University at Leyden coded and computerized the series; D.J. Noordam has made some calculations on the basis of the sentences in: "Criminaliteit van vrouwen in Leiden in de 17de en 18de eeuw", *Leids Jaarboekje* 77 (1985) 36-46.
 12. A. van den Hoeven, "Ten exempel en afschrik", *strafrechtspleging en criminaliteit in Haarlem 1740-1795* (unpublished doctoral thesis Utrecht 1982).
 13. Figures for Delft are included in: D.J. Noordam, *Genealogische en historische Encyclopedie van Delft* (Genealogische vereniging Prometheus 1988) II, 41, 43, 45, 73, 146, 164, 221, 225, 243.
 14. T. Wijsenbeek-Olthuis, *Achter de gevels van Delft, Bezit en bestaan van rijk en arm in een periode van achteruitgang (1700-1800)* (Hilversum 1987) 27.
 15. S. Faber, *Strafrechtspleging en criminaliteit te Amsterdam, 1680-1811, de nieuwe menslievendheid* (Arnhem 1983) 50, 62-71; Spierenburg also describes the serial records available for quantification in the Municipal Archive of Amsterdam. He considers the *schoutsrol* of minor importance, because it was almost exclusively concerned with minor transgressions which in most cases only resulted in a fine. Pieter Spierenburg, *The spectacle of suffering, executions and the evolution of repression: from a preindustrial metropolis to the European experience* (Cambridge U.P. 1984) 208-210. However, M. Gijswijt-Hofstra found that many fugitives of manslaughter were included in the *schoutsrol*. M. Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Wijkplaatsen voor vervolgd, Asielverlening in Culemborg, Vianen, Buren, Leerdam en IJsselstein van de 16de tot eind 18de eeuw* (Dieren 1984) 155.
 16. See for example, H. Zehr, *Crime and the development of modern society, patterns of criminality in nineteenth century Germany and France* (London 1976) 9-30.
 17. The sample of 2,750 cases is part of the SR 18 project described by H. Diederiks, "Patterns of Criminality and law enforcement during the Ancien Regime: the Dutch case", *Criminal Justice History, an international annual* (1980) I, 157-174.
 18. S. Faber, *Strafrechtspleging en criminaliteit te Amsterdam*, 94, 95.
 19. See J.H. Langbein, *Torture and the law of proof, Europe and England in the Ancien Régime* (Chicago U.P. 1976).
 20. P. Spierenburg, *Judicial Violence in the Dutch Republic, corporal punishment, executions and torture in Amsterdam 1650-1750* (Amsterdam 1978) 81, 157, 158.
 21. S. Faber, *Strafrechtspleging en Criminaliteit te Amsterdam*, 117.
 22. Some of the evidence has been brought together in a paper by H. Diederiks & P. Spierenburg, prepared for a colloquium of the IAHCJ in Warsaw in December of 1985, entitled: *Preliminary observations on policing in the Netherlands in the 17th and 18th centuries*.
 23. G. Rudé, *The crowd in history, 1730-1848* (New York 1964).
 24. I. van Manen (rapporteur), "De "crowd" in de geschiedenis van Amsterdam, de jaren 1696, 1748 en 1787", *Mededelingenblad, orgaan van de Nederlandse Vereniging tot beoefening van de sociale geschiedenis* 46 (1974) 43-73.

25. R. Dekker categorized these incidents as tax riots, but some others classified them as political events. See R. Dekker, *Holland in beroering, oproeren in de 17de en 18de eeuw* (Baarn 1982).
26. A. van den Hoeven, "Ten exempel en afschrik", 11,12, 68.
27. I.J. van Manen & K. Vermeulen, "Het lagere volk van Amsterdam in de strijd tussen patriotten en oranjegezinden, 1780-1800", *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis* 20 (1980) 331-356; 21 (1981) 3-42, especially 33.
28. P.T. van Rooden, "De plunderingen op Schouwen en te Zierikzee, 1786-1788", *Archief van het koninklijk Zeeuws Genootschap der Wetenschappen* (1983) 173-201.
29. P.T. van Rooden, cited 184.
30. L. Stone, "Interpersonal Violence in English Society, 1300-1983", *Past and Present*, 102 (1984) 206-215.
31. V. Verhaar & F. van den Brink, "De bemoeienissen van stad en kerk met overspel in het achttiende-eeuwse Amsterdam", in: S. Faber, ed., *Nieuw Licht op oude justitie, misdaad en strafen tijde van de Republiek* (Muiderberg 1989) 64-93, appendix 114.
32. S. Faber, *Strafrechtspleging en criminaliteit te Amsterdam*, 98.
33. D.J. Noordam, "Criminaliteit van vrouwen in Leiden in de 17de en 18de eeuw", *Leids Jaarboekje* 77 (1985) 45.
34. M. Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Wijkplaatsen voor vervolgd, asielverlening in Culemborg, Vianen, Buren, Leerdam en IJsselstein van de 16de tot eind 18de eeuw* (Dieren 1984) especially chapter VIII.
35. W.P. te Brake, "Violence in the Dutch Patriot Revolution", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30 (1988) 143-163.
36. R. Dekker, "Some remarks about collective action and collective violence in the history of the Netherlands", *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis* 15 (1989) 158-164.
37. J.M. Beattie, "The pattern of crime in England 1660-1800", *Past and Present* 62 (1974) 47-95.
38. See reference 13.
39. See reference 11.
40. V. Verhaar & F. van den Brink, "De bemoeienis van stad en kerk met overspel in het achttiende eeuwse Amsterdam", *op. cit.* 77-79.
41. H. Diederiks, "Ambtsmisdriven tijdens de achttiende eeuw" in: *à Tort et à Travers, Liber Amicorum Herman Bianchi* (Amsterdam 1988) 243-254, especially 246.
42. H. Diederiks, "Stadt und Umland im Lichte der Herkunftsorte der Kriminellen in Leiden im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert", in: H.K. Schulze, ed., *Städtisches Um- und Hinterland in vorindustrieller Zeit* (Städteforschung A) 22 (Cologne/Vienna 1985), 183-205.
43. G. van Mayr, *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre, Band III: Moralstatistik* (Tübingen 1917) 741; J.C. Hudig, *De criminaliteit der Vrouw* (Utrecht/Nijmegen 1939) X.
44. S. Faber, *Strafrechtspleging en criminaliteit*, 253-259.
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VI

PERIODS AND CAESURAE IN THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE NETHERLANDS, 1600-1900

by

H.P.H. Nusteling

When is it that the so-called Golden Age of the Seven United Provinces came to an end? This question is raised again and again in historiography, albeit in varying terms and forms. Is this caesura to be situated around 1650, shortly before 1700, or as late as the middle of the eighteenth century as other authors would have it? The theme is related to the broader discussion concerning the crisis that Europe struggled with in the seventeenth century. This debate is also characterized by a rich diversity of viewpoints. Paul Hazard, a historian of ideas who gave the impetus to further research and discussion with his book *La crise de la conscience européenne 1680-1715* (1935), placed this turning point around 1700. However, a tendency developed to extend the transition period as other aspects were included such as demography, the economy, and social relationships and conflicts. This finally led Jan de Vries to publish a study in 1976 with the title *Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis 1600-1750*. In addition to the criteria used and the data to be tested, the range of opinions held by historians has also been determined by the idiosyncrasies of the areas involved. If it is shown, for example, that the Republic succeeded in maintaining her central role in European trade and commerce until 1740 and that the period of Dutch commercial and industrial decline did not start before then (even though the prosperity of the United Provinces did not last much longer than the European crisis), different matters are involved which can be mutually complementary. In this article the problem of the turning points in Dutch history will be examined. Little or no attention will be paid to the economic (and political) breakthrough during the revolt at the end of the sixteenth century. The end of the Republic's "Golden Age" will be dealt with in - depth, while the issue of the so-called late industrialization of the Netherlands will be briefly evaluated. Demographic data form our major instrument.

1. Views about the "Golden Age"

Successive generations of historians have applied new shades and touches to the picture of the Republic's heyday. Whereas in the nineteenth century the idea took root that Amsterdam's trade, and consequently the Republic's trade, had gradually lost its predominant position after the middle of the seventeenth century and thus ceased to flourish, at the beginning of this century P.J. Blok argued that the "Golden Age" had lasted longer, until about 1700.¹ "The historian of our "Golden Age"," says Blok, "has a grateful task to accomplish, because the glory of our nation never rose higher than in those days, in particular in the second half of that century".² Although Blok agreed with the prevailing opinion that signs of *internal* decline already existed at the time of Stadtholder William III, he emphasized that the commonwealth was simultaneously at the peak of its power within the system of European states – with William III as King of Britain at a given point in time – and that it held the leading position in the areas of trade and shipping. Through the absence of innovative impulses, there was moral and cultural deterioration after 1670, which manifested itself in a need for refinement and luxury and in headstrong captiousness and presumptuous priggery.³ Nonetheless, the old spirit was still sufficiently proficient. However, with the "luring voice of the delight in peace and domesticity" decline began to appear in the area of foreign relations after 1700, which eventually resulted in the very sad disaster for the State at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748).⁴

This is typical of the ideas which were held by historians in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, as far as economic history is concerned, H. Brugmans followed in Blok's footsteps by arguing on the basis of the proceeds of the *convoien*, *licenten* and other duties, that the prosperity of Amsterdam and the Republic did not end before the turn of the eighteenth century. From that time onwards, trade and industry would have gradually deteriorated.⁵ In spite of J.C. Westermann's criticism of the commercial statistics used by Brugmans, he too shared the judgement that the economic peak of the Seven Provinces should be situated near 1700.⁶ This was the established opinion, which did not give rise to much discussion. Only a few years earlier J. Huizinga had written in *Nederlandse beschaving in de zeventiende eeuw* (*Dutch Civilization in the Seventeenth Century*) (1941):

"Since 1660 all this political and economic advantage had become unsteady or had come to its end. However, losing advantage does not imply declining prosperity. The later years of the seventeenth century were the high point for the Republic, both politically and economically. The inevitable tragedy of our State only occurred after 1700, during the War of the Spanish Succession."⁷

Although the political downfall was assigned an earlier date with the War of

the Spanish Succession and the Peace of Utrecht (1713), Huizinga nonetheless found it difficult to accept a general spiritual collapse as characteristic of the eighteenth century. For him cultural change was primarily expressed by heroism giving way to peacefulness, and so he was inclined to see the opposition between prosperity and decline as the difference between acquiring and possessing: "If our flourishing era [of the seventeenth century] should have a name, then let it be one of wood and iron, pitch and tar, paint and ink, daring and piety, spirit and imagination. The term 'Golden Age' would be more appropriate for the eighteenth century, when gold coins lay in the strongboxes".⁸

In recent decades, however, new viewpoints were once again presented. For example, in 1948, J.G. van Dillen defended the position that Amsterdam's economy did not reach its peak until around 1730 with good arguments.⁹ He found support for this position among foreign scholars. Was it not C. Wilson who pointed out the central role of the Dutch staple market in the sale of English goods on the continent until about that time?¹⁰ A few decades later, the French historian F. Braudel recognized Amsterdam's dominant influence in European trade until the middle of the eighteenth century.¹¹ His countryman Pierre Boulle also testified to the supremacy of Dutch shipping and trade well into the 18th century:

"In my research I was struck by one thing: a century after Colbert's efforts to eliminate the Dutch from the French trade, and half a century after the famous Dutch decline, there are as many Dutch ships in Nantes as in the seventeenth century, if not more. More than that, the Dutch virtually monopolized Nantes' trade with northern ports".¹²

These statements, however, do not alter the fact that A.M. van der Woude, on the basis of his demographic knowledge, has expressed considerable skepticism regarding Van Dillen's argument for economic prosperity in the first decades of the eighteenth century. Although the historical demographer from Wageningen admits that Van Dillen's periodizations are not in conflict with his own findings concerning the secular trend, he doubts whether the latter's proposition will hold when more demographic studies become available. Van der Woude is correct in requiring Van Dillen's viewpoints to be verified against changes in demographic variables, in the factors of production and in income distribution; but because Van der Woude does not have sufficient data, he does not go beyond the suggestion that the province of Holland (where almost half of the Dutch population lived) had reached a phase of economic decline between 1650 and 1680 and that this did not end before 1750.¹³ With this hypothesis, Van der Woude is in good company. A few years earlier Ivo Schöffer had already stated that this stagnation had started after 1660.¹⁴

In agreement with Van der Woude's desiderata, the present contribution

intends to shed some light on the diversity of viewpoints presented in the above discussion on the basis of statistics for urbanization and population growth and by testing these results against the development of prosperity. Just as the general demographic evolution is an indication of changes in the amount of employment, the degree of urbanization constitutes a rough measure for the importance of the sectors of trade, commerce and industry, on the one hand, and the size of the primary sector on the other hand, in which fishing and the supply of raw materials were of minor importance in comparison to agriculture. A further consideration is that the more detailed the data concerning population growth and urbanization becomes the better our understanding of major economic trends becomes — particularly of employment and welfare.

2. *Some urbanization trends*

In 1984 Jan de Vries published valuable data concerning the degree of urbanization in Western European countries. These figures give the percentages which the towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants comprised of the total population in the period 1500–1850. The statistics show that by 1800 Holland, Belgium, Italy and England (and Wales) — referring to present names and territories — were the most urbanized areas of Europe (see Table 1). Since 1500 Italy was surpassed in urbanization by both the Northern and the Southern Netherlands. The Apennine Peninsula, in any case, shows a

Table 1 *Degree of urbanization of the most urbanized areas of Europe, 1500-1850*¹⁵

	1500	1550	1600	1650	1700	1750	1800	1850
Engl. and Wales	3.1	<i>3.5</i>	<i>5.8</i>	<i>8.8</i>	<i>13.3</i>	<i>16.7</i>	<i>20.3</i>	<i>40.8</i>
Netherlands	15.8	15.3	<i>24.3</i>	<i>31.7</i>	<i>33.6</i>	30.5	28.8	<i>29.5</i>
Belgium	21.1	<i>22.7</i>	18.8	<i>20.8</i>	<i>23.9</i>	19.6	18.9	<i>20.5</i>
Italy	12.4	<i>12.8</i>	<i>14.7</i>	14.0	13.4	<i>14.2</i>	<i>14.6</i>	<i>20.3</i>

Percentages that show an increase in relation to the previous figure in italics.

curious development from that time onwards. In contrast to most areas, Italy's cities lost ground in the seventeenth century. In all other periods, however, the larger towns attracted relatively more people than the small towns and villages. In contrast with Italy and the Netherlands, England was traditionally a country with a markedly rural character. During this period it became increasingly urbanized, although it would take until about 1800 before England became more urbanized than Belgium and it only superseded the Netherlands as the most urbanized area around 1830, which the latter had

been since the end of the sixteenth century.¹⁶ The Low Countries, however, had already begun to lose their unchallenged position at an earlier date. After the strong expansion of the seventeenth century — in 1700 one out of every three Dutchmen lived in one of the twenty towns with a minimum of 10,000 inhabitants¹⁷ — the Republic had to cope with considerable de-urbanization in the eighteenth century. De-urbanization also occurred in Southern Netherlands, which moreover had suffered severe set backs as early as 1600. The main conclusion to be drawn from Table 1 might be that, in so far as urbanization is a measure of social development, the Netherlands must be seen as the most developed region in Europe between the end of the sixteenth century and about 1830, despite the fact that de-urbanization had already set in before 1750.

The data as presented in Table 1 are indispensable for comparing levels of urbanization in the different countries. However, they slightly distort the urbanization process when it is understood as a growing tendency for people to live in larger agglomerations. The degree of urbanization will automatically increase (if there is a fixed minimum limit of 10,000 people for cities) with a steady growth of existing residential areas, without the population necessarily living closer together in space. In order to redress this deficiency, the degree of urbanization in Table 2 has been corrected for the disturbing effect of population growth or reduction, starting from the proportions in 1650. This manipulation alters the picture of the development in the period 1500–1850 presented above. According to the new percentages it was only around 1700 that the population in the Southern Netherlands showed a preference for larger cities, whereas in the period before the middle of the nineteenth century such a concentration occurred in Italy only around 1650. As far as the Republic is concerned, urbanization become more pronounced in comparison to our earlier description. The exceptionally strong urbanization at the end of the sixteenth century, which was the result of massive immigration, appears to have soon led to the high concentration levels of the next century and a half. This did not prevent urbanization from continuing — to a limited degree — till about 1700. The subsequent process of population dispersion increased in strength over time: it was stronger in the first half of the nineteenth century than in the eighteenth century. This manipulation also has its consequences for the pattern of percentages for England: between the end of the sixteenth century and roughly 1750 — and particularly during the second half of the seventeenth century — the cities exerted great attraction, but from that time onwards until well into the nineteenth century, a period that was characterized by considerable population growth and the start of industrialization, the smaller rural communities predominantly won ground. The ruralization of England probably did not stop until 1830, and was followed by very strong urbanization in the strictest sense. It was not before this turning point — see Table 1 — that Albion became more urbanized than the Low Countries, and

rather significantly at that.

Table 2 *The degree of urbanization (in percentages) corrected for population growth/reduction, with 1650 as point of reference for the most urbanized areas of Europe, 1500-1850*¹⁸


	1500	1550	1600	1650	1700	1750	1800	1850
Engl. and Wales	6.7	6.1	7.4	8.8	<i>13.8</i>	<i>15.3</i>	12.4	12.8
Netherlands	31.6	23.3	<i>30.8</i>	<i>31.7</i>	<i>33.6</i>	30.5	26.1	18.7
Belgium	30.1	27.5	23.5	20.8	<i>23.9</i>	17.8	13.0	9.3
Italy	13.3	12.7	12.7	<i>14.0</i>	11.4	10.5	9.3	<i>9.6</i>

Percentages that show an increase in relation to the previous figure have been printed in italics.

3. *The need for more detailed information on the Netherlands*

The study of the phenomenon of urbanization sheds new light on economic history, as will be readily accepted after the foregoing. This conclusion naturally creates a demand for additional data on urbanization in the Netherlands. In connection with the national debate about the length of the "Golden Age", it is in particular interesting to know whether the peak of urbanization occurred between 1650 and 1700 or between 1700 and 1750. The data which are currently available give rise to this question, but they are inadequate to answer it. The findings of a study made by Henk Schmal in 1986, however, provide a good starting point.¹⁹ This historian collected population data for *the same* 30 towns, including 14 in Holland, with 50 year intervals from 1600 to 1900 and expressed them in percentages of the total Dutch population, which constitute a consistent measure of urbanization. This measure not only includes towns that had a certain size during this period or at a given point in time, but also includes places which later gained in importance, for example Den Helder, and places that lost most of their economic importance, for example Enkhuizen. These percentages, therefore, do not possess the drawback mentioned earlier, which is inherent in the use of a fixed lower limit: there are no changes in the number and in the composition of the towns involved and no additional increase or decrease in the share of the towns under observation as a result of general population movements. In international comparisons such as that carried out by De Vries, such a procedure is extremely difficult to realize.

Schmal's data, which are presented with some minor corrections in Figure 1, do not provide conclusive evidence on the issue of whether or not urbanization in the Republic reached its peak before 1700. Is it possible to

Figure 1. *Urbanization of the Netherlands and possible trends.*

answer this question by completing the diagram for the 30 towns with estimates that are computed as carefully as possible? It is in any case difficult to accept the overall picture presented in Figure 1 as definitive. It would be a very curious trick of fate if the turning point in Dutch (de)urbanization coincide or almost coincide with the figures that are available for every fiftieth year. Although decennial census data only becomes available after 1830 and quantitative data are extremely scarce for the period preceding the first general census of 1795/96, through combining present historical knowledge with the available statistical material, it nonetheless seems possible to give a clearer answer than has been given so far.

4. *Modus operationis*

For the construction of a more detailed graph we start from two schematizing and formalizing assumptions: *first*, that (de)urbanization in general proceeded gradually and without any short-term fluctuations; *second*, that pronounced changes in certain periods cannot be ruled out. These assumptions can bring the problem closer to its solution. It is thus necessary to identify the turning


points and to determine the degree of urbanization. As these conditions are better met, urbanization in the intervals can be more exactly determined.

If urbanization normally changes its course only once every 50 years, then a maximum of six turning points can be counted in a 300 year period. On the basis of Schmal's data and the resulting tendencies, it can be concluded that there were at least four changes of direction: namely around 1670, during the third quarter of the eighteenth century, around 1800, and circa 1850. There probably have been more such changes, because with only four discontinuities in the trend for the entire period 1670-1850, there should be a decline which would not be checked until the second half of the eighteenth century. With a decrease of this extent and duration, a turning point at an earlier period would be expected. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that urbanization continued well into the first half of the eighteenth century, although at a very slow rate. This also implies more than four changes in development.

With the present state of historical affairs six caesurae are assumed to exist aside from the very strong growth after 1580-85. The years 1645, 1670, 1735, 1760, 1795 and 1850 are suitable in this respect. As was the case with many other regions of Europe, several parts of the Republic were confronted with a decline in population after 1640. Even areas along the Zuider Zee, such as the northern part of North Holland, witnessed a fall in the number of inhabitants after the middle of the seventeenth century.²⁰ For Amsterdam, the most rapidly growing city in Holland at the time, population growth steadily abated after 1640 and finally became negative in the 1670s.²¹ The number of inhabitants in the province of Holland declined then, just as in the other coastal provinces.²² Some towns in the province of Holland had more residents in 1670 than they would have in centuries to come.²³ Changes in general urbanization trends around 1645 and 1670 should therefore be taken into account. It should be recognized, however, that the acceptance of both changes in direction entails a reversal in the first half of the eighteenth century. This turning point can be dated around 1735, and presumably occurred in 1737/38. An indication for this is the serious demographic and economic depression which Amsterdam and the rest of Holland then experienced. In the course of the next 15 years, Amsterdam lost 15% of its inhabitants. Other cities in the same area suffered even greater misfortune.²⁴ Within three decades the populations of Alkmaar, Haarlem, Leiden and Gouda were nearly halved.²⁵ In part due to the recovery which occurred in Amsterdam around 1755, the sad decline of these cities also seems to have come to a halt then and a period of stability began. Available statistics show that subsequent changes of direction occurred around 1795 and around 1850.)²⁶

If this selection is complete and if, furthermore, the turning points have been correctly dated, then we only need to know the precise degree of urbanization for one of these junctions. *If this is known, then on account of the*

Figure 2. Trends of urbanization aroiund 1700



principle of even development, all of the turning points are determined, because the urbanisation values (which act as a sort of pivot) are always given every fifty years. It is evident that when the caesuras are precisely known the intermediate values can be easily calculated. The degree of urbanization for the point in time which serves as the basis for all further computations, and on which the quality of the other estimates is highly dependent, should be established as accurately as possible.

With respect to the reliability of the method, it is also necessary to point out the importance of the underlying data for the outcome. The available urbanization percentages not always have the same degree of precision. This is already the case just because of the total Dutch population figures on which they are based. The population figures for the Netherlands were published by the Wageningen School, under the supervision of Bernard Slicher van Bath, in the form of maximum and minimum values; consequently, neither the absolute nor the relative differences are always constant. The deviation from the mean between 1600 and 1750 ranges between $\pm 1.3\%$ and $\pm 6.7\%$.²⁷ Because of these deviations, it is necessary to use minimum and maximum values in the calculations.

Before determining the values of the turning points, we shall first determine the urbanization percentage for the 30 cities in 1732 and, as a means of verification, Amsterdam's share in the percentage. For this particular year, data are available concerning the size of the towns. In view of the ratio of the respective population figures (780,000 : 237,000) (see appendix 1), the urbanization percentage of the 30 towns (including Amsterdam) is known to be 3.291 times as big as Amsterdam's share alone. At this point it is assumed that the degree of urbanization — and this is also true of Amsterdam's portion in 1732 — is the average (G) of the two trends (lines a and b in Figure 2) that can be deduced from the data for 1650, 1700 and 1750.


Since there are some margins of doubt regarding the total Dutch population figures on which the percentages for 1650, 1700, and 1750 are based, the means for both the minimum and maximum urbanization percentages have been computed. The overall degree of urbanization in 1732 amounted to a minimum of 35.4% and a maximum of 37.39%, while Amsterdam's share was between 10.70% and 11.27%.²⁸ Since these percentages must also be in a proportion of 3.291 : 1, the upper limit for overall urbanization can be somewhat reduced to 37.08% and the lower limit for Amsterdam's share can be somewhat increased to 10.78%. Thus, average urbanization in 1732 was calculated to be 36.2% (= from 35.47 to 37.08%) and the average quota of Amsterdam was 11.02% (= from 10.78 to 11.27%).

5. *New urbanization figures*

Through applying the principle of gradual development it is possible to compute all the named turning points and their connecting lines of development without further problems. Appendix 2 and Figure 3 present the results of these computations. The graph on general urbanization shows that after the considerable growth which began at the end of the sixteenth century, the cities lost only very little ground during the period 1670-1737. The original data indicates that it is most likely that the share of the towns in the total population dropped from 37.2 to 36.2% in this 67 year period. However, considering the demographic stagnation around 1700, a relative strengthening of the position of the towns might have been expected. This possibility, moreover, should not be ruled out. In view of the margins of doubt regarding the national population figure in 1700, the degree of urbanization could have remained stable or even increased slightly in four out of ten cases.²⁹ It is even possible that there was an increase from 36.1% (the minimum for 1670) to 37.0% (the maximum in 1737). Since there may have been an increase instead of a decrease, neither of which was most likely of much significance, the period 1670-1737 can best be characterized as a period of considerable stability. This comes to the fore especially when this period is compared with the following decades, when the cities share dropped from an average of 36.2% in 1737 to an average of 32.8% in 1755. From that time on, the decline of the towns proceeded much more gradually and a low point of 28.7% was reached in 1850.

Nonetheless, the stability in urban expansion in the decennia before 1737 appears to have occurred in combination with a concentration of the population in the largest cities. Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague housed about 42% of the urban population in 1732, as opposed to around 36% in 1670.³⁰ Amsterdam had great attractive powers. In view of this city's significance, it is useful and also clarifying to pay explicit attention to the relative demographic development of this commercial center. For this

Figure 3. *Percentual proportions of the towns (30 including Amsterdam and without) and of Amsterdam in the Dutch population once every 10 years, 1600-1900*



reason, Amsterdam's share in the total population, insofar as it was known, has been computed in the same way as was done for the urbanization graphs, namely every ten years. However, the relative development for the 29 towns not including Amsterdam was deduced from the general statistical series and series for Amsterdam. The three resulting sequences are presented in Figure 3. On the basis of the graphs for the *average* values, it can be determined that Amsterdam continued to strengthen its position between 1670 and 1737. At the same time, the other towns together lost about half of the gain which they had experienced in the preceding 70 years. Even if *general* urbanization in the period 1670-1737 would have remained stable at 36.75% (the average in 1700) the share of the remaining towns is nonetheless somewhat reduced. Between 1737 and 1755 this group of 29 towns had much heavier blows to deal with, when in less than twenty years their losses were at least twice as large as in the seven preceding decades. After the sudden and drastic

reduction in the middle of the eighteenth century, further decline was limited. Since that time the quota of these 29 towns did become smaller, but not by much: less than one percent in the following one hundred years. The second time the towns were firmly pushed back within Dutch society, which occurred during the Batavian–French era (1795–1813), may be attributed to the steep decline of Amsterdam in those years. In sharp contrast with most other towns in the Netherlands, this metropolis had withstood the depression of the 1740s without too much damage and had succeeded in maintaining her quota at the 1670 level in the second half of the eighteenth century. The setbacks around 1800 were more serious for Amsterdam. With the fall of Napoleon and the end of the French Empire, more favorable times dawned, but Amsterdam's demographic growth was insufficient to prevent its share from diminishing even further. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the city was completely on the defensive.

Buying power statistics confirm the foregoing description of urbanization. They prove in particular that the Republic was the most urbanized between 1670 and 1737 and that a possible de-urbanization can only have been minimal. For Amsterdam it has been shown that after 1670 there was a distinct *positive* relationship, which varied in intensity between the development of purchasing power and of the population.³¹ In this context it appears that in 1733 (a year which falls in the decade before 1860 when the city had its largest population both relatively and absolutely) real wages were at their highest. In addition, the trend of real wages for construction workers in the Western Netherlands published by Jan de Vries for the period 1560–1830³² corresponds with the development of general urbanization. The wage trend shows two peaks: one around 1690 and the other before 1730. Moreover, the wage level in the period 1675–1740 amply exceeds the wage level in all other periods. According to these data, buying power was a few percentages higher in 1690 than around 1730, and this would confirm the slight de-urbanization which is the most likely according to our figures. However, this concordance may not be seen as final proof that urbanization did not increase around 1700. The data on Dutch wages are not "hard" enough to substantiate such a conclusion. The trend of real wages depends, among other things, on the way in which the various types of wages were weighted, and it is not clear how this was done. What, for example, is the effect of the different developments of various wage categories? According to De Vries, nominal wages for unskilled work in the Western Netherlands were higher in 1650–79 than in 1745–54, whereas wages for skilled workers show the opposite tendency. This might indicate that the demand for skilled craftsmen had increased relatively as a result of the greater demand for more expensive products, with which this category of workers may have grown proportionately. Regarding the question of the duration of urbanization it is furthermore interesting that in Holland the nobility – which is generally associated with the rural economy – saw a steady reduction in its ranks after

the middle of the sixteenth century (which, however, was less rapid between 1670 and 1730) while it did not suffer any further losses after 1730.³³

6. *New population sequences*

There is yet another way to illuminate the development of urbanization. With the help of the urbanization sequences currently available, it is also possible to generate *absolute population figures*. For the cities in question, this can be done when the Dutch population is known at the desired point in time. These figures can now be calculated without too much trouble for the period 1600–1820 by combining the cyphers for Amsterdam's population, which I previously published, with its proportion in the total Dutch population, which I have now computed. From 1830 onwards, decennial census results are available. The reliability of the calculated population estimates, of course, does not exceed the reliability of the two sequences for Amsterdam.

How the statistics of the capital's share in the Dutch population were constructed has already been extensively discussed. However, some explanation is called for with respect to the numbers of inhabitants for Amsterdam, which were constructed with what might be called the *method of demographic homeostasis*. The primary idea on which this sequence rests is that there was a *fixed relationship* between fertile marriages and the size of the population prior to the demographic transition, which began in Holland around 1880. Ultimately therefore, effective fertility determined the growth or stagnation of the population. Procreation, as a rule, was restricted to the state of marriage, which was easier or more difficult to enter depending upon the circumstances (and the related immigration and emigration). Several factors affect the number of marriages bearing children. The age of the marriage partners is an indication of nuptiality, that is, the inclination to marry. When only a few men and women remain unmarried, the average age at the time of marriage was low, but when marriage opportunities turned the ages at the time of marriage increased, as did the range in the ages of those marrying. Age *fluctuations* at the time of marriage naturally have an effect on the number of marriage partners, but are not taken explicitly into account in the calculations of fertile marriages, which are the basis for extrapolating population size. Similarly, *changes* in mortality have been ignored as well. Indications of changes in adult mortality are rare, but this is not a prohibitive objection as long as the number of *first* marriages is used as the basis for determining the number of fertile marriage. For in those days, remarriage was closely related to mortality among married couples. If one does not include those remarrying in the figures, then one may also ignore the fluctuations in mortality. On balance, this method has yielded very favorable results. Insofar as a control was possible, the deviations in the sequences of Amsterdam's population proved to be not more than 2 to 3%.³⁴


The accuracy of the ratio of the residents of Amsterdam compared to the whole of the nation is consequently of crucial importance for the quality of the decennial population totals for the Netherlands. In view of the variations in the accuracy of the fifty year national population figures, it is advisable to use the minimum and maximum values for the quota, and this is, of course, reflected in the range of the results. Consequently, the national population sequence is the least accurate for the seventeenth century and particularly for the beginning of the century ($\pm 7\%$). In 1732 the deviations of the calculated means do not amount to more than 2 or 3%, while for the second half of the eighteenth century these differences gradually diminish from more than 1% to zero.

The new population figures, which are based on the two sequences mentioned above (see Figure 4), show that the number of Dutchmen increased until 1650–70. This was followed by a period of decline and stagnation until 1720. Between 1720 and 1820 the population fluctuated around 2.1 million, which is about 10% more than in the preceding period. It is not until after the French period that the Netherlands once and for all left the level of the eighteenth century far behind, with an expansion which was unequalled in its history and which has led to today's 15 million inhabitants.

The one and a half centuries between 1670 and 1820, in which the balance of population growth was relatively low, are characterized by pronounced demographic depressions around 1680, 1710, 1750, and 1800.³⁵ These fluctuations are partly synchronous with developments elsewhere. According to the computations made by Wrigley and Schofield,³⁶ after 1686 England experienced virtually uninterrupted population growth, which was initially slight and which gained significantly in strength after the middle of the eighteenth century. However, on the basis of the marriage figures published by these authors, it is my conclusion that there was a demographic expansion which started around 1695 and which was already quite strong from the beginning. It was only interrupted once, by a heavy depression during the 1740s.³⁷ England, however, was in an unique position in Europe. With the rise that began at the end of the seventeenth century, England was at least twenty years ahead of the Dutch Republic. Moreover, the British Empire, practically doubled in population during the eighteenth century. Demographic trends in the Low Countries were more similar to those in France. About 1705, during the 1740s, and around 1790–95, France also contended with stagnating population. In this century its growth was relatively not much greater than that of the Dutch Republic.³⁸

In addition to the population trend for the 30 towns, for the same towns minus Amsterdam, and for Amsterdam alone, Figure 4 also presents the trend for the rural population. The rural population is seen as the difference between the sum totals for the Netherlands as a whole and the population of the 30 towns. It not only includes villagers, but also people living in small towns such as Harderwijk, Wageningen, Eindhoven, and Venlo. Rural is not

Figure 4. *Population of the Netherlands, towns and country, 1600-1900*



the same as agricultural. Under nineteenth century conditions, about 50 to 60% of the people in the country were employed in agriculture³⁹, which means that if conditions were the same in 1700, only 32 to 36% of the nation made their living in the agricultural sector. At that time, the countryside had already been in a state of demographic rigidity for several decades, a situation against which the towns could not safeguard themselves either. It may be noted from Figure 4 that the towns were stable in size between 1650 and 1720, especially if the peak around 1670 is not taken into consideration. This was followed by twenty years of growth, which lasted until about 1740. From that time onwards, the urban population — as opposed to that of the countryside — generally showed a decreasing tendency. The high urban population figures of the 1730s would not be surpassed until 1880 and then for good. The towns' loss of inhabitants also entailed an absolute reduction in the population of the province of Holland.⁴⁰ After 1735 demographic growth was borne by other provinces. Until the middle of the nineteenth century these predominantly rural areas functioned as the driving force which brought about change in Dutch society. The beginning of this new rural clan, which would be regularly interrupted, can generally be dated at about 1720. This was already established in an earlier study of Arnhem, which was then a small provincial town. This change was accompanied with marriages at younger ages and more premarital pregnancies.⁴¹ If there was initially growth with periodic losses in the countryside, after 1800 the population no longer declined. It would take until about 1850 before the cities once again showed relatively greater expansion than the agricultural areas.

7. *After prosperity, a heavy economic downturn*

In the foregoing it has been argued that Dutch population did not increase at all between 1670 and 1720 in contrast to the rest of the eighteenth century, in which period the limited positive balance was due exclusively to growth in the countryside. Insofar as the degree of urbanization is a measure of economic development, it can be concluded that the Republic's economy was not in decline before 1735. Through making the most of the new demand for more luxurious goods, Holland successfully managed to defend and maintain the position and rank which it had acquired in 1670 for a long time. According to a procedure which is as objective as possible, the decline in urbanization was shown to be only minimal: from 37.2% in 1670 to 36.2% in 1737. In addition, it should be recognized that an increase from 36.1% to 37.0% during that period — which is really the maximum change — cannot be ruled out. In the following period until 1850, the old economic order was continuously impaired and weakened by de-urbanisation and was finally completely run-down.

Through the protectionistic course which it followed after the Navigation Act of 1651, England constituted the greatest threat to Dutch merchants. "The English", according to a paragraph from the *Proposition* submitted by Stadtholder William IV in 1751 to the States General of the Netherlands, "are the first, but certainly not the only ones to have applied and still apply themselves to taking away and drawing to themselves the trade of our Republic and that which depends on it".⁴² Until 1700 competition from Anglo-Saxon areas was nonetheless moderate. Although the economic interests of small English towns did increase strongly in the second half of the seventeenth century, their significance remained quite small. The city of London totally dominated economic relations throughout the country. Perhaps England's urbanization was sooner an advantage than a disadvantage to Dutch trade and commerce and did not weaken its position. The appeal to Stadtholder William III during the Glorious Revolution of 1688 also attests to the position of great respect and strength which the Republic enjoyed in seaborne trade. Before the eighteenth century, for that matter, circumstances were not very favorable for drastic changes in the existing order. There was not a single Western European state which displayed any significant demographic growth between 1650 and 1700. As mentioned before, England was the first country to end this stagnation. With a considerable population increase between 1695 and 1735, which was soon accompanied by a remarkable modernization of the economy⁴³, England ended its period of protracted stagnation. After some time, the changes in England also seem to have stimulated the international trade of the Seven Provinces. After 1720 England's imports increased — including from the Republic, which had initially suffered losses — more than its exports. However, this stimulus for the economic activities of Amsterdam and the other Dutch towns was short-lived and was reversed with the demographic and economic depression which Western Europe, even England, was confronted with in the second half of the 1730s. Because of this severe depression the international market not only showed a reduction in demand, which had its greatest effect on Dutch trade, but competition increased considerably in the same time. Because of the reduced demand at home, English manufacturers not only wanted to supply this market themselves, but also proceeded to sell their remaining surplus abroad.⁴⁴

In the Republic this decline was immediately experienced as an extremely serious problem for trade and industry and called for drastic measures. As early as 1738 the Amsterdam city fathers were presented a proposal to establish a duty free port in order to compensate the extensive commercial losses.⁴⁵ The initiative finally resulted in the Stadtholder's aforementioned *Proposition of 1751*, with which the interested parties wished to protect the trade and commerce of the coastal provinces against competition from Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, through considerably reducing tax burdens and possibly eliminating duties. When economic conditions stabilized soon

afterwards — for the province of Holland at a lower level — the *Proposition* was abandoned and existing practices were set forth. It is not until a hundred years later that the course was completely changed with the Dutch Navigation Acts of 1850. The rise and impact of the railroads in neighboring countries then made it necessary to abandon the time-honored policy of protecting the staple market. This was replaced with a policy of free trade and with the principle of free transit, in order to restore relations with Germany. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Amsterdam's staple market had to give way to the transit port of Rotterdam.⁴⁶

8. *New prosperity and growth*

With our last observation we touch upon a controversy in Dutch historiography which is similar to the discussion regarding the length of the "Golden Age" and which treats the question of when the Dutch economy began to industrialize. Until recently, opinions on this differed strongly: did the industrial revolution occur late in the Netherlands not materializing before 1890; or does the turning point lie between 1850 and 1870; or should it be located around 1830, as was recently asserted under Anglo-Saxon influence?⁴⁷ Despite the remaining differences of opinion, there is generally a growing tendency to place the turning point around the middle of the nineteenth century, rather than at the end of the century.

On the basis of changes in the political regime, which were accompanied by dramatic changes in economic policy, and because of unmistakable adjustments in the economic system, which manifested themselves in shifts in employment and a rise in national per capita income, I already had the opportunity to maintain that "the rise of Dutch economy" should be placed "shortly after 1850".⁴⁸ A few years later, R. Bos recognized a similar economic breakthrough, but, at the same time, also contended that this did not answer the question about the onset of industrialization. If industrialization means the construction of factories, then the statement can be accepted; but if the term is meant to imply *rapid economic growth* due to new production functions, as Bos defined it, then it is not possible to accept the view that there was not any industrialization before 1890.⁴⁹ Bos' viewpoint is confusing, if not contradictory. New production functions imply changed technologies which, when applied, will lead to new combinations of production factors and higher returns. This requirement was met since the middle of the century.

Since that time, there were distinct shifts in employment, which indicated "new production functions" at the macroeconomic level. Of sheer necessity, agriculture had absorbed an increasing number of people before 1850 in both absolute and relative terms, whereas after 1850 this development was reversed insofar as the farmers were able to sustain a growing population,

which preferred employment in other economic sectors with relatively fewer people. This is confirmed by the fact that labor productivity and wages in agriculture dropped during the first half of the nineteenth century, but increased again afterwards.⁵⁰ When a free trade policy was introduced around 1850, trade and traffic (railways and steamships) were powerful stimuli for this process of change. Undoubtedly the demand of the English, who had grown both in numbers and in purchasing power, was also very important for agriculture and the other sectors. England was the first country to instigate commercial expansion and sectoral change. In the following decades the German consumer market in particular, became increasingly important for the growth of the Dutch economy.⁵¹ As is evident from general counts of professions⁵²; trade, traffic and other services were of decisive importance for the process of economic change. If the category of household services, which initially provided 11% of employment in 1849, is not included in the general service category, this sector showed the most growth of all sectors — and this is also true of the twentieth century. Whereas the share of the tertiary sector, household services excluded, had risen from 18.0% of the working population in 1849 to 41.8% in 1960, the percentages for trade and industry combined were 23.9 in 1849 and 41.0 in 1960. It is characteristic of the Dutch situation that, today, economic emphasis is still on the services sector and that the manufacturing and industrial sector is relatively less important than in neighboring countries.

It is not at all clear why *rapid* economic growth should be a prerequisite for the industrial revolution. After 1855, nonetheless, there was a considerable increase in per capita income.⁵³ As for most, if not all, countries, it is difficult to precisely determine national income before 1900, but this drawback need not stop us from commenting about its general development. Recent studies have confirmed that prosperity, after a period of stagnation, increased greatly after 1850, with which real per capita income grew and had more than doubled by 1910.⁵⁴ Urbanization and increasing income often go together. The urbanization, which started again in the Netherlands around 1850 is therefore another piece of evidence, accepted by others as well⁵⁵, that the Dutch economy started to modernize then. The level of urbanization reached during the Republic, which despite heavy losses could still be defined as high before the middle of the nineteenth century, also explains why the Netherlands participated in the industrial revolution in its own way, with its traditional preference for trade and shipping and an awareness of the advantages of its geographical position.

9. Conclusion

The demographic material presented here is the main basis for drawing the following general conclusions. Because of her international function, the

Republic could not protect herself against demographic stagnation, which most other Western European countries already had to cope with after 1640 or even earlier. This development, however, did not preclude the Dutch commonwealth from succeeding in convincingly maintaining, if not unchallenged, its leading economic position until around 1740. A different development is probably less obvious, since an increase in populations elsewhere seems to have been a necessary condition for seriously injuring the central function of the province of Holland within the international economic system. The evidence now available — at least for England, France and the Dutch Republic — indicates that the so-called European crisis of the seventeenth century had come to its end in 1700-1720. Soon the first signs appeared of the great problems facing the Republic in the area of international trade. The decline in foreign trade is associated with the fact that there was hardly any demographic growth in the Northern Netherlands in the eighteenth century and that an increase in population only became evident after 1810. The number of people in rural areas did increase after 1720, but the numerical strength of townsmen dropped after 1735. This de-urbanization occurred mainly in Holland, particularly in the 1740s and around 1800. Although Amsterdam had maintained its size quite well in the beginning, it was nevertheless the main cause of the de-urbanization around the turn of the century.

While the "Golden Age" of the Republic did last longer than is generally accepted, the Netherlands on the other hand, was not a latecomer to the economic and social innovations of the nineteenth century, as it is frequently thought to have been in comparison with other regions on the continent. It is a matter of a reverse reflex: around 1740 English competition contributed greatly to the shrinking of the Dutch towns, whereas about a century later the growing demand of the English market, in addition to the innovations in commercial traffic, served as a stimulus for the expansion and diversification of employment and for an increase in general prosperity in the delta of the Rhine and Maas rivers. Insofar as the intensity of urbanization is concerned, the Netherlands was outdistanced by "the first industrial nation"; but when urbanization in England is understood as the population's preference to live in larger agglomerations, this does not date further back than about 1830, and then the growth of Dutch towns did not lag that far behind. It is an established fact that the inhabitants of the Netherlands despite the nineteenth century urge for innovation, started from what was achieved in the past. They certainly were not a "backward" people: In spite of what some authors think who are looking for a type of industrialization that does not belong here and was never desired.

APPENDIX 1

Populations (x 1000) of 30 towns in the Netherlands after published figures, 1600-1900.

	1600	1650	1700	1732	1750	1795	1850	1900
I.a. Top of North Holland	42	52	41	46	30	27	36	61
b. Around the								
Haarlemmermeer	115	288	302	356	283	279	297	678
c. South of Holland	77	114	143	166	136	151	228	657
Holland (= a + b + c)	234	454	486	568	449	457	561	1396
Holland, not including Amsterdam	180	279	282	331	244	240	337	859
II. Groningen, Friesland, Utrecht, and Zeeland	88	110	106	(106)	101	107	144	263
III. Remaining provinces	100	104	106	(106)	100	105	173	331
Total (= I + II + III)	422	668	698	(780)	650	669	878	1990

Towns in the various categories

- Ia. Den Helder, Enkhuizen, Hoorn and Alkmaar;
- Ib. Zaandam, Amsterdam, Haarlem and Leiden;
- Ic. Den Haag, Gouda, Delft, Schiedam, Rotterdam and Dordrecht;
- II Groningen, Leeuwarden, Utrecht, Amersfoort, Middelburg and Vlissingen;
- III Kampen, Zwolle, Deventer, Zutphen, Arnhem, Nijmegen, Den Bosch, Breda, Tilburg and Maastricht.

Sources: Totals are based on the figures for individual towns collected by Schmal (*o.c.*, 462). To this end he made use of publications by J.G. van Dillen, J.C. Ramaer, Jan de Vries and A.M. van der Woude. As for Amsterdam, the total numbers I published earlier (see *Welvaart*, 240-1) have been used, which causes the total figure for 1600 to deviate from Schmal's report.

Data on the Netherlands for 1732 have been taken from Nusteling, *o.c.*, 248-9, where they were reported for the period around 1735, and they are practically in agreement with J.C. Ramaer, "De middelpunten van bewoning in Nederland voorheen en thans", *Tijdschrift van het Kon. Aardrijkskundig Genootschap* 2 (1921), 179-181. It has been assumed that Zaandam's population in 1732 was 16% greater than in 1796 (see Van der Woude, *Noorderkwartier*, 186), while Den Helder was supposed to have the same population as in 1700 and 1750 (2,000 people). Although it is not possible to guarantee the accuracy of the population figures for each town individually, the totals for all of the towns together may be accepted as reasonably accurate. And finally, the populations of the towns which are not a part of Holland have been put at the same in 1732 level as in 1700. According to the information available, they held between

1650 and 1800 an average of 210,000 inhabitants, with a minimum of 201,000 and a maximum of 214,000.

Tendencies: The strong decline in population in the middle of the eighteenth century hit the towns in the north of the Netherlands in particular, several of which are said to have lost half of their population. Between 1732 and 1795, according to Ramaer's computations for 1732, the population of Enkhuizen dropped from 14,000 to 7,000, Hoorn from 16,000 to 10,000, Alkmaar from 14,000 to 8,000, Haarlem from 47,000 to 21,000, Leiden from more than 60,000 to 31,000 and Gouda from 21,000 to 12,000: a total drop from 172,000 to 89,000 inhabitants. If the decline of Amsterdam (from 237,000 to 217,000) is taken into account as well, this results in a loss of 103,000 inhabitants. This almost fully accounts for the decline in the urban population.

In addition, in my opinion, recent publications on some Dutch towns present population estimates for 1732 which are too low. C. Davids (see Diederiks, *o.c.*, 159-60), for example, argues Leiden had 45,000 inhabitants 1732, and this is lower than any other estimate. For Leiden the following figures were found for this year or neighboring years: *Tegeuwoordige Staat* (1742) c. 70,000, Kersseboom (1738) 63,000, Ramaer (1921) 61,800, Nusteling (1985) 60,000, Blok (1910) 54,000, Posthumus (1939) 50,000, and Davids (1978) 45,000. The average of all these figures is 58,000. I have always used the figure of 60,000.

A remarkable fact is the concentration of urban populations in the larger towns until well into the second half of the eighteenth century. This is shown in the following table with distributions in percentages:

	1600	1650	1700	1732	1795	1850
30 towns, of which in:	100	100	100	100	100	100
— Amsterdam	12.8	26.2	29.2	30.6	32.4	25.5
— 7 next largest towns	33.6	34.9	35.0	35.1	33.3	36.7
— 8 largest towns (A'dam included)*	46.4	61.1	64.2	65.7	65.7	62.2

* For Holland this category includes the towns of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Leiden and Haarlem and for the other provinces the towns of Utrecht, Groningen and Middelburg.

The population distribution in percentages for the 30 towns in the categories applied earlier, namely Holland, other coastal provinces (Groningen, Friesland, Utrecht and Zeeland) and inland provinces (remaining provinces) shows the following shifts:

	1600	1650	1700	1750	1795	1850
I. Holland	55.4	68.0	69.6	69.1	63.9	70.2
II. Other coastal provinces	20.9	16.4	15.2	15.5	16.4	13.2
III. Inland provinces	23.7	15.6	15.2	15.4	19.7	16.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

APPENDIX 2

The population of the Netherlands and the population figures and shares in percentages for Amsterdam, the same 29/30 towns and the countryside, with a maximum interval of ten years, 1600-1900.

	Amsterdam			30 Towns			popu- lation
	proportion of Dutch population in % min.	max.	average	proportion of Dutch population in % min.	max.	average	
1600	3.38	3.86	3.62	26,4	30.1	28.3	424
1610	4.62	5.03	4.82	28.3	31.3	29.8	478
1620	5.86	6.20	6.03	30.2	32.6	31.4	522
1630	7.11	7.37	7.24	32.1	33.8	32.9	581
1640	8.35	8.54	8.45	34.0	35.0	34.5	634
1645	8.97	9.21	9.05	34.9	35.5	35.2	650
1650	9.21	9.46	9.34	35.2	36.1	35.6	668
1660	9.69	10.13	9.91	35.6	37.2	36.4	690
1670	10.16	10.80	10.48	36.1	38.3	37.2	730
1680	10.26	10.88	10.57	36.0	38.1	37.1	671
1690	10.36	10.95	10.66	35.9	37.9	36.9	696
1700	10.46	11.03	10.74	35.8	37.7	36.8	698
1710	10.56	11.10	10.83	35.7	37.5	36.6	672
1720	10.66	11.18	10.92	35.6	37.3	36.5	691
1730	10.76	11.26	11.01	35.5	37.1	36.3	770
1732	10.78	11.27	11.02	35.5	37.1	36.3	776
1737	10.83	11.31	10.07	35.4	37.0	36.2	782
1740	10.76	11.19	10.07	34.9	36.3	35.6	754
1750	10.51	10.79	10.65	33.3	34.2	33.8	650
1755	10.39	10.59	10.49	32.5	33.1	32.8	630
1760	10.40	10.57	10.48	32.5	33.0	32.8	650
1770	10.41	10.53	10.47	32.4	32.8	32.6	699
1780	10.42	10.50	10.46	32.3	32.5	32.4	697
1790	10.44	10.46	10.45	32.2	32.3	32.3	707
1795			10.44			32.2	670
1800			9.88			31.6	644
1810			8.75			30.4	638
1815			8.18			29.7	654
1820			8.04			29.6	697
1830			7.74			29.2	761
1840			7.38			28.8	825
1850			7.33			28.7	878
1860			7.34			29.0	960
1870			7.40			29.3	1050
1880			7.90			30.7	1233
1890			9.04			34.1	1536
1900			10.52			39.0	1990

	Towns minus Amsterdam		Countryside (= total of the Netherlands minus 30 towns)	
	proportion of Dutch population in percentages	population (x 1000)	proportion of Dutch population in percentages	population (x 1000)
1600	26.64	369	71.7	1076
1610	24.99	401	70.2	1127
1620	25.33	422	68.6	1143
1630	25.67	453	67.1	1184
1640	26.01	479	65.5	1206
1645	26.19	483	64.8	1195
1650	26.29	493	64.4	1207
1660	26.52	503	63.6	1205
1670	26.74	524	62.8	1230
1680	26.50	480	62.9	1139
1690	26.26	495	63.1	1189
1700	26.02	494	63.2	1202
1710	25.78	473	63.4	1163
1720	25.54	485	63.5	1204
1730	25.29	536	63.7	1350
1732	25.25	540	63.7	1364
1737	25.12	542	63.8	1378
1740	24.67	522	64.4	1361
1750	23.12	445	66.2	1275
1755	22.35	432	67.2	1296
1760	22.28	442	67.2	1335
1770	22.13	475	67.4	1446
1780	21.97	472	67.6	1453
1790	21.82	478	67.7	1483
1795	21.75	453	67.8	1410
1800	21.70	443	68.4	1396
1810	21.61	454	69.6	1462
1815	21.56	474	70.3	1546
1820	21.51	508	70.4	1663
1830	21.42	559	70.8	1849
1840	21.46	614	71.2	2035
1850	21.39	654	71.3	2179
1860	21.67	717	71.0	2349
1870	21.93	785	70.7	2530
1880	22.83	916	69.3	2780
1890	25.01	1128	65.9	2975
1900	28.47	1453	61.0	3114

	Dutch population (millions)		
	minimum	maximum	average
1600	<i>1.40</i>	<i>1.60</i>	1.500
1610	1.54	1.67	1.605
1620	1.62	1.71	1.665
1630	1.73	1.80	1.765
1640	1.82	1.86	1.840
1645	1.82	1.87	1.845
1650	<i>1.85</i>	<i>1.90</i>	1.875
1660	1.85	1.93	1.895
1670	1.90	2.02	1.960
1680	1.76	1.86	1.810
1690	1.83	1.94	1.885
1700	<i>1.85</i>	<i>1.95</i>	1.900
1710	1.79	1.88	1.835
1720	1.85	1.94	1.895
1730	2.07	2.17	2.120
1732	2.09	2.19	2.140
1737	2.11	2.21	2.160
1740	2.07	2.16	2.115
1750	<i>1.90</i>	<i>1.95</i>	1.925
1755	1.91	1.95	1.930
1760	1.97	2.00	1.985
1770	2.13	2.16	2.145
1780	2.14	2.16	2.150
1790	2.189	2.193	<i>2.19</i>
1795			2.08
1800			2.04
1810			2.10
1815			<i>2.20</i>
1820			2.36
1830			<i>2.61</i>
1840			<i>2.86</i>
1850			<i>3.06</i>
1860			<i>3.31</i>
1870			<i>3.58</i>
1880			<i>4.01</i>
1890			<i>4.51</i>
1900			<i>5.10</i>

Percentages and total figures for the Dutch population, which have been italicized, are based on immediate statistical observation or on data from earlier publications. See Appendix 1 for sources. For the nineteenth century also see the *Staatkundig en staathuishoudkundig jaarboekje voor 1850*, 318-21 and the *Annual Figures* for 1894 and 1901 published by Centrale Commissie voor de Statistiek. Since a few towns are not covered by these sources — particularly 1890 — we sometimes had to be satisfied with extrapolations.

In most instances the average share of the 29 towns has been computed by subtracting Amsterdam's percentage from the percentages for the 30 towns. For the years 1800, 1810, 1815, and 1820, the shares in percentages are extrapolations based on the 1795 and 1820 data for the 29 towns. In contrast with the total figure for the 30 towns (Amsterdam!) the share of this category showed only little change. The quotas for all 30 towns in those days have been computed by adding the percentages for the 29 towns to those of Amsterdam, which we were fortunately also able to determine also for the first decades of the nineteenth century on the basis of the 1815 data.

The computation of the Dutch population figures (columns 12-14) has been based on Amsterdam's proportions of the Dutch population (columns 1-3) and on the geometric means of the numbers of inhabitants for this city in the two adjacent intervals (see Nusteling, *Welvaart*, 240-1)

Translation: Drs. Peter van der Kaaij, Nijmegen.

NOTES

1. P.J. Blok, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche volk* (1914) III, 285, 295, 317, *sqq.*.
2. *Ibidem*, preface 1901.
3. *Ibidem*, 281-5. See also H. Nusteling, *Welvaart en werkgelegenheid in Amsterdam 1540-1860. Een relaas over demografie, economie en sociale politiek van een wereldstad* (Amsterdam-Dieren 1985) 214 note 101.
4. Blok, *o.c.*, 302, 441.
5. H. Brugmans, *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam* III (Utrecht-Antwerpen 1973²) 203-6.
6. J.C. Westermann, "Statistische gegevens over den handel van Amsterdam", *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 61 (1948) 3-15.
7. In J. Huizinga, *Verzamelde werken* II (Haarlem 1948) 436.
8. *Ibidem*, 505-7. Quotation, 507.
9. J.G. van Dillen, "Naschrift. De achttiende eeuw", *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 61 (1948) 17, *sqq.* See also his *Van rijkdom en regenten* ('s-Gravenhage 1970) 494-510, 649-54.
10. Ch. Wilson, *Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge 1941) 28, 31-2, 57, 61.
11. F. Braudel, *Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism* (Baltimore and London 1977) 85.
12. P. Boulle, "General comments" in: F. Krantz & P.M. Hohenberg eds, *Failed Transitions to Modern Industrial Society: Renaissance Italy and Seventeenth Century Holland* (Montreal 1975) 73.
13. A.M. van der Woude, *Het Noorderkwartier; Een regionaal historisch onderzoek in de demografische en economische geschiedenis van westelijk Nederland van de late middeleeuwen tot het begin van de negentiende eeuw* (Wageningen 1972) 604-11.
14. I. Schoffer, "Did Holland's Golden Age coincide with a period of crisis?", *Acta Historiae Neerlandica* I (Leiden 1966) 82-107. Also published in G. Parker & L.M. Smith, eds., *The General crisis of the Seventeenth Century* (London 1978). For a brief

- summary of several viewpoints, see E.H. Kossmann, "Some meditations in Dutch Eighteenth-Century Decline", in: Krantz and Hohenberg, *o.c.*, 49-54.
15. Jan de Vries, *European Urbanization 1500-1800* (London 1984) 39, 45. The figures for Italy are the unweighted averages of the percentages for the North, Middle and South of Italy as presented by De Vries.
 16. A comparison with the percentages for the remaining countries seems to indicate that either the figures for the Netherlands in 1550 are too low or those of before 1500 are too high.
 17. De Vries, *o.c.*, 29.
 18. The percentages in Table 1 have been raised or reduced in proportion with the growth or decrease of the population since 1650. For the population figures applied here, see De Vries, *o.c.*, 36.
 19. H. Schmal, "Patterns of de-urbanization in the Netherlands between 1650 and 1850", in: *Ninth International Economic History Congress, Debates and Controversies 2. The dynamics of urban decline in the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Times: Economic response and social effects* (typescript 1986) 455-62. This study is more readily accessible since it has been published in: H. van der Wee, ed., *Rise and Decline of Urban Industries in Italy and in the Low Countries (Late Middle Ages - Early Modern Times)* (Leuven 1988) 287-306, 291.
 20. B.H. Slicher van Bath, "Demografische ontwikkeling tijdens de Republiek", in: *Vaderlands verleden in veelvoud. 31 opstellen over de Nederlandse geschiedenis na 1500* (The Hague 1975) 319.
 21. Nusteling, *o.c.*, 240.
 22. Slicher van Bath, *o.c.*, 325. For Friesland see J.A. Faber, *Drie eeuwen Friesland. Economische en sociale ontwikkelingen van 1500 tot 1800* (Wageningen 1972) and H.P.H. Nusteling & Th. van der Weegen, "Dopen en trouwen en de bevolkingsomvang van Friesland in de periode 1655-1794", *It Beaken. Tydskrift fan de fryske akademy*, 46 (1984) 105-58. Particularly 119.
 23. Appendix 1.
 24. Nusteling, *o.c.*, 56-7, 94-5. J. Dupâquier, *La population française aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles* (Paris 1979) 98, observes that the 1740-43 crisis in France actually started in 1738.
 25. See Appendix 1. For Leiden also H.A. Diederiks et al., *Een stad in achteruitgang. Sociaal-historische studies over Leiden in de achttiende eeuw* (Leiden 1978) 23, sqq. and 105-8.
 26. Appendix 2. Cf. Amsterdam's decline starting about 1795 (Nusteling, *o.c.*, 33, 38, 40, 240).
 27. J.A. Faber, H.K. Roessingh, B.H. Slicher van Bath, A.M. van der Woude and H.J. van Xanten, "Population changes and economic developments in the Netherlands: a historical survey", *A.A.G. Bijdragen* 12 (Wageningen 1965) 47-113. Here one finds the following figures for the Dutch population before 1800: 1500, 0.9 to 1.0 million; 1550, 1.2 to 1.3 million; 1600, 1.4 to 1.6 million; 1650, 1.85 to 1.90 million; 1700, 1.85 to 1.95 million; 1750, 1.90 to 1.95 million; 1795, 2.078 million.
 28. If one wishes to compute the average trend (line g in diagram 2a) at the end of the fifty year period 1700-1750, this can be done by applying the formula $G = B - \frac{1}{2}A + \frac{1}{2}C$. G is the average value, A stands for the value in 1650 and B and C are the values in 1700 and 1750 (see diagram 2a). For the average value of one of the

preceding years, A' and C' are to be substituted for A and C, i.e., $A' = A + X/50(B-A)$ and $C' = C + X/50(B-C)$, where X is the number of years separating the year in question from origin B within the fifty year period ($X_{1732} = 32$). Substitution leads to the following formula for the average trend: $B + (A-C)(X-50)/100$.

Actual data are:

– urbanization for 30 towns:

A (= 1650): minimum 35.158%, maximum 36.108%;

B (= 1700): minimum 35.795%, maximum 37.730%;

C (= 1750): minimum 33.333%, maximum 34.211%.

– Amsterdam's share in the total population:

A (= 1650): minimum 9.211%, maximum 9.459%;

B (= 1700): minimum 10.462%, maximum 11.027%;

C (= 1750): minimum 10.513%, maximum 10.789%.

Therefore, the urbanization percentage in 1732 is

– for the 30 towns:

minimum = $35.795 + (35.158-33.333)(32-50)/100 = 35.795 + 1.825*-0.18$
 $= 35.795-0.3285 = 35.467$;

maximum = $37.730 + (36.108-34.211)(32-50)/100 = 37.730 + 1.897*-0.18$
 $= 37.730-0.341 = 37.389$.

– for Amsterdam:

minimum = $10.462 + (9.211-10.513)(32-50)/100 = 10.462 + (-1.302*-0.18)$
 $= 10.462 + 0.2344 = 10.696$;

maximum = $11.027 + (9.459-10.789)(32-50)/100 = 11.027 + (-1.33*-0.18)$
 $= 11.027 + 0.2394 = 11.266$.

29. Probability is computed on the assumption that the *average* values computed on the basis of minimum and maximum values can themselves be considered as value limits. It is furthermore assumed that the town totals are correct. Calculations have been carried out for 1700 and 1732, but since the relationship between both years determines the 1670 values, the result also holds for the latter year. The urbanization range in 1700 is 1.935 (= 37.730 (max.) – 35.795 (min.)), which is 0.652 higher than the highest value for 1732 (= 37.078), i.e., 33.7%. For 1732 the margin is 1.611 (= 37.078 (max.) – 35.467 (min.)), which is 0.328 smaller than the lowest value for 1700, i.e., 20.36%. The probability of both values occurring in a common range is $(100-33.70 = 66.60)\% * (100-20.36 = 79.64)\% = 52.80\%$. Within these 52.80% the probabilities of both values being equal or being unequal are both 50%, the 1732 value being greater than the 1700 value in 50% of the cases and smaller in the other 50%. For overall probability this means that in 60.40% of all possible cases, the 1700 value will be greater than the 1732 value, whereas chances are 1 in 4 (26.40%) that no change has occurred, and 1 in 8 (13.20%) that urbanisation increased between 1700 and 1732.
30. The location of such a strong decline in the years 1737-1755 is supported by the fact that extrapolating the share of the 29 towns from 1830 and 1795 to 1755, practically results in the minimum value for that year, as computed on the basis of 1737 and 1750.
31. Nusteling, *o.c.*, 119, 137.
32. Jan de Vries, "Preindustrial Netherlands", in: R. Rotberg, ed., *Population and Economy. Population and History from the Traditional to the Modern World* (Cambridge

- 1986) 101-22, 112-13.
33. H.F.K. van Nierop, *Van ridders tot regenten. De hollandse adel in de zestiende en de eerste helft van de zeventiende eeuw* (1984) 61.
 34. See H.P.H. Nusteling, "La population d'Amsterdam de la fin du XVIe siècle au début du XIXe siècle. Une méthode de reconstitution", in *Population* 41 (1986) 961-77, and Nusteling, *Welvaart*, 9-35, 72, 240-1. The method was also successfully applied to Friesland in Nusteling and Van der Weegen, *o.c.*. A study is also in progress in which the homeostatic method will be used to construct a population sequence for England from 1551 to 1873.
 35. Regional studies also point to decreasing population figures. See D.J. Noordam, *Leven in Maasland. Een hoogontwikkelde plattelandssamenleving in de achttiende en het begin van de negentiende eeuw* (Hilversum 1987) 77 (depressions around 1710 and 1800), and Nusteling & Van der Weegen, *o.c.*, 119 (decline of Friesland around 1710, 1740 and during the 1770s. As far as the latter period is concerned, the figures for the Netherlands express only minor stagnation), Nusteling, *Welvaart*, 52 (Limburg around 1680 and 1740), and Th. Engelen, "De bevolkingsontwikkeling in Staats-Valkenburg gedurende de 18de eeuw", in: *Studies voor de sociaal-economische geschiedenis van Limburg* 22 (1977) 76-7 (decline around 1800).
 36. E.A. Wrigley & R.S. Schofield, *The Population History of England 1541-1871. A reconstruction* (Cambridge, Mass. 1981) 207, 403, 528-9, 532.
 37. See note 36.
 38. Dupâquier, *o.c.*, 35, 37, 81. Between 1720 and 1790 the population of France would have grown by 22% as opposed to 16% for the Dutch population.
 39. Compare my urbanization percentages with the percentages for the agricultural population as presented by J.L. van Zanden, *De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw in de negentiende eeuw, 1800-1914* (Wageningen 1985) 353.
 40. If Holland held 43.5% of the total Dutch population in 1732 — the average of the percentages for about 1660 and 1795 (see Slicher van Bath, *o.c.*, 319) — then this province had 930.000 inhabitants in 1732 (computed on the basis of the total population figures for the Netherlands in Appendix 2). Therefore, it probably then had its largest population until the nineteenth century. For a comparison with a similar, but differently constructed total population figure for the Netherlands, see Nusteling, *Welvaart*, 248.
 41. G.H.J. Holthuizen-Seegers & H.P.H. Nusteling, "Arnhem tussen 1665 en 1714. Van gesloten samenleving naar ontluikende pluriformiteit en groei", in: *Bijdragen en mededelingen vereniging Gelre* 78 (1987) 65-105, 76-79, 96. On the basis of available population figures, it is generally assumed that the population of the Netherlands started to increase again after 1750. It seems, however, that 1715-20 (the end of Europe's crisis according to Hazard) should now be preferred, although the growth after that date was less pronounced for all of the Netherlands than for the countryside, because of the decline of the towns after 1737.
 42. See *De Nederlandsche Jaarboeken* (1751) 895, sqq. for the Proposition of 1751. Citation 896.
 43. One of the facts from which the modernization of England's economy may be deduced is the rise of real wages for construction workers (Wrigley & Schofield, *o.c.*, 643) which started soon after the beginning of the eighteenth century and lasted through mid-century, in spite of the growth in population through the 1730s. The increase of buying power after 1735 is a normal phenomenon for a

- diminishing rural population.
44. For the changing proportions of England's imports and exports after the middle of the 1730s, see B. Thomas, "The Rhythm of Growth in the Atlantic Economy of the Eighteenth Century", *Research in Economic History. An Annual Compilation of Research* 3 (1978) 17-8. Also see D. Omrod, "Dutch commercial and industrial decline and British growth in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries", in: Krantz & Hohenberg, *Failed Transitions* 36-43, 38-9 (large grain exports for England around 1750) and 41-2 (regarding linen and paper).
 45. J.G. van Dillen, "Het bedrijfsleven van Amsterdam in de achttiende eeuw", in: A.E. d'Ailly, ed., *Zeven eeuwen Amsterdam IV*, 78. See also H. Brugmans, *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam IV* (Utrecht-Antwerpen 1978²)23, 28-9, 78.
 46. See H.P.H. Nusteling, *De Rijnvaart in het tijdperk van stoom en steenkool 1831-1914* (Amsterdam 1974) 41-7.
 47. *Ibidem*, 399-414, and R.W.J. Bos, *Brits-Nederlandse handel en scheepvaart 1870-1914. Een analyse van machtsafbrokkeling op een markt* (1978) 78-92. Following R. Griffiths and J.M.M. de Meere, *Economische ontwikkeling en levensstandaard in Nederland gedurende de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw* ('s-Gravenhage 1982) 5, 32, 115, argues that the first signs of economic growth become evident around 1825-30, and that growth accelerated after 1850. De Meere seems to suggest here that the working classes did not benefit from greater prosperity because of the abundant supply of labor. P.W. Klein rightly posed the question whether the growth between 1825 and 1850, in view of all modernisation, could not be better characterized by change than by continuity in: *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 98 (1985) 276.
 48. Nusteling, *o.c.*, 403-5. See also 334-5, 405 (table 9.1) 459, 492-4 for my data on (per capita) national income on the basis of tax revenues.
 49. Bos, *o.c.*, 84-5.
 50. Van Zanden, *o.c.*, 353, 379.
 51. J. Bieleman, *Boeren op het Drentse Zand 1600-1910. Een nieuwe visie op de "oude" landbouw* (Wageningen 1987) 672-3, 676, and Bos, *o.c.*, 275-7.
 52. C.B.S., *13de algemene volkstelling 31 mei 1960*, Part 10 *Beroepsbevolking. C. Vergelijking van de uitkomsten van de beroepstellingen 1849-1960* (Hilversum 1966) 11.
 53. If my data on national income (see note 48) are combined with the figures on price development (Nusteling, *Welvaart*, 261) this results in the following index for real per capita income: 117 (1850), 100 (1855), 122 (1860), 140 (1865), 137 (1870), 148 (1875), 158 (1880), 174 (1885), 178 (1890), 183 (1895), 177 (1900), 180 (1905) and 192 (1910). This would imply that real per capita income had increased between 1855 and 1910 by over 90%. Preceding this development, buying power would have dropped, while around 1870 a stagnation in the development of wealth would have occurred and an even stronger depression around the turn of the century. It is striking that income would already have increased by 83% between 1855 and 1895.
 54. Van Zanden, *o.c.*, 353, 361, 378-83. The data on national income, which are computed on the basis of estimates of the various income categories, do not differ very much in general from the data mentioned in the previous note, which are based on the assumption of a generally constant tax quota. Wages in Amsterdam also more than doubled (Nusteling, *Welvaart*, 265). In view of our present knowledge, it is at least a rash and thoughtless statement when F.A.M. Messing

(*Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 96 (1981) 382) argues that "Nusteling's argument has been invalidated, where he rejects De Jonge's view on the phases of the "take-off" in the Netherlands in the years 1890-1914 and where he places the "rise" of Dutch economy shortly after 1850". It is interesting to note that Hille de Vries (*Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis* 97 (1984) 638) has his doubts whether all kinds of American concepts, including the "take-off", are the right instruments of analysis for the history of the Netherlands.

55. See Van Zanden, *o.c.*, 358-60. In this study on agriculture Van Zanden reaches the conclusion, partly on the basis of urbanization figures, that there was a turning point in the economic development of the Netherlands around 1850.

VII

PUBLIC LOANS AND MONEYLENDERS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NETHERLANDS¹

by

M. 't Hart

Whereas much of seventeenth century Europe could be characterized as "poor people, rich kings"², the United Provinces of the Netherlands astonished many by the abundance of the public's wealth and the state's public credit. No other state, except Genoa (which contracted loans at a rate of only 1.5 percent) could borrow more cheaply than the Dutch. The rates paid by the Dutch state were even reduced to a mere 3 percent at the end of the century. The United Provinces was a major exception to the "dismal succession of defaults" characteristic of many states.³ The credit worthiness of the Dutch state was regarded as one of the major causes of its military success in the early seventeenth century.⁴

What was the background of the Dutch financial success? In this article we will examine how the financial revolution in the province of Holland supported the financial management of the Generality, the central government of the federated provinces. Major institutional backing came from the Bank of Amsterdam, the *Wisselbank*, which was established in 1609. The accumulated resources of the Dutch bourgeoisie provided rich fields from which to harvest funds. An analysis of the subscription lists of the Receiver General of the Union and of some receivers of the province of Holland yielded data on the background of those who lent money to the Dutch state. The private purses supporting the Dutch state proved to be varied and numerous.

1. *The financial revolution*

Sufficient public credit during the seventeenth century would not have come about in Holland without the financial revolution of the sixteenth century. Public finance in Holland differed from that of other states in three respects: first, the voluntary character of the loans; second, the stability in interest payments through regular and permanent taxation; and third, the broad

distribution of the debt over domestic investors. The achievement of this smoothly functioning system of public finance was accomplished in the course of the sixteenth century. It enabled long-term credit planning and was based on an expanded pool of lenders.⁵

The system was called "funded" debt. Because the receiver who had issued the securities also collected the tax revenues, the servicing of the loan was guaranteed. Initially much of the debt was floated temporarily (short-term or floating debt), but long-term arrangements quickly became the rule. To secure the regular payment of interest, taxation (in particular excises) had to be increased at regular intervals. The broad tax base of the province, with no major exemptions and enhanced by a high degree of urbanization and commercialization, provided a firm basis for the loans. The cities had a well established tradition of issuing obligations, called *lijfrenten* (annuities) and *losrenten* (permanent loans).

For the young state, however, the situation was not favorable in the beginning. The United Provinces had been forced to suspend interest payments on its loans in 1581. Such a moratorium of payments was regarded as a "bankruptcy".⁶ A result was, of course, higher interest rates. Rates of 12 to 15 percent were not uncommon.

As trade developed and the chance of winning the war improved in the 1590s, credit was reestablished. Interest rates declined from 10 percent around 1600 to 4 percent in the 1650s.⁷ Much of this development was due to the crucial role played by the province of Holland, which served as a model for financial management and provided funds. Its inhabitants developed the habit of providing an income for their old age and for their families by buying government annuities. The great merchant Louis de Geer, for example, was proud to buy annuities as a present for his children, as his letter of 16 March 1646 showed:

"Children, I prayed God in the year 1619, that He should rule over you, the unborn as well as those already born, and allow you to be reared in his fear, so I vowed — so far as God heard my prayer — to give for each child two hundred guilders yearly; God heard my prayer and notwithstanding my many sins and crimes, awakened my joy in you and allowed it to grow.

Now I write you, this fatherly exhortation, that you will feel forever in God's debt, and that you will carry forward this charitable eulogy, always to remember the poor and behave righteously, and not think that your means lessen through such giving, but on the contrary, they will expand and grow, as seed that a fruitful Farmer sows.

This said story has moved me to purchase annuities for each child in the sum of 210 guilders yearly, with the understanding that the surplus 10 guilders should be for the poor (...). You can dispose yourselves of the money, and God pray that he so rules your hearts, that he implants in you the love for the poor (...) that you will hear forever the voice of our Lord Matt. Chapter 25, verse 34 and following (...).

Amen. Amen. Your Father, Louys de Geer."⁸

Public loans became a very popular investment item. Calculations show that by 1700 the amount of capital invested in government bonds exceeded all other investments.⁹

The Republic's public debt was heterogeneous in accordance with its federative character. There were obligations issued by the Union and by the Receiver General, the wealthy Philips Doubleth of The Hague.¹⁰ There were obligations and annuities issued by the individual provinces — primarily Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht. The five Admiralties issued loans (mainly obligations), while fifty-eight cities sold annuities and obligations. Other generality officers occasionally also borrowed money, such as the receiver of passports and the officials in the Generality Lands of Brabant and Flanders.¹¹

The shortage of cash in the 1570s and 1580s brought about the emergence of a new kind of loan: the semi-private *obligatie* issued by the receivers. Annuities (*lijfrenten*) and permanent loans (*losrenten*) had been based upon city finances, but the *obligatie* was a loan made by the receiver himself. The interest payment was his responsibility, for which he could use tax funds, but was not required to do so. Increasingly, the *obligatie* became anonymous, and were thus easier to sell on the market than the *losrente*, which was generally sold in an individual's name. Actually, *obligaties* were used in anticipation of future revenue (either tax funds, annuities or permanent loans), yet they came to be renewed regularly. The receivers received a commission for the issue of the loan (*makelaardijgeld*).¹²

Obligaties became more popular than the *losrente*, because they were easier to transfer. Life annuities, yielding about twice the interest of an *obligatie* or *losrente*, were highly sought after as well. The age of the nominee was not taken into account, and this could be quite profitable for the lender. At regular intervals, it was stipulated that one could buy a *lijfrente* only in combination with a *losrente*.¹³

All these securities could be sold at the Amsterdam Bourse, established in 1611. There, government bonds were in demand, despite the fact that most of them were not easy to transfer. Even the terms of the Generality loans were not uniformly worded. But when they were sold, they were sold for a good price on the market. The Republic's credit was underscored by the fact that the bonds issued in the sixteenth century were sold at 112 and 113 percent of their face value, despite the conversions of these debts at the beginning of the seventeenth century and in the 1640s. Property holders obtained additional security in 1651, when a law was enacted which confirmed the negotiability of bonds.¹⁴

For the prudent investor, relatively safe investments included the loans negotiated by the city of Amsterdam, the province of Holland, and the Union. At times, investors competed to obtain shares in public loans.¹⁵ On the other hand, the administrators of the Dutch public debt profited from the accumulated capital amassed in Amsterdam and other thriving cities:

"Dutch credit was regarded as something exceptional. The rate of interest was low and itself an index to the integrity of the Generality; its moderate level may also be explained by the fact that capital seeking sound investment outside the risks of commerce was abundant in Holland throughout the age of her greatness".¹⁶

Amsterdam achieved a dominant position in the international bullion trade and became the world's financial center, marked by the establishment of the Bank of Amsterdam. Although the link was only indirect, the Bank of Amsterdam was a major backbone of the Republic's financial policies. It stabilized and regulated the stock of precious metals and was regarded as the lender of last resort for the Dutch Republic.¹⁷

2. *The generality debt*

The long-term debt of the Generality dated from 1596. These loans were always contracted as semi-private obligations of the Receiver General of the Union. Before 1596, loans had been paid back in the short or medium term, supported by Holland's powerful financial intermediaries. For a long-term loan from England, for example, the Dutch had pawned Flushing, Brielle and Rammekens. The funded character of the Generality debt was not watertight; much of the revenue was temporary or extraordinary, like the tax on beer and soap in the sixteenth century or the revenue from confiscations. The only tax which lasted longer, used to meet the Receiver General's interest payments, was the one on salt.¹⁸

Often additional credit was necessary and wealthy merchants were asked to guarantee a loan contracted by the Generality. Johan van der Veeken of Rotterdam, for example, provided security for loans contracted by the Receiver-General. Guarantees could also be provided by high officials in the central state machinery, such as the Treasurer-General Joost Brassier.¹⁹ At other times, support was asked from the Estates of Holland as a body, the city of Amsterdam, the Admiralty of Amsterdam or the Dutch East India Company (VOC). When these institutions refused to cooperate, the central government experienced great financial difficulty. In 1621 and 1623, when the Estates of Holland were prepared to guarantee only their quota for a loan, the Receiver General Doubleth could hardly get his loans subscribed.²⁰ These years assumed a crisis character for the Dutch state.

In 1618, the total debt of the Generality amounted to *f* 4,893,960, with an annual debt service of *f* 318,113. This does not include the loans contracted for foreign states and princes: the Palts, Brandenburg, East Frisia, Embden and Sweden, which totaled *f* 1,286,127 and were guaranteed by the Dutch State, but were contracted by the Receiver Reael in Amsterdam, the Receiver of the Amsterdam Admiralty Hoeffijser, the City of Amsterdam and the Estates of Holland.²¹

When resumption of war became likely at the end of the Truce, the Council of State tried to pay off the long-term Generality debt incurred before 1618. Fears of restricted credit because of the large debt were not imaginary. Never before had the Dutch state been faced with such a large, continuous burden. Holland and Zeeland welcomed the proposals to reduce the debt. To redeem these loans, they wanted to increase taxation or levy new taxes, especially in the Generality Lands and also in other provinces. However, other provinces were less willing to do this. Utrecht and Friesland reacted stubbornly, stating that they did not want to pay for debts incurred by other provinces which had defaulted on their payments. In their view, the provinces which had defaulted should be required to pay their debt. Groningen tried to find a solution in the customs: they should be used to pay off the old debts. But the Council of State described Groningen's proposal as an illusion: the customs were not even sufficient to pay for the expenses of the navy itself.²²

Despite protests made by Utrecht, it was decided to bring the debt service under the *Staat van Oorlog* (the Generality's war budget) and to make a repartition of the quota for Holland. In return, Holland would have to pay less for direct military expenses. Holland's credit was correctly regarded as the best and it was thought that this arrangement would have a positive effect upon future loans.²³

In the following years, the States General tried to contain the debt as much as possible and to reduce the burden of the debt charges. However during the 1620s, a decade of a continuous war pressure, the debt mushroomed. By 1630, so many loans had been contracted that the Receiver General of the Union, Philips Doubleth, barely managed to raise new ones. Yet in a pamphlet entitled *Treves-Krack* (1630) it was stated:

"I know very well, that the country is in urgent need of funds, and that warfare is very costly, but I know also, that costs as such are not opposed to making profits (...) and even when our country has no money, it still has its credit, and the enemy has neither funds nor credit".²⁴

The anonymous author was right: after all, "the enemy", Spain had gone bankrupt in 1627. Its soldiers eventually mutinied, tired of waiting for their money. Dutch troops, on the other hand, were well-paid, "second to none in Europe".²⁵ Yet they were only paid at the expense of an increase in the Generality's long-term debt. In 1648, the debt stood at f 13,151,505, while sixty years later it had reached the 70 million mark.²⁶

3. *The lenders to the union*

The burden had never been so large. Who was willing to subscribe to the Union's loans? Registers recording the subscriptions made to the obligations issued by the Generality in 1649 and 1650 have survived. These registers

appear to list the conversions of old debts and the subscription of new ones after the general reduction in the interest rates from 6.25% to 5%.²⁷ All loans were of a semi-private character: they were issued after a decision by the Council of State and the approval of the States General, but the administration of the loans was completely in the hands of the Receiver General himself.²⁸

Of all subscribers, 44 percent of the buyers' names were recorded, while 54 percent were anonymous. The registers list the amount and the date of the purchase. In these two years, there were a total of 3,501 subscriptions. The smallest amount subscribed was *f* 50, while the highest single subscription was *f* 39,750. The total amount raised was *f* 6,037,004 and each subscription on average amounted to *f* 1,700.²⁹

The obligations bought in an individual's name were usually smaller than the ones sold to bearer. The former averaged *f* 1,500, while the latter averaged *f* 1,900. Most likely, the truly large investors, and perhaps also the more regular ones, preferred an anonymous bond which could more easily be sold on the market.

We are left with a possible analysis of 1,700 known buyers. Among them, we also find big, regular and repetitive subscribers. After eliminating the names which appeared more than once, 1,178 names are left, including 607 males, 485 females and 86 "collective" subscribers.

The proportion of females subscribing to these loans was quite large: 41 percent. Dutch women apparently had a significant say in the management of their finances. In general, the amounts they invested were somewhat smaller than those invested by men. In examining the percentage distribution of the six categories in table 1, we find that the largest number of women invested in loans of *f* 500 and under, whereas for males the category of *f* 1,001 to *f* 2,000 was the largest.

Table 1 *Percentage distribution of the amount subscribed by individuals to the Receiver General of the Union 1649-1650, total (including collective subscribers, males and females) and according to sex*

<i>Amount</i>	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>	<i>All</i>
0- 500	14.3	28.5	20.6
501- 1000	26.0	27.4	26.7
1001- 2000	28.2	21.0	24.4
2001- 5000	21.9	16.0	19.3
5001-10000	6.9	4.9	6.5
10001 and over	2.6	2.1	2.5
total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=	607	485	1178

In general, the distribution among the females descended fairly evenly, whereas the distribution among males was skewed to the categories *f* 501-*f* 1,000 and *f* 1,001-*f* 2,000. Males and females, however, were almost equally represented among the really big investors (over *f* 10,000).

Looking at the amounts subscribed by males, we find a mean of *f* 2,500 and a median of *f* 1,000. There was a striking difference in the average investment between the different classes of male investors. Those with a title of *heer*, owners of a manor (comparable to seigneur), invested the most: *f* 6,000. Those with a title of *jonkheer* or *baron* (which were not always necessarily genuine titles of nobility³⁰) invested less, but nevertheless invested more than the average: *f* 4,000. Next in line came those with a university title, such as *meester* or *doctor*, and those with the title of *secretaris* or *griffier*, which indicated considerable bureaucratic status. Their average investment was the same as that of the entire sample: *f* 2,500. As for those for whom we could not trace any specific title or occupation, their subscription was lower than average: *f* 2,000.

In comparing the female subscriptions to those of the males, we found a lower mean (*f* 1,900) and median (*f* 750). The category with the title *vrouwe* (*n* = 10) on average subscribed *f* 6,100, whereas their male counterparts with the title *heer* on average invested *f* 6,000. A group of females with the distinction *joffrouwe* subscribed an average of *f* 2,000, which is slightly higher than the average loans of all females. More significant were sums from the widows in our population (*n* = 11), who on average lent *f* 3,000. But as far as we could gather information concerning the background of our female subscribers, widows did not dominate the population of female obligation holders. As for those women without any further title or specification, their funds averaged *f* 1,600.

The group of collective subscriptions comprised 7 percent of the total. Sixteen consisted of two or more individuals who might be married or be brothers and sisters. Inheritances incited investments. Five investments were made by the guardians of one or more orphans and thirty investments were made by a group of inheritors. Institutions like church boards, guilds, orphanages, poor houses, etc. accounted for thirty-five of the investors. The collective investments were considerable: on average *f* 3,000. Those of the institutions were clearly above average, with a mean of *f* 4,500.

Among the known investors during 1649 and 1650, we find a total investment of *f* 2,652,920 with an average of *f* 2,300 and a median of *f* 1,200. Together, the top ten investors (not even 1 percent of all subscribers, see Appendix) invested *f* 305,850. This is 12 percent of the total invested in the obligations sold to named individuals. Despite the size of their investment, we must conclude that the distribution over separate investors was really quite large: over two-thirds lent *f* 2,000 or less.

The largest investor during these years was *Heer* Mr Davidt le Reu de Wilhelm (1588-1658) who subscribed *f* 54,000 in eleven parts. He was a man

of considerable political influence in central government politics. Born in Hamburg and initially a merchant, he moved to The Hague where he became Councillor to the Stadtholder Frederick Henry and Councillor and Superintendent for Brabant. He was married to Constantia Huygens who was a daughter of Christiaan Huygens (the influential first secretary of the Council of State). Her sister was the wife of the Receiver General of the Union, Philips Doubleth, who had issued the loans.³¹

The other male investors among the top ten also lived in The Hague. *Heer* Nicolaes de Bije, from a Leiden family, invested *f* 28,100 in five parts. He was a Councillor in the High Court of Appeal in The Hague. The nobleman Willem van Lier, *Heer van Oosterwijk*, was a Councillor in the Court of Holland in The Hague. He bought five obligations which totaled *f* 22,700.³² Johan van der Maa (*f* 21,200) was a goldsmith and a future burgomaster of The Hague.³³ Jacob Schotte (1607-1670) invested *f* 19,350 in nine parts. He was a descendant of a distinguished family from Zeeland and Councillor of the High Court of Appeal in The Hague.³⁴

There were three women among the ten largest subscribers. *Joffrouwe* Pertronella van Campen bought fifteen obligations, which totalled *f* 45,100. *Vrouwe* Agnes van Asteleij subscribed five times (*f* 27,050). Maria Andries, who probably came from Brielle, bought seven obligations for a total investment of *f* 20,550.

Two institutional investors were included in the top ten. Both came from Enkhuizen. The regents of the orphanage bought twelve obligations totalling *f* 20,100, while four church boards collectively invested *f* 47,750 in the Dutch state.

Among the other subscribers we found Adriaan Pauw, the famous *raadpensionaris* of Holland, who was listed next to Maritje Cornelis, the wife of a shoemaker in The Hague. The usher Barent van Langenes bought an obligation, as did Willem Kalkoen, a goldsmith in Amsterdam. Adriaen Doubleth, a brother to the Receiver, was also included in the list, as was Captain Jan Gideonsz, who had distinguished himself on a ship of the brothers Lampsins in privateering against the Dunkirkers.³⁵

We are not in a position to give a breakdown of all the subscribers. The occupation and place of origin of only 14.8 percent of the population can be traced. This fact is however relevant by itself. It indicates the broad range of those purchasing obligations. The subscribers were not restricted to the charmed circle of political leaders and wealthy merchants, although this circle may have provided the largest investors.³⁶ There was, in fact, an amazing number of people who invested their funds in the state, who obviously trusted the state and this included common people.

4. *Holland's debt*

Many more investors invested in the public loans of the province of Holland. The debt of the province had stood at *f*1.5 million in 1620. It increased rapidly as Holland played a crucial part in financing the war and new loans were raised, particularly in the later 1620s. It coincided with the rapid build up of military forces during the Dutch counteroffensive. The Southern Quarter's debt stood at *f*44.4 million in 1632 and *f*92.3 million in 1647. By the end of the Eighty Years' War, Holland's debt (Southern and Northern Quarters combined) stood at *f*150 million, with an annual debt service of 6 to 7 million guilders.³⁷

For any long-term loan issued by the province — be it either in the form of *obligaties*, life annuities or *losrenten* — the consent of the Estates of Holland was required. The amount of the loan was then divided over the major tax receivers: the central receiver at The Hague for the province; the six large traditional cities (Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, Amsterdam, Gouda); Rotterdam, Gorinchem, and Brielle; and sometimes Schiedam and Schoonhoven.³⁸ The quota roughly resembled the proportion of each in the tax yields. In a minority of the cases, the distribution was different. This was, for example, the case in 1642 with a loan for the Admiralty of Rotterdam, in which bonds were sold in Haarlem, Leiden and Rotterdam. Another example is a loan made in 1646 for the *Groote Visserij* (herring fisheries) when sums only came from the provincial receiver, Delft, Rotterdam and Brielle.³⁹

The buyers of Holland's bonds were, like those of the Receiver-General of the Union, spread out over many categories of the population. Because the loans were issued by the separate receivers of the constituent cities, the subscribers were also geographically spread out. Magistrates could be urged to subscribe during difficult times to stimulate buyers.⁴⁰ Many, apparently, followed their example.

As compared to our analysis of the creditors of the Republic, we had many more registers listing the names of debt holders at our disposition.⁴¹ We took two samples: one coinciding with the registers available for the Receiver General of the Union, consisting of loans issued from August 1648 to December 1650 (henceforth "1650"). This had the advantage that a comparison could be made with the Republic's creditors. The other sample is from 1628. This was one of the most critical years for the Republic and for Holland, with considerable wartime pressures upon its finances. In all probability, the most important investors, those subscribing regularly to the loans issued by Holland, should be found in this sample. A second criteria for selecting the registers for this year is that they have been preserved in a reasonable state. *Lijfrenten* books, however, were not included in our analysis, as only the registers for the later years have been saved. This probably did not harm our overall analysis: the same names appear in the obligation books, the *losrenten* lists and the *lijfrenten* accounts. There is no

evidence that females tended to invest more in life annuities.⁴²

In 1628, a total of 1,409 obligations and *losrenten* were sold, with a total value of *f* 2,102,549. The average subscription amounted to *f* 1,500. In 1650 the number of subscriptions was lower (*f* 1,084), but the average amount subscribed was higher (*f* 2,100) for a total investment of *f* 2,280,471.⁴³

There were some significant differences between the separate tax receivers in the various cities. The bookkeeping for the provincial loans show that each receiver had considerable freedom in selecting the means he used to meet his quota. Some receivers, like Boudewijn de Man in Delft, made a repartition of the sum they had to raise, after which they sold bonds in the smallest possible amount and in multiples of that amount. For example, in 1628 de Man's bonds were for 515 guilders, 1,031 guilders and so forth. Most receivers used more straightforward bookkeeping, accepting sums of 1,000, 1,600 or 2,000 guilders. Each receiver, obviously, had some persons in his neighborhood who were willing to subscribe the small and irregular sums needed to complete the issue. Some receivers could decide not to raise loans at all. Mr Johan Uytenbogaert at Amsterdam, for example, could draw upon his reserves from a loan in the year before.

The instruments used to raise the loan also differed. The Amsterdam receiver primarily raised his revenue through issuing obligations, and only used *lijfrenten* and *losrenten* as an additional measure. Likewise, in Brielle, Jacob van der Goes rarely issued *losrenten*. In Delft *losrenten* also constituted a small share of the loans. In 1628, 12 *losrenten* were issued for a total of *f* 7,915, in comparison to 157 obligations with a value of *f* 216,753. In 1650, 2 *losrenten* were issued for a total of *f* 1,500, and 91 obligations valued at *f* 44,761. On the other hand, in some cities the receivers did not rely on the sale of obligations. For example, Johan van Berckel in Rotterdam and Gerart van der Hoeij in Gorinchem, primarily issued life annuities and *losrenten*.

No *losrenten* from our sample were anonymous, although books of other years showed that these bonds could be sold to bearer. They were almost invariably lower than obligations. Obligations were more often sold anonymously. In Leiden 8 percent of the obligations were anonymous, for the provincial receiver 11 percent and for Amsterdam 15 percent. But Delft was the absolute winner in this field. Fifty percent of the obligations sold in 1628 were anonymous as were 59 percent of those sold in 1650.⁴⁴ Also, inhabitants of The Hague may have subscribed to the loans issued by the receiver in Delft. Those sold in other cities were all bought in an individual's name, at least in our sample.

It is difficult to make consistent statements concerning the origin of our non-anonymous creditors. Again, occupation or place of origin were not listed in most of the cases. Fortunately, some of the registers provided relevant information. As for those investing in Amsterdam in 1628, at least 16 percent came from outside the city; most of them from Broek in Waterland (Northern Quarter). Of those investing in the 177 *losrenten* sold by Haarlem

in 1628, at least 48 percent came from outside the city: the highest proportion (21 in number) coming from Monnickendam, followed by Zaandam (19), Oostzaan (15), and Broek in Waterland (10). Leiden, likewise, attracted capital from rural areas. For example, in 1628, 20 of its 24 *losrenten* were sold to residents of Oosthuizen, Landsmeer, and Bèets. Moreover, Amsterdam's inhabitants invested in bonds issued in Haarlem and vice-versa.

Collective investors (institutions and groups of inheritors) accounted for 19.9 percent of all subscriptions to obligations and *losrenten* in 1628 and 1650. A major part came from the University of Leiden which underwrote the *losrenten* issued by the Leiden tax receiver. After subtracting the collective loans from the whole, we found that females subscribed to 40 percent of the loans. Neeltje Cornelis, from Dordrecht, subscribed the smallest amount. In 1650, she subscribed *f* 14 with an annual interest of 14 stuyvers (*f* 0.70).

Our analysis concentrated on the creditors of the provincial receiver at The Hague and of the local receivers in Amsterdam and Rotterdam because of the available studies on the *vroedschappen* of these cities. As we have noted above, Amsterdam had virtually stopped issuing *losrenten*. Most of its funds came from obligations. No *losrenten* were sold in 1628. One was sold in 1649 to Bartholomeus Schout for *f* 1,904. In 1650 one was sold for *f* 2,300 to Johannes Oorschot. Rotterdam, on the other hand, issued only one obligation in 1628, to Engel Herck van Hertdorp for *f* 4,800, and one in 1649 for *f* 2,996 to Jacob Vervoorn.

We singled out the double subscriptions. The result is a table showing the percentage distribution of the investors in loans made by Holland (table 2).

Table 2 *Percentage distribution of the amount subscribed with the Receiver-General of Holland, the Receivers in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, 1628*

<i>Amount</i>	<i>RG Hol</i>	<i>Amsterdam</i>	<i>Rotterdam</i>
0- 500	15.2	5.4	27.8
501- 1000	23.2	32.4	44.4
1001- 2000	23.2	27.0	16.7
2001- 5000	26.1	24.3	10.0
5001-10000	10.4	8.1	1.1
10000 and over	1.9	2.7	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	211	74	90

The distribution of the obligations sold by the provincial receiver Joachim van Mierop was fairly equally divided over the middle categories between *f* 501 and *f* 5,000. For Amsterdam, few subscriptions were found in the

smallest category, obligations up to *f* 500. Most of the subscriptions, almost one-third, were in the category *f* 501-*f* 1,000, with declining values in the subsequent categories.

As we could have expected, in Rotterdam (receiver: Eewout van Bijlwerff) the sale of small bonds dominated. Rotterdam probably resembled many of the other smaller cities of Holland, while Amsterdam was more of an exception in its debt management. The financial center of Holland, obviously, could draw upon the largest incomes. More than a third of the investors in Amsterdam invested more than *f* 2,000. In Rotterdam, only eleven percent of the investors were found in this category, while 72 percent invested *f* 1,000 or less.

How much did this distribution change over time? Table 3 presents the distributions of the loans in "1650".

Table 3 *Percentage distribution of the amount subscribed at the Receiver General of Holland, the Receivers in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, August 1648-December 1650*

<i>amount</i>	<i>RG Hol</i>	<i>Amsterdam</i>	<i>Rotterdam</i>
0- 500	13.9	5.0	24.5
501- 1000	27.8	16.8	17.3
1001- 2000	23.5	25.1	30.6
2001- 5000	23.5	34.6	17.3
5001-10000	7.8	9.5	9.2
10000 and over	3.6	8.9	1.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	281	152	98

In comparison to 1628, a similar distribution seemed to reign for the creditors of the Receiver General of Holland, although the middle categories had grown somewhat larger. For Amsterdam, however, the middle categories increased significantly. The largest category was now *f* 2,001-*f* 5,000, instead of *f* 501-*f* 1,000. For Rotterdam the sums also increased, but there were two peaks: one with investments up to *f* 500 and another with investments between *f* 1,001 and *f* 2,000.

Looking at the means and medians, we found the same pattern: an increase in investments for Amsterdam and Rotterdam. For the Receiver General of Holland, however, the amounts were almost the same in 1628 and 1650: (zie tabel 4)

The average investment in Rotterdam increased from *f* 1,000 to *f* 1,900, while the median increased from *f* 800 to *f* 1,600: both almost doubled. In

Table 4 *Mean and median investments at receivers in Holland (rounded figures)*

	mean	median
Receiver General Union 1650	2300	1200
Receiver General Holland 1628	2300	1600
Receiver General Holland 1650	2500	1600
Receiver Amsterdam 1628	2300	1500
Receiver Amsterdam 1650	3600	3000
Receiver Rotterdam 1628	1000	800
Receiver Rotterdam 1650	1900	1600

Amsterdam, the mean investment rose from *f*2,300 to *f*3,600, while the median rose from *f*1,500 to *f*3,000. This was, however, not the case with the Receiver of Holland. Although the mean investment increased somewhat, the increase was much smaller than in Amsterdam or Rotterdam. The median investment remained the same: 50 percent of the investments were *f*1,600 or less.

These data tell us something about the financial position of the bureaucratic center. The Hague was of importance and remained so, but wealth seemed to increase at a much faster rate in other centers in Holland, as we observed for Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

How did this compare with the Receiver General of the Union? Like the provincial receiver of Holland, he was located in The Hague, and generally drew upon more or less similar resources. The number of subscribers to the Receiver for the Union was larger in 1649-1650, yet the average and median sums were smaller: a mean of *f*2,300 and a median of *f*1,200, for a total sum of *f*2,652,920. Also, the sums were mostly invested in the lower categories. This may point to a greater trust in the finances of Holland *vis-à-vis* those of the Republic.

Holland also attracted large investors from outside the province. Among the top ten investors of 1628 for the Receiver General of Holland (Appendix), we found at least two investors living outside Holland: Rutgert Huygens (*f*16,774), who was a burgomaster of Arnhem⁴⁵; and *Jonkheer* Adam van Lockhorst, heer van den Lyer (*f*44,343). Lockhorst was born in Utrecht and was a member of the College of Nobles. He later married Cornelia Pauw and became a delegate to the Generality's Chamber of Accounts in The Hague.⁴⁶ He was the single largest investor in the sample of 1628.

As for the sample of 1650, the second largest investor in the top ten was Mr Johan Dedel (*f*21,266). He was the President of the Court of Holland in The Hague and died in 1655.⁴⁷ He had also invested in obligations in 1649, in a life annuity from the Receiver Van Mierop in 1630 and in two others in 1638. Mr Dirck van Schilperoort (*f*20,000) was the receiver of church property in Delft, and a former burgomaster of that city. *Heer* Mr Cornelis Haga (1578-

1654; *f* 16,000) was a lawyer and former envoy in Turkey. He became President of the High Court in The Hague in 1645.⁴⁸ *Heer* Willem Backer (1595-1652; *f* 14,120) belonged to the Amsterdam magistrature and was a director of the VOC, burgomaster of Amsterdam and captain of the city militia. He had also bought a life annuity in Amsterdam in 1629.⁴⁹ The next largest investor with the colorful name of *Heer* Guiljam Bartolotti (1602-1658; *f* 12,000) was a famous Amsterdam banker. His father had been Willem van den Heuvel, who changed his name into Guilliello Bartolotti. His son (our investor) stood at the head of several banking houses and enterprises, trading with the Levant and Italy in particular. He was a director of the Dutch West India Company, owned the monopoly of export of copper from Denmark, and was one of the financiers of the Stadtholder Frederick Henry.⁵⁰ The only woman in the top ten, Maria van Berckel (*f* 11,200), was married to Paulus Verschuer. He was the Receiver in Rotterdam, a burgomaster and a woolens merchant in the same city. Moreover, she was the sister of Receiver General of Holland, Johan van Berckel, who had issued the loan.⁵¹

Among the smaller investors, we found the wife of the receiver general of Holland, Hillegont van der Aa, who invested *f* 8,497. Princess Maria d'Orange, married to William II, invested *f* 10,000.⁵² Lijsbet Jans, a *dienstmaecht* (servant), held a bond to the considerable sum (for her) of *f* 750. She was listed next to the envoy of Sweden, Sir Camerarius. He was the only one we could trace as foreigner in these samples. Most funds seemed to have come only from domestic backgrounds. However, there might have been foreign lenders among the anonymous obligation holders.

The famous merchant Pieter Trip (1597-1655) was the largest single subscriber in Amsterdam (*f* 78,000). He owned several enterprises, specialized in weaponry, was one of the Amsterdam Commissioners of the Sea and one of the Commissioners of the Bank of Amsterdam.⁵³ Also among the top ten was Jacob Willemsz Hooft (1588-1659; *f* 16,400). He was a merchant and a regent of several institutions in Amsterdam.⁵⁴ Cathryna Lodden (1602-1671), one of the three female investors in the top ten (*f* 16,250), was married to Hillebrand Pietersz Vinck, master of equipage at the Admiralty of Amsterdam.⁵⁵ Her fellow subscriber, Aeltjen Trist (*f* 20,000) was a widow. Institutions also figured in the top ten for Amsterdam: the Old Men's House (*f* 25,000), the Leperhouse (*f* 17,800), and others. Two members of the Heeremans family were among the ten largest investors in 1650: Cornelis Heeremans (*f* 20,800) and Maria Heeremans (*f* 18,400). This wealthy family had lived in Amsterdam since the fifteenth century, but because of their Catholic background they were not a part of the city government in the seventeenth century.⁵⁶ Not listed among the top ten but also subscribing: Jacob, Cathryna, Elisabeth and Mattheus Heeremans, all brothers and sisters of Maria and Cornelis.⁵⁷

Among the smaller subscriptions we found Dr Willem Piso, a medical

doctor to Count Johan Maurice of Nassau, the silk merchant Reynier van Neck, and the famous burgomaster, Cornelis Bicker, *Heer van Swieten*.⁵⁸ The future *raadpensionaris* Johan de Witt invested in obligations in Amsterdam, although the receiver of his city Dordrecht must have offered him the opportunity to make investments as well.

Looking at the Rotterdam investors whose occupations could be traced, we find a wide variety of investors. Also, in comparison to Amsterdam, many funds seemed to stem from inheritances. One of the most important investors was Pieter Sonnemans (1588-1660), a merchant and a director of the VOC, who invested *f* 7,600. The wealthy Willem van Couwenhoven (died 1659) subscribed *f* 6,000. He was a brewer and a burgomaster.⁵⁹ Joost Verschuyren de Oude and Anna Verschuyren, father and sister of the receiver, were also among the subscribers. Furthermore, for some smaller sums, there were Elisabeth Claesdr, servant (*dienstmaecht*), *f* 200. An orphan of Steven Cornelisz, sailor (*zeevarende man*), bought a *losrente* of *f* 124 guilders and the skipper Pieter Symonsz bought one of *f* 1,200 guilders.⁶⁰

5. Conclusion

A large number and a wide range of creditors supported the Dutch state in the seventeenth century. It was an extremely broad base to contract public loans with.

In all, two-fifths of the non-anonymous creditors to the Union and the province of Holland were female, a large proportion, due in all probability to the independent capacity of women to invest their own funds and to the fairly secure character of the Dutch public debt. Most of the subscriptions were small. Bonds of 50 or 100 guilders were not a deterrent for several servants and artisans. Apparently, most loans were domestic, placed within the borders of Holland itself.

As for the provincial debt, we notice a difference between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The first could contract larger loans and used the instrument of semi-private obligations, while Rotterdam issued predominantly the traditional *losrente* and drew much from inheritances and collective subscribers. Yet, in comparison to the Receiver of the province, we found that local receivers gradually took in a larger share of the funds, while the "center" continued to attract funds at the rate established in the 1620s.

Holland's credit radiated to the Generality. That the Generality's debt was only partially secured through funding did not seem to matter. The Republic's public finances compared favorably with that of other contemporary states. The great elasticity of the Dutch money market, the access to the world's financial center and international commercial capital flows, the sound financial institutions (the Bourse and the Bank of Amsterdam in particular), the success of the financial revolution in Holland and, above all, a large body of *renteniers* were the major contributors to this phenomenon.

APPENDIX

Top ten investors Receiver General of the Union, 1649-1650:

1. *Heer* Mr Davidt le Reu de Wilhelm (54,000);
2. Four Church boards of Enkhuizen (47,750);
3. *Joffrouwe* Petronella (van) Campen (45,100);
4. *Heer* Nicolaes de Bijе (28,100);
5. *Vrouwe* Agnes van Asteleij (27,050);
6. *Jonkheer* Willem van Lier, *Heer* van Oosterwijk (22,700);
7. Johan van der Maa (21,200);
8. Maria Andries (20,550);
9. Regents of the orphanage of Enkhuizen (20,100);
10. Jacob Schotte (19,300).

Top ten investors Receiver General of Holland, 1628:

1. *Jonkheer* Adam van Lockhorst (44,343), *Heer* van den Lyer;
2. *Vrouwe* Louise van der Noot (25,500), *Vrouwe* van Hoog- en Aertswoude;
3. *Heer* Rutgert Huygens (16,774);
4. *Joffrouwe* Clara van Swansbil (14,600);
5. *Jonkheer* Lodewijck de Rockelsing (8,971), *Heer* van Nazareth;
6. *Jonkheer* Abraham de Bijе (8,500);
7. *Jonkvrouwe* Dorothea de Bijе (8,500);
8. *Jonkvrouwe* Maria de Bijе (8,500);
9. *Heer* van Rysoir (8,500);
10. *Joffrouwe* Margaretha de Cester (8,000).

Top ten investors Receiver General of Holland, 1649-1650:

1. Jan Meyndertsz van Aeckeren (29,204);
2. Mr Johan Dedel (21,266);
3. Mr Dirck van Schilperoort (20,000);
4. *Heer* Mr Cornelis Haga (16,000);
5. Jan Adriaensz Gansenburg (16,000);
6. *Heer* Willem Backer (14,120);
7. *Heer* Guiljam Bartolotti (12,000);
8. Maria van Berckel (11,200);
9. Dirck Dedel (11,000);
10. Cornelis Jacobsz (11,000).

Top ten investors Receiver at Amsterdam, 1628:

1. Jacob Willemsz. Hooft (16,400);
2. Jacob Hendricksz. Servaes (13,000);
3. Regents Leperhouse (8,300);

4. Pieter Jan Mathijsz. (8,000);
5. Regents Huisarmen Nieuwezijds (7,000);
6. Pieter Wttenbogaert (6,000);
7. Frans Jacobsz. Hinlopen (6,000);
8. Stephanie Loene, orphan (5,200);
9. Regents Gasthuis (5,000);
10. Rachel Arents, housewife Jacob Laurens (4,800).

Top ten investors Receiver at Amsterdam, 1650:

1. Pieter Trip (78,000);
2. Old Mens' House Amsterdam (25,000);
2. Jacob van Eeden (25,000);
4. Cornelis Heeremans (20,800);
5. Isaac Senior (20,000);
5. Aeltjen Trist (20,000);
7. Maria Heeremans (18,400);
8. Leperhouse Amsterdam (17,800);
9. Cathryna Lodden (16,250);
10. Nicolaes van Bambeek (16,000).

Top ten investors Receiver at Rotterdam, 1628:

1. Guilliam Dullert (7,000);
2. Children Abraham Balde (4,100);
3. Maritgen Lievens, widow (4,000);
4. Regents Gasthuis (3,200);
5. Vaster Anthonisz. (3,200);
6. Mr Willem van der Graeff (3,000);
7. Regents Heilige Geesthuis (2,400);
8. Hans de Wael (from Gorcum) (2,400);
9. Jacob van Nispen (2,200);
10. Regents Pesthuis Rotterdam (2,000).

Top ten investors Receiver at Rotterdam, 1650:

1. Agatha Welhelmx (11,900)
2. Meyndert Verhoven (10,000);
3. Pieter Sonnemans (7,600);
4. Maria Visch (7,000);
5. Elisabeth van Casperen (6,731);
6. Helena Bijlwerff (6,000);
7. Children Maerten de Reus (6,000);
8. Willem van Couwenhoven (6,000);
9. Adriana Beaumont (5,600);
10. Camile Hoorn (5,600).

NOTES

1. I am very grateful for comments upon earlier drafts by Maarten Prak and Henk van Nierop.
2. Cf. chapter five in C. Webber & A. Wildavsky, *A history of taxation and expenditure in the Western World* (New York 1986).
3. I. Wallerstein, *The modern world system* (New York 1980) II, 57. For defaults in French public debt management, see for example: R. Bonney, *The King's debts; Finance and politics in France 1589-1661* (Oxford 1981) 274-276.
4. G. Parker, "The emergence of modern finance in Europe", in: C.M. Cipolla, ed., *The Fontana History of Europe* (Glasgow 1974), 573; S. Homer, *A history of interest rates* (New Brunswick 1977) 174; J.G. van Dillen, "Amsterdam's role in the seventeenth century Dutch politics and economic background", in: *Britain and the Netherlands* 2, (1964) 382; M.G. Buist, *At spes non fracta; Hope & Co. 1770-1815. Merchant bankers and diplomats at work* (Den Haag 1974) 23, 69. Cf. discussion in P.W. Klein, "De wereldhandel in edele metalen 1500-1800: centraliteit of polycentriciteit?", *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 100 (1987) 185.
5. J. Tracy, *A financial revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands* (Berkeley 1985) 3; J.C. Riley, *International government finance and the Amsterdam capital market 1740-1815* (Cambridge 1980) 2.
6. D. Houtzager, *Holland's lijf-en losrenten voor 1672* (Schiedam 1950) 45. For the financial difficulties in Delft in the 1570's see J.H. van Dijk, "De geldelijke druk op de Delftsche burgerij in de jaren 1572-1576", *Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde* 107 (1935) 185.
7. J.J. Weeveringh, *Handleiding tot de geschiedenis der staatsschulden* (Haarlem 1852) I, 6; J. de Witt lowered the interest rate to 4 per cent in 1655.
8. Quoted by S. Marshall, *The Dutch gentry 1500-1650* (Greenwood 1987) 91.
9. According to P. Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam* (London 1974) 56-57. Studies on the income of eighteenth century urban elites showed that 50 to 70 percent of their income derived from state, provincial and city rentes. M. Prak, *Gezeten burgers* (Amsterdam 1985) 117; J. de Jong, *Met goed fatsoen* (Amsterdam 1985) 109; L. Kooijmans, *Onder regenten* (Amsterdam 1985) 100.
10. See B.E. de Muinck, *Een regentenhuishouding omstreeks 1700. Gegevens uit de privé-boekhouding van Mr Cornelis de Jonge van Ellemeet, ontvanger-generaal der Verenigde Nederlanden* (Den Haag 1965). See also M. 't Hart, "Staatsfinanciën als familiezaak tijdens de Republiek: de ontvangers-generaal Doubleth", in J.T. de Smidt, ed., *Fiscaliteit in Nederland*, (Zutphen 1987).
11. Loans from the receiver of passports: see *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal* in: *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën* [R.G.P.] 23 August 1621, 15 February, 29 March 1622. On loans in the generality lands: *Algemeen Rijks Archief* [A.R.A.] [State Archives] Slingelandt 247; J. 77; *Groot Placaet Boeck vervattende de Placaten ...* I (The Hague 1644) 1502; A.C.M. Kappelhof, *De belastingheffing in de Meierij van Den Bosch gedurende de Generaliteitsperiode* (Tilburg 1986) 87.
12. Obligations were renewed every six months or annually: yet, because renewals were rare, they were regarded as long-term debt, raised against "interest". See J. Tracy, "The taxation system of the County of Holland during the reigns of Charles V and Philip II, 1519-1566", *Economisch- en Sociaal- Historisch Jaarboek* 48 (1985) 71-117, p. 76-77. *Makelaardijgeld* had been 1% but was reduced to 0.5% in

- 1605: Houtzager, *Holland's lijf-en losrenten*, 127. The abolition of this brokerage upon the continuation of loans was promulgated in 1640; for the new loans, *makelaardij* continued.
13. After 1652, an *attestatie de vita* was required for each payment of interest upon annuities. J. Smit, *Inventaris van het archief van de Financie van Holland* (Den Haag 1947) 20; P.J. Blok, "Stadsfinanciën onder de Republiek", *Verslagen en Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Academie van Letteren* V-2 (1917) 234. Smit alleges that *losrenten* were never anonymous, however, in the books of the A.R.A.: Financie Holland we found several anonymous ones (*Ibidem*, 14). Neither have we found proof of his statement (*Ibidem*, 10) that obligations could be dissolved only by the debtor. Neither Smit nor Houtzager (in *Holland's lijf-en losrenten*) mention anywhere that the crucial differentiating aspect of obligations was that they were *semi-private*.
 14. Weeveringh, *Handleiding geschiedenis staatsschulden*, I, 4; J. de Vries, *The economy of Europe in an age of crisis* (Cambridge 1976) 227.
 15. See for example H.H.Rowen, *John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland* (Princeton 1978) 119.
 16. A.V. Judges, "Money, finance and banking from the renaissance to the eighteenth century", in: *European Civilization* (London 1937) 445.
 17. J.G. van Dillen, *Van rijkdom en regenten* (The Hague 1970) 354; P. Vilar, *A history of gold and money* (New York 1976) 209.
 18. See *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal* in: R.G.P., 2 November 1621, for funds from salt reserved for the interest payments; also M. 't Hart, "Salt trade and salt taxes in the Netherlands", in: *Le roi, le marchand et le sel* (Villeneuve d'Ascq 1987) 293-314.
 19. *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal* in: R.G.P., 2 and 3 February 1607; for the Treasurer General Brasser: A.R.A.: Generaliteitsrekenkamer 94: 17 February 1627 and 28 January 1628; J.H. Kernkamp, *Johan van der Veeken en zijn tijd* (Den Haag 1952); W.E. van Dam van Isselt, "De geldmiddelen onzer republiek voor den veldtocht van 1599", *Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde* (1920) 5-2, 9-56.
 20. *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal* in: R.G.P., 28 June and 7 July 1621, 15 September 1622, 5 August and 26 October 1623, 24 January 1624.
 21. A.R.A. Staten-Generaal 12548-194: Register of Generality loans until 1619. The annual interest for the foreign loans was *f* 77,688. On the continuation of those debts, see: *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal* in: R.G.P. 1 November 1619, 16 March 1620, (Embden/Frisia) 2 December 1619, 13 January 1620.
 22. *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal* in: R.G.P., 9 February, 27 August, 21 October 1619, 29 July 1620, 27 October 1621; A.R.A. Staten-Generaal 12548.194.
 23. A.R.A.: Generaliteitsrekenkamer, *Staat van Oorlog*, 1621.
 24. *Treves-Krack, door een gesprek van twee slechte gesellen*, New York Public Library 1630. For Doubleth's difficulties, see: A. van der Capellen, *Gedenkschriften* (Utrecht 1777)I, 573. For more pamphlets concerning the peace talks with the king, see J. Israel, *The Dutch republic and the Hispanic world* (Oxford 1986) 223.
 25. C.R. Boxer, *Dutch Seaborne Empire* (London 1965) 4.
 26. Excluding a debt of *f* 1.5 million which was contracted in 1635-1640. Based upon A.R.A. Staten van Holland 1291, a and ARA: Staten-Generaal, 12548-188: "Stukken betreffende genegotieerde penningen"; 12548.194 "Staten van penningen"; *Staten van Oorlog*. For 1613: R.G.P., 1-11-1613 (debt charges

- f 559,327). By 1726, the Generality's debt would stand at f 70 million; J. Aalbers, *De Republiek en de vrede van Europa* (Groningen 1980) 331. The largest part of the debt consisted of wages to troops and for the maintenance of fortifications. For the origin of the Generality's debt, see A.R.A.: Raad van State, 2103 IV.
27. The generality followed Holland's reduction of 1640. A.R.A.: Generaliteitsrekenkamer, 2328; on the conversion: Houtzager, *Holland's lijf en losrenten*, 154.
 28. See Instruction Receiver-General in: A.R.A.: Generaliteitsrekenkamer, 94. The requirement of the combined approval of the Council of State and the States General dated from 1628. Before, approval from either one had been sufficient.
 29. Henceforth, averages are presented in rounded figures to the hundred.
 30. H. van Nierop, *Van ridders tot regenten* (Amsterdam 1984) 31.
 31. His family was known later as Leu de Willem; *Jaarboek Genealogie* 25. See on the Huygens' connection also P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, "De bruiloft van Susanna Huygens", *De Zeventiende Eeuw* 3 (1987) 181. On the family Doubleth, see R. Fruin, "Uit het dagboek van een oud-Hollander", *De Gids* 33 (1869) 372; also M. 't Hart, "Staatsfinanciën als familiezaak tijdens de Republiek: de ontvangers-generaal Doubleth", in: *Fiscaliteit in Nederland*, 57-66.
 32. See H.E. van Gelder, "Haagsche Cohieren", *Die Haghe Jaarboek* (1913) 23.
 33. A.R.A.: Raad van State, 2103 IV; H.P. Fölting, *De vroedschap van 's-Gravenhage* (Pijnacker 1985) 137-138.
 34. F. Nagtglas, *Levensberichten van Zeeuwen* (Middelburg 1893) 607.
 35. Elias, *Vroedschap*, 656, 326, 978, 761; Fölting, *Vroedschap*, 90.
 36. These elites are listed in the reference works consulted for this survey. From the known investors, we could find only additional details, such as biographical data and their occupation, for the largest ones. Used were: Elias, *Vroedschap*; Engelbrecht, *Vroedschap*; Fölting, *Vroedschap*; A.J. van der Aa, *Biographisch woordenboek* (Amsterdam 1964); Nagtglas, *Levensberichten Zeeuwen*; *Nederland's Adelsboek*, *Nederland's Patriciaat*.
 37. Loans raised: see P.H. Engels, *De belastingen en de geldmiddelen van den aanvang der Republiek tot op heden* (Utrecht 1862) 23-24; confirmed by A.R.A.: J. Cats. Figures on Holland's debt varies, due to exclusion of the Northern Quarter one time, inclusion of life annuities another time, exclusion of the semi-private obligations for a third time, etc. The most reliable figures appear in Houtzager, *Holland's lijf-en losrenten*, 38, 142. His figures are apparently based upon the *Memorie* of the A.R.A.: Financie van Holland 797 or 806. I found a confirmation of the figures, drafted in 1667, with *retroacta* to 1652, in Gemeente Archief Amsterdam 5030.153. The debt of the *obligations* and *losrenten* amounted for the Southern Quarter in 1632 to f 37.3 million, in 1647 f 92.3 million and in 1652 f 96.3 million. Its *lijfrenten* amounted in 1632 to f 7.1 million, in 1647 f 7.5 million, no figures for 1652. Totals, respectively 1632 and 1647: f 44.4 million and f 99.8 million. The *obligations* and *losrenten* of the Northern and the Southern Quarter amounted in 1652 to f 121.2 million, to which approximately f 30 million should be added for the *lijfrenten*. Debt charges Southern Quarter 1652: f 6,058,840 for *obligations* and *losrenten*, f 932,633 for *lijfrenten* (which would point to almost f 10 million in *lijfrenten* for the Southern Quarter).
 38. A.R.A. J. Cats, 18.
 39. A.R.A.: Financie van Holland, 249. In addition, arrears in payments of provincial officers could be transferred into loans. Loans could be placed through the

- intermediary of a city, a board of a rural district or an admiralty. Cf. "Lijst capitalen" in A.R.A.: Van Hoornbeek, 66 later in the century.
40. Such as 1653 in Dordrecht; Houtzager, *Holland's lijf-en losrenten*, 162.
 41. A.R.A.: Financie van Holland, 337-383.
 42. For example: Willem Backer (1595-1652) burgomaster of Amsterdam; Pieter Roelofs burgomaster of Zwolle; Dirck de Goyer from Utrecht; Mr Simon van Baarsdorp secretary to Leiden; Justus Baack (1597-1681) merchant; Councillor Dedel; Leonard Casembroot; Willem Schade; Constantijn Huygens; Herbert van Beaumont. A.R.A.: Financie van Holland, 344 and 367. See also A.R.A.: Heereman, 2658 for an account of obligations, rentes and annuities from the same family in 1630.
 43. A.R.A.: Financie van Holland, 246, 249, 251, 252, 278, 279, 281, 283, 289, 296-316.
 44. J. Tracy had described the powerful tradition of this city on the *renten* market, which apparently gave it a lead over the others, even over Amsterdam. Tracy, *Financial revolution*, 127; J.J. Woltjer, *Een Hollands stadsbestuur* (Leiden 1985) 261; Van Dijk, "Geldelijke druk", 167. However, Delft experienced an overburdening by loans in the 1570s; Houtzager, *Holland's lijf-en losrenten*, 147: in 1640 and 1641, again the debt burden seemed too large, as Delft needed a subsidy of the Estates of Holland (each time f 200,000) in order to restore its credit. Smit, *Inventaris*, 20 mentions unworthy *lijfrenten* issued by its receiver in 1640.
 45. Van der Aa, *Woordenboek*, 67.
 46. Elias, *Vroedschap*, 196.
 47. Van Gelder, "Haagsche Cohieren", 23.
 48. He was married to Aletta Brassier, who may have been an a sister to the Treasurer General.
 49. Elias, *Vroedschap*, 364; ARA Financie van Holland, 367.
 50. Elias, *Vroedschap*, 388; P.W. Klein, *De Trippen in de zeventiende eeuw* (Assen 1967) 197, 385.
 51. Engelbrecht, *Vroedschap*, 137.
 52. A.R.A.: Financie van Holland, 249.
 53. Elias, *Vroedschap*, 266; Klein, *De Trippen*, 35, 184.
 54. Elias, *Vroedschap*, 151.
 55. Elias, *Vroedschap*, 320.
 56. As Hoeffijsser went bankrupt, this might well have been the reason that this piece of paper survived the ages. On Hoeffijser: W.F.H. Oldewelt, "De Hoeffijsserse schuld", *Jaarboek Amstelodamum* 51 (1959) passim. Claes' son Sylvester was a lawyer and engaged in settling the debts.
 57. J.A.M.Y. Bos-Rops, *Inventaris van het archief van de familie Heereman van Zuydtwijck* (Den Haag 1987) xxv: "roomsgezind en schatrijk"; xxvi: Sylvester, Maria, Cornelius, Elisabeth, Jacob and Cathryna were probably children of Claes Heeremans (1562-1650), a famous banker. He had been active in the magistrate before 1578; A.R.A.: Heeremans, 21, "Stukken terugbetaling lening Sylvester Heeremans", A.R.A.: Heeremans, 2658, "Aantekeningen betreffende los-en lijfrenten".
 58. Elias, *Vroedschap*, 175.
 59. Engelbrecht, *Vroedschap*, 160.
 60. Listed in A.R.A.: Financie van Holland, 248.



VIII

"ROUGH MUSIC" OUTSIDE EUROPE; THE CASE OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY JAVA

by

P. Boomgaard

In a Sundanese-Dutch dictionary, dated 1879, we find the following explanation of the term *ngadeungkleung*: "A woman, caught in the act of adultery, being led around on horseback, sitting back to front, as a punishment, clad only in a *cawet* (loin-cloth), her head covered with an *aseupan* (coniform basket for steaming rice) to which a *wera* flower was attached, her face besmeared with mud and dirt; a punishment of former times".¹

The following explanation for the word *ngagembréng* is given in a dictionary of a somewhat later date: "A person found guilty of adultery is dressed up in a ridiculous fashion and led around, either on foot or back to front on horseback, in order to expose him or her to derision; old customary law".² The word itself is derived from *gembréng*, meaning cymbal, and another source makes it plausible that this cymbal was used during the aforementioned procession.³ In all probability both words (*ngadeungkleung* and *ngagembréng*) refer to the same ritual: the former word emphasizing the ride on horseback, the latter one the noise being made.⁴

This description of a customary law punishment from the nineteenth-century Sunda area (western Java, Indonesia) reminds one forcefully of the now rather well researched *charivari* or "rough music" of Europe. A subject popular with nineteenth century folklorists, *charivari* has recently drawn the attention of a number of historians and anthropologists predominantly interested in European history from the fourteenth century onward.⁵

If we survey the recent contributions to the ongoing debate concerning the origins, meanings and functions of *charivari*, it seems that the term often is employed in two different ways. In the first place, there is *charivari stricto sensu*: a "noisy popular ritual expressive of mockery or hostility"⁶ organized and carried out by the village youth (particularly male bachelors), occasioned by a remarriage of a widow or widower or when there is a large discrepancy between the ages of the prospective marriage partners.⁷ The usual interpretations of this ritual stress three factors: the noise that was made in

order to chase away or alternatively, represent the ghost of the defunct husband or wife of the remarrying widow or widower; the aggression of the village youth against someone who, after having been married already once, took away one of the (few) eligible local girls; and the derision owing to the disparity in ages. This description and its explanation fits the early *charivaris* (fourteenth through seventeenth centuries). From the eighteenth century onward, the same ritual is employed against other infractions of local norms and values.⁸

Most writers, however, use the term *charivari* or "rough music" in a much broader sense. It then covers all (often noisy) rituals against infringements of community norms: often – but not always – related to sexual behaviour and/or behavioural rules for married couples.⁹ For these authors *charivari* is a generic concept of which the *charivari* "proper" is but one sub-category. Other often mentioned sub-categories are the "skimmington ride" or "*promenade sur l'âne*", where the culprit (or his/her neighbour) is paraded, back to front, on horseback or on the back of a donkey, occasioned by wives who had beaten their husbands or by henpecked husbands in general¹⁰; and the "*chemin de paille*" or "*jonchée végétale*", which is a trail of straw or bran between the houses of illicit lovers.¹¹

When an author uses the term *charivari*, it is not always immediately clear whether this concept refers to *charivari* proper or to *charivari* as a generic category. Sometimes both meanings of the term are used in the same article or even on one page.¹²

Returning now to the Javanese case described earlier, it can be said that it combines a number of charivaresque elements (a noisy procession, the ride on horseback, adultery/fornication as the "crime" to be punished) but in a rather unorthodox way, at least if we take the European "model" as our point of departure.¹³ Given this mixture of striking similarities and equally remarkable differences, a number of obvious questions arise.

- 1) Are the similarities between the Javanese and the European *charivari* entirely fortuitous, a "freak" occurrence; ultimately based on atavistic elements common to all human beings or can we find some historical connection?
- 2) How strong is the link between a certain breach of the community rules (e.g. wives beating their husbands) and a specific form of charivaresque punishment (e.g. the donkey-ride)?
- 3) Does the Javanese example give occasion to some rethinking of current interpretations of the European *charivari* (in the generic sense of the word)?

These questions are, of course, interrelated. For reasons of clarity, however, it seems appropriate to separate them analytically and to try and answer them one by one, starting with the second question. If it can be demonstrated that causes and forms of *charivaris* do not appear in rather rigid pairs, there is a greater probability that the Javanese and European *charivaris* were linked historically.

Although it is far from easy to find any author stating explicitly that the *charivari* is an exclusively European phenomenon restricted to the period 1300-1950, it seems that in many recent contributions to the debate such a restriction is at least tacitly assumed to be valid. The proceedings of the 1977 Paris symposium on *charivari* include three non-European contributions, but the subject matter of these contributions is so totally different from the European examples that they seem to emphasize the "Europeanness" of *charivari* more than any explicit statement to that effect could have done.¹⁴ Although later on I will show that charivaresque phenomena were certainly not restricted to Europe between 1300 and 1950, for the time being I shall examine the European manifestations only -as if they constituted the entire universe of *charivari* appearances- in accordance with recent practice.

The question, then, remains to be answered whether certain causes and specific forms of *charivari* were always found in fixed combinations. In other words, whether remarriage of widows or widowers could be "punished" by a *charivari stricto sensu* only, and whether such a ritual could occur only when a widowed person remarried.

The answer to this question is represented in the following matrix in which the x's indicate the "classical" combinations, whereas the name of a country stands for at least one reference to any other link between a certain "crime" and a specific "punishment".¹⁵

	remarriage	husband beating	adultery/fornication
<i>charivari</i> proper	x	England	
<i>promenade sur l'âne</i>	Italy	x	Belgium England France
<i>chemin de paille</i>	Netherlands		x

One glance at this matrix, based on a restricted number of articles (and therefore far from exhaustive), shows that many combinations were possible. E.P. Thompson expresses a similar view when he states that the *charivari* (in the broader sense of the word) was more or less "neutral" regarding functions and typology, and that it could serve various ends.¹⁶ Other writers emphasize the continuity of the various external forms of *charivari* rituals versus their changing functions due to structural transformations in European society between 1300 and 1950.¹⁷

In other words, the Javanese combination of a noisy procession with the victim back to front on horseback, brought about by illicit sexual relations,

would not have been an exotic pageant in late mediaeval or (early) modern Europe.

Having said this we can relax two self-imposed conditions: that we should look at Europe only and that our search should be restricted to the period 1300–1950. It then appears that at least one charivaresque combination, to wit the *promenade sur l'âne* as a punishment for adultery, did exist outside Europe and/or before 1300. We find references to classical India and Asia Minor, and to Russia and Persia in more recent times.¹⁸ As this happens to be precisely the combination that we found in nineteenth-century Java, we are now in a much better position to discuss the first question raised above: whether similarities between these Javanese manifestations and those of Europe are a matter of pure chance or whether we may assume some historical connection.

If we regard the possibility that it was pure chance as an *ultimum remedium*, we may start with considering two theoretically possible historical connections: a direct influence from Europe (particularly the Netherlands) on Java, or a common origin for both phenomena. We shall consider both possibilities in turn.

Dutchmen had been present in Java since 1600, and the first territorial establishment of the Dutch East India Company (V.O.C.) dates from 1619. Up to 1800, however, the Dutch were hardly interested in village affairs or even physically present in small communities outside the few harbour towns on Java's north coast. During the nineteenth century the Dutch colonial state in the East Indies, of which Java was an important part, became more and more involved in the affairs of local communities. Is it, therefore, not possible that Dutch people had introduced these charivaresque manifestations in (Western) Java? In my opinion there are a number of reasons that militate against such an interpretation.

In the first place, these phenomena are already described as customs of older days around 1880. The wordings of the dictionaries cited are such, that one is inclined to assume that these manifestations at the time of writing could not be observed anymore.¹⁹ Although nowadays the idea of the "invention of tradition" has been firmly established in the minds of most researchers, this charivaresque manifestation must have been a very short-lived tradition indeed if it had been invented after 1800 and had already (almost) disappeared by 1880.

In the second place, it seems that the *promenade sur l'âne* was not a phenomenon that could be found all over the Netherlands. Whereas around 1930 the *charivari* proper was still remembered in most Dutch provinces, the donkey ride is only reported for the province of Limburg.²⁰ Finally, one wonders why any Dutchman would have wished to introduce such a curious ritual in Western Javanese villages. If for any reason whatsoever a local Dutch civil servant might have wished to punish adultery or fornication, he could have issued a decree to that effect as was done in a number of Eastern Javanese

districts.²¹ There was no need to introduce any "tradition".

Perhaps one should also consider the fairly remote possibility that a European immigrant who had "gone native" and had no connection whatsoever with the civil service, would try to introduce a charivaresque custom from his home town. If this custom had been entirely alien to the local population, it is not very likely that such an attempt at introduction by a lower-class European, with no official status, would have been successful.

That leaves us with the second possibility: a common origin of Javanese and European *charivari* manifestations. References to classical India and Asia Minor seem to suggest an early Indo-Germanic origin of the donkey ride/adultery complex. As it is also generally accepted that Java underwent strong influences from India in an early phase of its development (first centuries A.D.), it is tempting to regard the Javanese *promenade sur l'âne* as part of the same Indo-Germanic heritage. At this stage of the research such a hypothesis is, of course, mere speculation, but it might be a stimulus to experts in (early) Indian and Indonesian cultural history to look for charivaresque phenomena. If such rituals were to be found in sources which up to now have not been searched for this specific purpose, detailed descriptions and relevant background information would be more than welcome.

I am fully aware of the fact that my references, cited at the beginning of this article, are sadly lacking in sociologically relevant particulars, even if they are fairly specific in folkloristic detail. We do not know, for instance, whether every case of illicit sexual intercourse was punished with a noisy donkey ride. Nor do we know whether Javanese (or rather Sundanese) and Dutch officials permitted such goings-on to be carried out, or whether the Islamic "clergy" had anything to do with them.²² Finally, we lack any information concerning the actual organizers of the *promenade sur l'âne*.

On the last issue, however, I can at least present the reader with a possible answer, inferred from other sources on Java but to an even larger extent based on my knowledge of the European situation. If I had not known that in late mediaeval and early modern Europe the village youth were often the actual organizers of the *charivari*, it might not have occurred to me to look for similar groups in nineteenth century Java. The evidence consists of two elements:

- 1) From 1830 onward we find occasional references to groups of single male adolescents (*perjaka*, *sinoman*, *kanoman*) in Javanese villages. They have their own leaders, and they are employed by the village administration for various village services.²³
- 2) In a more recent anthropological study we find the following passage: "If a couple were discovered to be illicitly sleeping together, the neighbours would be enraged, and usually send a group of village officials, or more often a *group of young men*, to storm the house where the couple are and force them to marry".²⁴

The organized bachelors mentioned in the nineteenth century, and the use of

young men as a kind of moral police in the twentieth, do bring to mind the Abbeyes of Youth of late mediaeval and early modern Europe.²⁵

We can now turn to the third and final question. Does the Javanese example give occasion to a rethinking of current interpretations of the European *charivari* (in the generic sense of the word)?

In the first place this example justifies, in my opinion, the inclination of some scholars to regard the various charivaresque manifestations as sub-categories of a larger phenomenon. If one limits oneself to specific combinations such as the *charivari stricto sensu* with the remarriage of widow(er)s, the possibility of interpretations that are too broad or too narrow is never absent.

This brings us to a second, related point. All interpretations of the symbolism of charivaresque phenomena, often derived from nineteenth century folklorists, that emphasize the Christian and/or European background of these symbols, might have to be restudied in the light of the possible non-Christian or non-European origins of some of these rituals. Such a consideration for instance, applies to current interpretations of the noise made during the *charivari* proper in late mediaeval and early modern Europe. The "rough music" which accompanied the mock rituals for remarrying widow(er)s was seen as either an attempt to chase away the ghost of his or her former partner, or alternatively as a reenactment of the noisy *chasse sauvage* of restless dead souls, and therefore as a representation of the defunct partner.²⁶ Both interpretations link the noise aspect of the ritual too strongly to both remarriage and Christian-cum-European beliefs regarding dead souls, given the fact that similar noisy rituals occur when remarriage is not the issue at stake, and in societies which have other ideas about souls.

Finally, this case study seems to support the view of those scholars who have stressed the continuity of the various external forms of *charivari* versus their changing functions. As a footnote to this view, I may add that it is equally remarkable that sometimes form and content may have been transmitted together, from place to place and from one century or even millennium to another, with only minor changes of detail.

NOTES

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1. H.J. Oosting, *Soendasch-Nederduitsch woordenboek* (Batavia 1879) 645.
2. S. Coolsma, *Soendaneesch-Hollandsch woordenboek* (Leiden 1884¹, 1913²) 188.
3. *Adatrechtbundel*, VIII ('s-Gravenhage 1914) 108.
4. In Coolsma's dictionary the terms are cross-referenced.
5. A good introduction is J. Le Goff & J.C. Schmitt, eds., *Le charivari* (Paris 1981), which also contains a very useful bibliography.
6. J. Goody, J. Thirsk & E.P. Thompson, eds, *Family and inheritance; Rural society in Western Europe 1200-1800* (Cambridge 1976) 399.
7. Such a "strict" interpretation for instance in N. Belmont, "Fonction de la dérision et symbolisme du bruit dans le charivari" in: Le Goff & Schmitt, *Le Charivari*, 15-21.
8. See e.g. C. Ginzburg, "Charivari, associations juvéniles, chasse sauvage", 139, and A. Burguière, "Pratique du charivari et répression religieuse dans la France de l'Ancien Régime", 194, in: Le Goff & Schmitt, *Le Charivari*.
9. For a recent example of this broader use of the term see e.g. M. Ingram, "Ridings, rough music and the 'reform of popular culture' in early modern England", *Past & Present* 105 (1984) 81.
10. On Skimmington ride/*promenade sur l'âne* see N.Z. Davis, *Society and culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford 1975) 100; J.L. Flandrin, *Families in former times; kinship, household and sexuality* (Cambridge 1979) 124; D. Fabre & B. Traimond, "Le charivari gascon contemporain: Un enjeu politique", in Le Goff & Schmitt, *Le charivari*, 23; Ingram, "Ridings", 86; P.J. Meertens, "Ketelmuziek in de Nederlanden", *Neerlands Volksleven* XII (1961/2) 82; D.J. van der Ven, *Het Carnavalsboek van Nederland* (Leiden [ca. 1939]) 68-69. Thompson ("Rough music": Le Charivari anglais", *Annales E.S.C.*, 27 (1972) 296) mentions the fact that in eighteenth and nineteenth-century England "ridings" were often directed against men who had beaten their wives!
11. On the *chemin de paille* see Fabre & Traimond, "Le charivari gascon", 23; M. Segalen, "Les derniers charivaris? Notations tirées de l'Atlas folklorique de la France" (1943-1950)", in Le Goff & Schmitt, *Le Charivari*, 68; M. Jacobs. "Charivari en volksgerichten; Sleutelfenomenen voor sociale geschiedenis", *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis* 12 (1986) 382; Meertens, "Ketelmuziek", 86.
12. E.g. Flandrin, *Families*, 125.
13. The term Javanese will be used in the broad sense of the word appertaining to Java; it does not necessarily refer to etnical Javanese. The term charivaresque will be used as a short expression for charivari in the broad sense of the word, as defined in this article.
14. Le Goff & Schmitt, *Le Charivari*, 337-360. P. Spierenburg, *De verbroken betovering; Mentaliteitsgeschiedenis van preïndustrieel Europa* (Hilversum 1988) does not regard it as plausible that charivari occurred before 1300 (p. 44).
15. The references for the "non-classical" combinations are: *charivari* proper/adultery: Ingram, "Ridings", 87; *promenade sur l'âne*/remarriage: C. Klapisch-Zuber, "La 'mattinata' médiévale d'Italie", in Le Goff & Schmitt, *Le Charivari*, 155; *promenade sur l'âne*/adultery: A. Bricteux, "Le châtiment populaire de l'infidélité conjugale", *Revue Anthropologique* 32 (1922) 324 (Belgium); Thompson, "Rough music", 288 (England); Burguière, "Pratique", 193 (France); *chemin de paille*/remarriage: Meertens, "Ketelmuziek", 86.
16. Thompson, "Rough music", 309.

17. See e.g. I. Chiva & F. Zonabend, "Le rituel; macro-analyse; Rapport introductif", in: Le Goff & Schmitt, *Le Charivari*, 367.
18. P. Saintyves, "Le charivari de l'adultère et les courses à corps nus", *L'Ethnographie* (nouvelle série) 32 (1935) 7-36; P. Schmitt-Pantel, "L'âne, l'adultère et la cité", in Le Goff & Schmitt, *Le Charivari*, 117. In the Sangam literature (cc. 50-150 A.D.) we find references to the ride on a hobby-horse made of palmyra leaves, in situations of "unrequited love" and "forced love" (J.R. Marr, *The eight anthologies; a study in early Tamil literature* (Madras 1985) 22-27. I owe this last reference to Ms. H.J. de Bruin.
19. There is however one example, dated 1913, of a Javanese charivaresque manifestation surviving into the early twentieth century: in Meester-Cornelis, a suburb of Batavia (now Jakarta), an adulteress had been led around in procession (no mention of a horse or specific attire). When the assistant-*wedana* (head of police) rescued the woman, an angry mob smashed his household effects; "De inlandsche pers", *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* 2 (1913) II, 1329.
20. Meertens, "Ketelmuziek"; Van der Ven, *Carnavalsboek*, 68-69. Of course it should be remembered that not all V.O.C. soldiers and sailors were Dutch.
21. P. Boomgaard, *Children of the colonial state; population growth and economic development in Java, 1795-1880*. (Amsterdam 1987) [Ph.D.dissertation] 224.
22. With the exception of the Meester-Cornelis case from 1913, where the assistant-*wedana* tried to stop the procession (see note 19).
23. Boomgaard, *Children*, 94-95.
24. H. Geertz, *The Javanese family: A study of kinship and socialization* (Glencoe 1961) 71 [italics mine].
25. See in particular Davis, *Society and Culture*, 97-123.
26. See Belmont, "Fonction", 19-20; Ginzburg, "Charivari", 133- 135.

IX

THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE DUTCH MILITARY REGISTERS AS A SOURCE FOR QUANTATIVE HISTORY

by

H.J. Brinkman, J.W. Drukker and S.J. Stuuroop

For a number of years there has been a sharp increase in the interest of Belgian and Dutch social and economic historians in using the results of military medical examinations as a quantitative historical source. This is understandable for a number of reasons. In the first place, many Dutch-speaking researchers will have noticed that a number of foreign historians of international repute have been interested in the results of military medical examinations for a considerable time. Obviously, this is not because the results made such interesting reading (the opposite is the case), but because they contain a wealth of information on social and economic phenomena which almost everyone considered essential to the writing of social and economic history.¹

The relatively continuous period of time which they cover is also an agreeable circumstance (consecutive series of years covering more than half a century are no exception), as is the fact that little changed in the system of collecting and presenting the results in these long series. Last but not least, the data — even in the earliest years — often includes an unbelievably large number of individuals. The results of the medical examination of some tens of thousands of young men are not unusual for the beginning of the nineteenth century.

At the present time there is virtually not one scholar to be found who would underestimate the major importance of this source for social and economic history. Van den Broeke for example, describes the military medical examination lists as being a "social-demographic meter", from which "...a number of sub-facets of social-demographic research (...), both in space as in time, to be studied further in depth".²

The paper from which this quote is taken is in itself an excellent example of the enormous variety of historical questions for which the medical examination lists constitute a prominent source of information. Apart from the height and a number of other physical characteristics of the candidates, the medical examination lists also generally included accurate data about the

date of birth of those examined: their birthplace, place of residence, occupation, whether or not their parents were still alive at the time of the medical examination, their parents' place of residence, the father's occupation, the mother's occupation if the father was deceased and the occupation of the guardian if both parents were no longer alive.

Since Villermé pointed out in 1829 that there was a striking relationship between the average height of those examined and the level of the material circumstances in which they grew up, most scholars have used the military medical examination lists as a source indicating the development of average height. In recent research, however, a definite increase in its applications can be detected.³

That the medical examination results constitute an extremely important source for social history is no longer a debatable subject. De Meere describes the military registers themselves as "probably the most "concrete" source of information" about the qualitative and quantitative development of the nourishment of the less and least prosperous classes in the Netherlands during the nineteenth century, and is referring here in particular to data relating to height.⁴

With the remark that the data from the military registers relates to the classes with the lowest income, De Meere broaches a point that at present is certainly an essential problem when working with military medical examination results: namely, the representativeness of the medical examination results. This is the essence of the question: "Do the results of the military medical examinations constitute a true reflection of the total population of young men of the appropriate age for a medical examination in that year, or are there reasons to assume that certain categories of the population are overrepresented or underrepresented in the medical examination results?" The opinions of the researchers in this field diverge completely on this point.

1. The debate

The reason for the difference of opinions is simple. If we limit ourselves for the moment to the figures for the Netherlands from 1863 and after, then the core of the problem is found in a break in the data between 1898 and 1899. Before 1899, the medical examinations and drawing of lots for the national armed forces were determined by the provisions of the "The Act of 19th August 1861, appertaining to the National Militia".⁵ Clauses 4 and 60 of this Act specified that the opportunity existed for each conscript to let "another take his place in the service of the militia...." Furthermore, according to Clause 33 of the same Act, it was not obligatory to appear in person during the drawing of lots.

Given that one now knows that 20 percent of the conscripts let themselves

be replaced and that the height data for about 20 percent of the conscripts is missing from the military registers, the temptation is great to suppose that until 1899 people who could afford to have themselves replaced as a member of the armed forces did not appear for the drawing of lots — which included the medical examination — for the simple reason that they were not obliged to do so. Consequently, data about the height of young men from the highest income class would be almost entirely missing in the registers of the drawing of lots until 1899. This would of course imply that the data in the registers would overrepresent the lower and lowest income categories.

De Meere for example, is one of the authors who takes this point of view. Moreover, he is very explicit about it:

[T]hroughout the whole of the nineteenth century what was known as the "replacements" system was employed, that is to say, that the conscripts who were financially well-off or whose parents could afford it, paid someone else to replace them. Only at the beginning of 1897 [this ought to be 1899, HJB-JWD-SJS] was replacement cancelled and in the medical examination reports the results of conscripts from every social class are to be found. Before 1897 the prosperous made grateful use of this arrangement, so that the data about the upper class is to all intents and purposes missing in the medical examination figures. This fact has as plus-point that the summary lists drawn up at that time tell us exactly about the quality of standard of living of the lowest classes.⁶

Should this latter "fact" prove indisputable, then the advantage noted by De Meere would nevertheless have one — to our opinion — equally important disadvantage: the data from the registers of the drawing of lots during the nineteenth century could then not be used as a representative reflection of the entire population of young men in the Netherlands around the age of nineteen.

Even Oppers, who has to be regarded as an important authority on this subject, holds the point of view that the registers of the drawing of lots probably contain a selection process, but arrives at this conclusion as a result of other considerations. His argument summarizes fairly precisely the actual course of events at the military medical examinations during the nineteenth century. Therefore, in this connection, it is worthwhile quoting from extensively:

[T]he material as such does not represent the entire population, nor can it be called random. One was not obliged to appear at the drawing of lots, although many certainly had a very good reason to do so. ... In as far as I have been able to check, the call up and the system of medical examination in the nineteenth century went as follows: The conscripts were measured at the drawing of lots under the eye of the medical examination officer. ... Should it be established during this measuring that a conscript is too short for any weapon, then he gets a summons to appear before the militia board, where he would be measured yet

again. Should he prove to be too short, he would then be declared unfit by the militia board. If someone had not turned up for the drawing of lots, he could still then appear before the militia board. He would then be measured here for the first time and if he was not tall enough, he would be declared unfit. However, should he have also failed to appear before the militia board, ... then he would be automatically allocated to the infantry by the militia commissioner. With the mobilization of the militia ... the candidate is obliged to report in person to the appropriate garrison. From that moment on the conscript is a member of the militia, possibly therefore without even being medically examined and measured. At this point a medical examination would follow: any possibly short-sized candidate, if this was established, would then be finally exempted. ... In principle in the registers of the drawing of lots there would now be entered for everyone whether he is "designated" or "exempted". In reality it does not matter whether men who were too short appeared at the drawing of lots or not. A conscript who was too short, it was generally understood by the people, was already likely to be declared unsuitable at the drawing of lots. Amongst those who wanted to be excluded from national service, the consequence of this would have been that in percentage terms more shorter candidates would have been attended the drawing of lots than taller ones. In fact, the register of the drawing of lots must then have been tidied up later, but given the presence all the time of the word "designated" or "exempted" behind the name where the height is not mentioned, it is difficult to check which category of height measurements are missing. Perhaps what is missing here is a batch of information which is based upon a random choice, but also perhaps not.⁷

Oppers is, therefore, clearly more circumspect in his conclusion than De Meere. On the basis of a yet to be further researched hypothesis concerning the behavior of the prosperous during the years when the replacement system was in effect, De Meere concluded that the less and least prosperous were considerably overrepresented in the material. Oppers thought that it was not possible to establish unequivocally that the material constituted a random sample of the population, and if, to be on the safe side, one would accept that the latter had *not* been the case, it is then unclear in which direction and to what degree there is a "bias" in the military registers.

There are, however, also researchers who adhere to the point of view that the data from the military registers constitute a virtually "flawless" reflection of the population of all young Dutchmen eligible for the medical examination. This was established, for example, by Van Wieringen in his dissertation. His own random sample of young Dutchmen who were eligible for a medical examination in 1967 resulted in an average height which corresponded exactly with the average height of the entire conscription in that year.⁸ According to his conclusion, this result and "the considerable regularity in which the height of the conscripts changes in the official publications, represents a good indication for increased accuracy and certainly justifies a detailed study of the changes of height during consecutive years."⁹

Given that he subsequently makes no allowance for a possible deviation of the height data for the years before 1899 as a result of the replacement system, it is clear that he embraces the point of view that the figures from before 1899 are fully comparable with those from later years. This can only mean that Van Wieringen implicitly assumes that the height figures originating from the military registers in the nineteenth century constitute an accurate reflection of the population of all young Dutchmen eligible for a medical examination.

Even Brinkman, Drukker, and Slot — who used the height data from the military registers to estimate the development of real national income in the Netherlands during the period 1845-1900 — assume that the median height for the conscripts corresponded exactly with the median height of all young Dutchmen eligible for a medical examination.¹⁰ In this connection they base themselves on Van Wieringen. But as we have seen — even with Van Wieringen — this basic assumption is nothing more than a hypothesis which requires additional research.

The preceding, therefore, makes two things clear. In the first place, there is no agreement among the authors in this field whether the results of the military medical examination constitute a true reflection of the entire population of young men eligible for a medical examination in that year. In the second place, as is apparent from the discussion of the debate to date, nobody has attempted to answer the question through simply looking at the figures themselves. This is what we have done and our results are presented in the remainder of the article.

2. Four questions empirically researched

In essence we empirically test De Meere's proposition, that as a result of the replacement system, the medical examination figures from before 1899 do not include data about the upper class. For this purpose we approach the problem from two points of view.

In the first place, we check what the position was of those in society who let themselves be replaced and whether those who let themselves be replaced did or did not appear at the medical examination. After all, it is conceivable that the conscripts from the upper class would probably show up at the medical examination, despite the fact that they definitely intended to let themselves be replaced after passing. If, for one reason or another, they were unexpectedly declared unfit, that would be an appreciably less expensive way of avoiding national service than through making use of the replacement system.

If the latter had been indeed the custom amongst the prosperous of the Netherlands in the nineteenth century, then De Meere's proposition would be false; even when only the upper section of society would have made use of replacement. In that case the prosperous would be underrepresented in the

population of conscripted militiamen, but *not* in the results of the military medical examinations.

It is clear that an answer to the question posed above is necessarily based on a sample. Because it is not inconceivable that another sample would have produced different results, we will also look at the problem from an entirely different angle. Supposing that De Meere was right, then the abolition of the replacement system would be noticeable through unusual differences between the medical examination results of the conscriptions in 1898 and 1899.

In the first place, the average or median height of the conscripts ought to have increased abruptly. In the second place, the skewness of the distribution of heights ought to have changed. The addition of the prosperous and, therefore, on average taller conscripts in 1899 ought to have made the distribution in comparison to preceding years more top heavy on the right side or less left-tailed. If neither the median height from the medical examination for 1899 shows any change in the trend nor has the skewness of the distribution changed in comparison to the preceding year, then there is reason to seriously doubt De Meere's proposition that the prosperous are underrepresented in the medical examination results from before 1899. These questions will be answered in the subsequent sections

3. *Social position and replacement*

Twelve years before De Meere published his monograph on the economic development and the standard of living in the Netherlands during the first half of the nineteenth century, a publication had already appeared which suggested that it was not only the prosperous who made use of the replacement system. In Witlox's biography of the Dutch statesman Schaeppman, there is a summary of the occupations during one year of those who made use of the replacement system: 55 farmers, 29 weavers, 22 manufacturers, 17 bakers, 14 clerks, 10 carpenters, 12 smiths, 11 without occupation and 10 factory workers. The list further includes a large number of minor figures, such as cigar makers, slaughtermen, shop assistants, teachers, compositors, tobacco-cutters and up to now one cobbler, painter, barber and bricklayer.¹¹

Witlox already concluded in 1960 that evidently not only the sons of rich people made use of the possibility of having a replacement perform their national service, but that about 70 percent of them consisted of craftsmen. This conclusion is in contradiction to De Meere's proposition. We thought, however, that the amount of information upon which Witlox based his conclusion was too limited to consider De Meere's proposition definitively refuted. Consequently, we were obliged to look for other sources.

Ultimately, the Proceedings of the States-General [Handelingen der

Staten-Generaal] prove to contain the necessary information. Before the abolition of the replacement system in 1899, there was a full debate in parliament whether individual national service should be introduced. During the often vehement discussion, a number and variety of arguments were presented to have replacement abolished or retained by the adherents and the opponents of individual national service. The adherents of abolition contended, among other things, that the quality of the army would be improved by individual national service.¹² The opponents maintained exactly the opposite: it was the replacement system which guaranteed the high quality of the armed forces through the "repeaters" amongst the replacements. An essential question for both sides consisted of who actually made use of the replacement system, or which group would be most affected by its abolition.

To answer this question, the Preparatory Committee [Staatscommissie tot voorbereiding der wettelijke regeling van de Militaire Dienstplicht] allowed an appendix to be added to its report in which the occupations of the conscripts who had their national service fulfilled by someone else were given for 1886 and 1887. Table 1 has been derived directly from the appendix.

Despite the remarkable differences between the provinces, Table 1 gives a clear picture of the occupations of those who let themselves be replaced in 1886 and 1887. In comparison to the other occupational groups, three groups made greater use of the opportunity to let themselves be replaced. These included those employed in the categories "farming and horticulture" (33 percent) and "trade, industry and related occupations" (16 percent) and the group which declared themselves as being "without occupation" (20 percent).

In this respect, it is striking that the social structure according to occupation in Table 1 corresponds surprisingly well to the "real" structure of the population of the Netherlands in 1889, as summarized by De Jonge.¹³ According to the table compiled by De Jonge, 33 percent of the working population in the Netherlands in 1889 was active in "farming, fisheries and hunting", and this corresponds exactly with the percentage in our table of those who originated from "farming".¹⁴

When we calculate the percentage from our Table 1 of what probably comes closest to the category "industry" in De Jonge's table by taking the sum of the categories "industry" and "handicrafts" and adding to it half the category "related to trade and industry", we arrive at 23 percent of the total. Even this deviates only a little from the 29 percent for industry given by De Jonge. When we add to the number of those employed in "trade" in our Table 1 half of the number of people who were working in the sector "related to trade and industry", we arrive at 7 percent of the total number of people in Table 1. Again, this deviates strikingly little from the 9 percent who were

Table 1 *Summary of the reported occupations and business of conscriptees who in the year 1886 and 1887 allowed their military service to be fulfilled by a replacement or number switcher (Percentages between brackets)*

Provinces	GRO	FRL	DRE	OVR	GLD	UTR	NOH	ZUH	ZLD	NBR	LIM	TOT
<i>Occupations:</i>												
Civil servants & techn. pers.	1 (0)	2 (0)	1 (1)	2 (1)	2 (0)	10 (4)	10 (1)	10 (1)	5 (2)	0 (0)	1 (1)	44 (1)
Navy & army	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)
Medicine, pharmacy & vet. med.	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (1)	3 (0)
Education	33 (9)	44 (11)	16 (14)	18 (6)	40 (9)	17 (6)	27 (3)	94 (9)	21 (1)	48 (8)	31 (21)	389 (8)
Church offices	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	2 (0)
Trade	22 (6)	15 (4)	2 (2)	5 (2)	21 (5)	14 (5)	48 (5)	44 (4)	9 (4)	18 (3)	1 (1)	199 (4)
Industry	24 (6)	20 (5)	3 (3)	15 (5)	28 (7)	5 (2)	43 (5)	56 (5)	8 (4)	59 (10)	8 (5)	269 (6)

(Table 1 continued)

Provinces	GRO	FRL	DRE	OVR	GLD	UTR	NOH	ZUH	ZLD	NBR	LIM	TOT
<i>Occupations:</i>												
Related to trade & ind.	12 (3)	10 (2)	2 (2)	23 (8)	1 (0)	6 (2)	133 (15)	77 (7)	0 (0)	0 (0)	11 (8)	275 (6)
Shipping	10 (3)	81 (2)	1 (1)	6 (0)	5 (1)	13 (2)	25 (1)	3 (2)	81 (1)	81 (1)	(1)	(2)
Farming, horticulture, forestry & stock br.	105 (27)	134 (33)	56 (47)	138 (45)	136 (32)	73 (28)	179 (20)	288 (28)	99 (46)	317 (53)	37 (25)	1562 (33)
Handicrafts	26 (7)	29 (7)	5 (4)	46 (15)	61 (14)	35 (13)	200 (22)	176 (17)	20 (9)	83 (14)	11 (8)	692 (14)
Various	20 (5)	21 (5)	8 (7)	15 (5)	46 (11)	17 (6)	55 (6)	98 (9)	11 (5)	32 (5)	9 (6)	332 (7)
Without	130 (34)	119 (30)	24 (20)	42 (14)	86 (20)	81 (31)	196 (22)	170 (16)	37 (17)	32 (5)	33 (23)	950 (20)
Total	383 (100)	403 (100)	118 (100)	305 (100)	427 (100)	263 (100)	906 (100)	1038 (100)	213 (100)	597 (100)	146 (100)	4799 (100)

Source: *Handelingen der Staten Generaal 1890-1891. Bijlagen Tweede Kamer.**Regeling van den Krijgsdienst [Proceedings of the States General 1890-1891, Appendix of the Lower House, Regulation of the Armed Forces] No. 363, pp. 168-169 (Bijlage 0)*

employed in trade in 1889 according to De Jonge's table.

Needless to say, with this rough comparison between the composition of the working population of the Netherlands in 1889 and the social structure according to occupation of the conscripts who let themselves be replaced in 1886 and 1887, we are not trying to prove that both tables are exactly the same. This is impossible anyhow, because of the differences in the criteria used to construct the categories in the two tables.

There is another problem with the information in Table 1. Although it tells us something about the occupations of the conscripts who had their military service fulfilled by a replacement, it does not tell us anything about their social position. These are not exactly one and the same. However, given the fact that we are dealing with boys of around nineteen years of age, we think that in this case it is fairly safe to assume that the vast majority of the conscripts from the upper social strata would indicate themselves as being without occupation. Normally there would be no financial need for them to start working at an early age and, at the age of their medical examination, many of them would be on the verge of entering the university. In other words, although there may be some misspecification involved with the assumed correlation between social position and occupation, in our view, the structure of occupations in Table 1 certainly does not seem to corroborate De Meere's proposition.

In short, the structure of the occupations of the conscripts who let themselves be replaced in 1886 and 1887 does not deviate much from the sectoral division of the working population of the Netherlands in 1889 and this suggests that the results of the medical examinations in the years before 1889 can be regarded as a reasonably true reflection of the population of young men in the Netherlands eligible for a military medical examination.

Table 1 is illuminating with regard to the questions we posed, but it also has a number of shortcomings. The information covers only two years, which furthermore, have also been combined. This may lead to distortions, and insight into the developments over a longer period cannot be derived from Table 1.

As control to the results from Table 1 and to provide some insight into possible variations over the course of time, we decided to have a look at the only "really" trustworthy source: the registers of the drawing of lots. The problem with this is that in this period each municipality made up and kept up to date its own separate register of the drawing of lots. Consequently, we were forced to make a selection. We consulted the registers of the drawing of lots from the municipality of Groningen during the following years: 1863, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1897 and 1898. The information obtained from these registers form the basis for Table 2.

A comparison of Table 1 with Table 2 is not without problems. Given that we do not know exactly how the categorization according to occupation by the Preparatory Committee [Staatscommissie tot voorbereiding der

Table 2 *Summary of the occupations of those in the municipality of Groningen who have let themselves be replaced for national service*

Division of occupations	1863	(%)	1870	(%)	1880	(%)	1890	(%)	1897	(%)	1898	(%)
Civil servants & technical personnel	2	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Personnel navy and army	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Medicine, pharmacy & vet.med.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Education	4	14	2	7	3	13	0	0	0	0	0	0
Church offices	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0
Trade	6	21	6	21	2	9	5	22	2	8	4	13
Industry	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	1	3
Related to trade & industry	1	4	0	0	1	4	4	17	6	23	1	3
Shipping	4	14	2	7	1	4	0	0	2	8	1	3
Farming	1	4	2	7	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0
Handicrafts	4	14	4	14	8	35	3	13	2	8	9	28
Various occupations	1	4	1	3	0	0	1	4	0	0	2	6
Without occupation	5	18	12	41	8	35	9*	39	12	46	14	44
Total	28	100	29	100	23	100	23	100	26	100	32	100

*) Excluded is 1 individual who was designated without a call up.

Source: Nationale militie. Provincie Groningen. Militie-district 1. Groningen, militie kanton gemeente Groningen, lotingsregister. [National army, Province of Groningen. Military district 1. Groningen, Groningen municipal military canton register of the drawing of lots] 1863, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1897, 1898).

wettelijke regeling van de Militaire Dienstplicht] took place, it is conceivable that the categorization of Table 2 may deviate somewhat from Table 1. However, it cannot be denied that the impression given by Table 1 is confirmed by Table 2: those who made use of the replacement system did *not* come solely or even to a large degree from the upper classes. This group almost certainly for the most part, let themselves be replaced, which in our view is seen by the relatively large size of the group "without occupation" in both tables. But, in addition to this, individuals from the groups "farming and horticulture, forestry and stock-breeding", "trade", "industry", and "handicrafts" also made frequent use of the possibility of having a replacement perform their national service.

The obvious explanation is that these groups in particular were dependent on family labor. Instead of having the son serve in the armed forces, a paid hand had to be appointed as a replacement. If the wages for a paid hand were higher than the costs involved in finding a replacement for military service, then it was obviously financially attractive to make use of the opportunities arising from the replacement system. In our view this conclusively our answer first question, the one concerning who made use of the replacement system.

4. *Replacement and attendance at the medical examination*

The second question that we posed in the introduction was: "Is it true that individuals who let themselves be replaced also did indeed not report to the medical examination?" The Proceedings of the States-General [De Handelingen van de Staten-Generaal] do not provide an answer to this question. Consequently, we limit ourselves to the data from the Groningen municipal archive. The reader will find the results in Table 3.

For all its simplicity, Table 3 speaks for itself. The vast majority (on average a little more than 80 percent) of the conscripts who allowed themselves to be replaced nevertheless still appeared at the medical examination. And with this conclusion we can clear up a persistent misunderstanding. The group of about 20 percent of the conscripts who let themselves be replaced is not the same as the group (likewise about 20 percent) whose height information is missing from the medical examination registers. This means that the data about the conscripts who let themselves be replaced in the vast majority of cases is certainly included in the military registers. Consequently, there is no reason to suppose that the upper section of society is almost entirely absent from the data from before 1899.

The most important reason to appear at the medical examination, even if one intended to let oneself be replaced, seems to have been of a purely financial nature. Should one appear in person, one could always be unexpectedly exempted. This would make it unnecessary to pay for a

replacement. In this context, it should be noted that the average cost of obtaining a replacement was about 500 guilders.¹⁶

It should be borne in mind that at the time such an amount was considerably more than the average yearly earnings of an educated adult employee. To put it another way, in modern terms the amount that one would have to pay for a replacement would be equivalent to some tens of thousands of guilders!¹⁷ One can imagine that the magnitude of this amount was reason enough for the vast majority of the population to seize their chance of being exempted and that they accepted the associated inconvenience of having to appear at the medical examination.

The second question in our introduction, namely whether those who let themselves be replaced also indeed did not appear at the medical examination, can therefore be answered. No, about 80 percent of the conscripts who let themselves be replaced had attended the medical examination. This, however, does not answer the question posed about those who did not appear and for what reasons they chose to be absent. The answer to this question will be given below.

Table 3 *Subdivision of the number of conscripts in the municipality of Groningen who had let themselves be replaced, with regard to the fact whether they did attend the medical examination (Percentages between brackets).*

	did appear	did not appear	total
1863	25 (89)	3 (11)	28 (100)
1870	29 (100)	0 (0)	29 (100)
1880	14 (61)	9 (39)	23 (100)
1890	20 (87)	3 (13)	23 (100)
1897	21 (81)	5 (19)	26 (100)
1898	22 (69)	10 (31)	32 (100)
Average	(81)	(19)	(100)

Source: Nationale militie. Provincie Groningen. Militie-distrikt 1. Groningen, militie kanton gemeente Groningen, lotingsregister. [National army. Province of Groningen. Military district 1. Groningen, Groningen municipal military canton register of the drawing of lots] 1863, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1897, 1898

Table 4 *Subdivision of the conscripts who were exempted, with regard to the fact whether they did or did not appear at the medical examination in the municipality of Groningen, several sample years between 1863 and 1909. (Percentages between brackets)*

<i>Reason for exemption:</i>	1863		1870		1880		1890		1899		1909	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Brother's service or only son	83 (89)	10 (11)	118 (83)	25 (17)	99 (81)	23 (19)	115 (78)	32 (22)	136 (68)	63 (32)	**	**
Too short or other bodily deficiencies	43 (96)	2 (4)	34 (94)	2 (6)	25 (86)	4 (14)	42 (91)	4 (9)	46 (96)	2 (4)	86 (93)	6 (7)
Professional soldier	0 (0)	19 (100)	0 (0)	24 (100)	0 (0)	16 (100)	0 (0)	36 (100)	6 (18)	28 (82)	0 (0)	35 (100)
Remainder	11 (100)	0 (0)	0 (*)	0 (*)	8 (100)	0 (0)	3 (43)	4 (57)	24 (83)	5 (17)	34 (81)	8 (19)
Total	137 (82)	31 (18)	152 (75)	51 (25)	132 (75)	43 (25)	160 (68)	76 (32)	212 (68)	98 (32)	** (**)	** (**)

*) Absolute numbers are nihil for this subcategory for this year, so percentages cannot be calculated.

***) Data missing in the source.

Source; Nationale militie. Provincie Groningen, militiedistrict 1.

Groningen, militiekanton gemeente Groningen, lotingsregister. (National Army. Province of Groningen, military district 1, Groningen municipal military canton register of the drawing of lots, 1863, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1899, 1909.

5. *Who did appear at the medical examinations?*

To answer the question why conscripts did not attend the drawing of lots, we have first examined the opportunities which then existed to obtain exemption from national service. It is, after all, conceivable that if one's exemption was known in advance, one might not take the trouble to appear at the medical examination. Strangely enough, this was not the case. If one accepts the municipality of Groningen as representative for the whole country, then it appears from the figures in Table 4 that the vast majority of those who knew beforehand that they were certain of being exempted, nevertheless appeared at the medical examination.

According to the Military Statute of 1861, there were a number of reasons which allowed a person to be exempted from national service.¹⁸ In this context, two reasons are of particular importance: first, exemption on account of being the "only legitimate son" (this reason was dispensed with in 1900); second, exemption on account of a "brother's service". One can reasonably suppose that the vast majority of the young men who were exempted for one of these reasons knew it before the medical examination.

Table 4 shows that the majority of the conscripts who were exempted for the two aforementioned reasons nevertheless appeared. The number of individuals who were exempted and who did not appear at the medical examination is to be found in the last line of Table 4. This excludes professional soldiers eligible for a medical examination who were, of course, not obliged to come. The conclusion is that despite the fact that they had obtained exemption (even if this was known in advance) people did not find this to be a sufficient reason to not appear at the medical examination. The question of why people did not appear at the medical examination has still not been answered.

A clear indication of the direction in which we have to look for the answer to this last question can be obtained by examining Table 5. This table lists for a number of sample years, *all* conscripts in the municipality of Groningen who did *not* appear at the medical examination, classified according to their occupation. From this table it is apparent that two occupational categories are considerably overrepresented in this group. The categories "shipping" and "professional soldiers" make up on average more than half of the total conscripts who did not appear at the medical examination. It is obvious what the causes were for their absence.

The attendance of professional soldiers at the medical examination would, of course, have been absurd. These conscripts would have taken a medical examination to see if they were suitable for military work for which they had previously been found fit and in which they were professionally engaged on a daily basis! It is also obvious to suppose that servicemen would not have been given a leave of absence by their superiors to attend the medical examination. This assumption is supported by looking once more at Table 4.

There it can be seen that not a single professional soldier, except for six in 1899, ever appeared at a medical examination. In this year, the medical examination was for the first time legally required of all young men who were eligible to be examined. This apparently confused a small group of professional soldiers as to whether or not the legal obligation also applied to them. In 1909, as was usual, not a single professional soldier appeared at the medical examination. The uncertainty over this seems to have been resolved.

An explanation for the large percentage of seamen who did not appear at the medical examination is even more obvious. It would have been a sheer coincidence if the seaman in question had been in town on the day of the medical examination. He was, after all, not obliged to appear in person at the medical examination.

It is clear that Table 5 provides answers to two questions. In the first place, the figures in this table do not provide the slightest support to the assumption that the conscripts who did not appear at the drawing of lots between 1863 and 1890 primarily came from the upper classes. Indeed, even if we take for granted that the last two categories in Table 5 ("without occupation" and "remainder") consist entirely of individuals from the upper classes – which would be an exaggeration, because in that case not a single unemployed person from the lower social classes would be included in the table – then they are smaller than the remaining occupational categories, for which it is very clear that those engaged in such work do *not* come from the upper classes.

In other words, the question as to whether De Meere was right in his proposition that the medical examination results before 1899 contained almost no individuals from the upper classes can be answered. No, there is not a shred of evidence for this conclusion. This last point is emphasized again by the fact that in the years 1899 and 1909, when there was certainly an obligation to appear at the medical examination, the categories "without occupation" and "remainder" together constituted 23% and 22% of the total number of conscripts who did not appear. This represents a decrease in comparison to the years 1880 (32%) and 1890 (32%), while if De Meere had been right, one would have expected an increase.

The second question answered by Table 5 is an extension of the previous one: "What was, in all of the years examined, the most important reason for not appearing at the medical examination?" The answer to this question is so simple, that this is probably the reason why not a single researcher has put it forward as a hypothesis. Absence was mainly due to out of town occupational obligations on the day of the medical examination.

As a control on the results presented this far, we did some research as to whether the national data starting from 1899 might constitute a different population than the data before that time.

Table 5 *Subdivision according to occupation of the conscripts in the municipality of Groningen, who did not appear at the medical examination.*

	1863	%	1870	%	1880	%	1890	%	1899	%	1909	%
Shipping	17	31	17	25	13	19	11	10	39	24	34	23
Trade & industry	3	6	5	7	7	10	8	7	22	14	27	19
Professional soldiers	20	37	27	40	17	24	39	35	30	19	36	25
Handicrafts	7	13	7	10	11	16	17	15	33	20	16	11
Without occ.	2	4	10	15	13	19	22	20	26	16	26	18
Remainder	5	9	1	1	9	13	13	12	12	7	6	4
Total	54	100	67	100	70	100	110	100	162	100	145	100

Source: Nationale militie. Provincie Groningen, militie district 1.

Groningen, militiekanton gemeente Groningen, lotingsregister. [National Army, Province of Groningen military district 1. Groningen, Groningen municipal military canton register of the drawing of lots, 1863, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1899, 1909).

6. *Research on the basis of national data*

If De Meere's proposition is true, then this ought to be evident in the national figures. This can be examined in a number of ways. The most obvious method is to formulate a "measure of skewness", which can be used to test whether the average of the ten years before 1898 (the year in which the replacement system was rendered inoperative) deviates significantly from the average of the measure of skewness for the ten years after 1898.

The most common measure of skewness can be expressed as follows:

$$S = \frac{Q_3 + Q_1 - 2M_e}{Q_3 - Q_1}$$

where:

- S = measure of skewness
- Q_3 = third quartile
- Q_1 = first quartile
- M_e = median (= D_5 = fifth decile)

The data as it has been published on the height of the conscripts, however, prevents the estimation of Q_3 because Q_3 falls into an open class. An alternative could be to take not the first and third quartiles, but the fourth and sixth deciles. This, however, also gives problems. After 1901 the sixth decile falls into a different class, so that in 1901 an unavoidable break occurs in the estimate of the sixth decile. For practical reasons, therefore, S in Table 6 is for the years 1889 up to 1900 calculated as:

$$S = \frac{D_6 + D_4 - 2M_e}{D_6 - D_4}$$

where:

- S = measure of skewness
- D_6 = sixth decile
- D_4 = fourth decile
- M_e = median (= D_5 = fifth decile)

The only remaining test is a comparison of skewness in the ten years before 1898 with 1899 and 1900. It ought to be clear that two years constitute much too small a sample to execute the above test, so that only a tentative comparison of the measure of skewness over time is possible. Table 6 shows that the measure of skewness in the years before 1898 is not markedly more

negative (*i.e.* the tail of the division is to the left) than after 1898, while De Meere's proposition certainly implies that this would be the case.

Given that we were unable to carry out the best method properly, we decided to look for other clues in the data which would either prove or disprove De Meere's proposition. In the first place, we can consider ($D_5 - D_4$) as a measure of skewness. However, this has to be done with some care, because the difference between these two deciles in any case increases in

Table 6 *Deciles in mm. and measure of skewness of the division of heights of Dutch conscripts, 1889-1908.*

	D_4	δD_4	D_5	δD_5	D_6	δD_6	S	$D_5 - D_4$	$\delta(D_5 - D_4)$
1889	1645.6		1664.5		1683.5		0.00264	18.9	
1890	1646.6	-1.0	1665.4	0.9	1684.4	0.9	0.00529	18.8	-0.1
1891	1648.3	1.7	1666.7	1.3	1686.7	2.3	0.04167	18.4	-0.4
1892	1648.0	-0.3	1667.1	0.4	1686.1	-0.6	-0.00262	19.1	0.7
1893	1646.3	-1.7	1665.5	-1.6	1684.7	-1.4	0.00000	19.2	0.1
1894	1648.9	2.6	1666.8	1.3	1687.4	2.7	0.07013	17.9	-1.3
1895	1647.4	-1.5	1666.5	-0.3	1685.6	-1.8	0.00000	19.1	1.2
1896	1649.4	2.0	1669.4	2.9	1689.4	3.8	0.00000	20.0	0.9
1897	1649.4	0.0	1668.6	-0.8	1687.9	-1.5	0.00260	19.2	-0.8
1898	1651.1	1.7	1670.5	1.9	1689.9	2.0	0.00000	19.4	0.2
1899	1653.0	1.9	1672.8	2.3	1692.5	2.6	-0.00253	19.8	0.4
1900	1655.0	2.0	1674.9	2.1	1694.8	2.3	0.00000	19.9	0.1
1901	1656.2	1.2	1676.4	1.5				20.2	0.3
1902	1656.9	0.7	1677.2	0.8				20.3	0.1
1903	1659.2	2.3	1679.8	2.6				20.6	0.3
1904	1659.4	0.2	1680.1	0.3				20.7	0.1
1905	1662.6	3.2	1683.9	3.8				21.3	0.6
1906	1662.9	0.3	1684.1	0.2				21.2	-0.1
1907	1662.3	-0.6	1683.5	-0.6				21.2	0.0
1908	1665.3	3.0	1687.0	3.5				21.7	0.5

Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Jaarcijfers voor Nederland*, [Statistical Yearbook for the Netherlands], (several editions).

this period. If, however, De Meere's proposition would prove to be correct, then between 1898 and 1899 ($D_5 - D_4$) would have to have increased very sharply. The last column of Table 6 illustrates that this is not the case. There is an increase in the difference between D_5 and D_4 , but this is not very large. It is, for example, even smaller than the increase between 1894 and 1895 or between 1895 and 1896. Also, if we estimate a regression line and introduce a dummy (Dummy = 0 before 1898 and 1 after 1898), this proves not to be significant at the 1 percent level.¹⁹

In the second place, it is possible to directly prove or disprove De Meere's proposition through using the series D_4 , D_5 and D_6 . If his supposition is correct, then between 1898 and 1899 the curves of these three deciles would

have to exhibit a kink. Table 6 shows that this is not the case. The increase of D_4 as well as D_5 and D_6 between 1898 and 1899 is considerably smaller than, for example, between 1895 and 1896 or 1899 and 1900. The dummies of the regression lines are also in this case not significant at the 1 percent level.²⁰

Finally, we may conclude that our control also leads to the conclusion that there is absolutely no evidence supporting De Meere's proposition about the absence of the upper classes in the results of the medical examinations before 1899. In short, for the nineteenth-century military archives of the Netherlands, we conclude: no bias found.

NOTES

1. Economic and social historical research in which use is made of the results of military medical examinations in nearly all Western countries can boast a tradition that goes back to the nineteenth century and extends up to the present day. A random selection of recent work for example constitutes: C. Susanne, "Interrelations between some social and familial factors and stature and weight of some young Belgian male adults", *Human Biology* 52 (1980), No.4, 701-709 (for Belgium); H.J. Brinkman, J.W. Drukker & B. Slot, "Height and income: A new method for the estimation of historical national income series", *Explorations in Economic History* 25 (1988) 227-264 (for the Netherlands); G. Olivier & G. Devigne, "Données nouvelles sur la stature et la corpulence en France", *Cahiers d'Anthropologie et Biométrie Humaine* 3 (1985) 111-123 (for France); L. Ulizzi & L. Terrenato, "A comparison between the secular trends of stature and some socio-economic factors in Italy", *Journal of Human Evolution* 11 (1982) 715-720 (for Italy); L. Sandberg, G. Larsen & R.M. Steckel, "Heights and economic history in the Swedish case", *Annals of Human Biology* 14 (1987) 101-110 (for Sweden); V.G. Valaoras, "Biometric studies of army conscripts in Greece", *Human Biology* 42 (1970) 184-199 (for Greece); M.D. Garralda & M.S. Mesa, "Anthropology of the Spanish population 1962-1982", *Homo* 36 (1985) 142-158 (for Spain); T. Bielicki, H.Szczotka & J. Charzeniski, "The influence of three socio-economic factors on body height in Polish Military Conscripts", *Human Biology* 53 (1981) 543-555 (for Poland); R. Floud, K.W. Wachter & Annabel Gregory, "The physical state of the British working class, 1870-1914: Evidence from Army recruits", *National Bureau of Economic Research (Working Paper no. 1661)* (Cambridge, Mass. 1985) (for the United Kingdom) and J. Komlos, "The height and weight of West Point cadets: Dietary change in antebellum America", *The Journal of Economic History* 47 (1987) 897-927 (for the United States).
2. C. van den Broeke, "De keurlingenlijsten als sociaal-demografische meter", *De Leiegouw (Vereniging voor de studie van de lokale geschiedenis, taal en folklore van het Kortrijkse)* 23 (1982) 236.

3. A good illustration of this is the contents of the special issue of *Social Science History* which appeared in 1982: R. W. Fogel & Engerman, eds, *Social Science History; The official journal of the Social Science History Association; Trends in nutrition, labor welfare, and labor productivity* 6 (1982) No.4.
4. J.J.M. de Meere, "De economische ontwikkeling en levensstandaard in Nederland gedurende de eerste helft van de 19e eeuw", *Cahiers Sociale Geschiedenis* 1 (1982) 98.
5. "Wet van den 19den Augustus 1861, betreffende de Nationale Militie", *Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* ('s-Gravenhage 1861) No.72.
6. De Meere, "Economische ontwikkeling en levensstandaard", 98.
7. V.M. Oppers, *Analyse van de acceleratie van de menselijke lengtegroei door bepaling van het tijdstip der groeifasen* (Amsterdam 1963) 44.
8. J.C. van Wieringen, *Seculaire groeiverschuiving; Lengte en gewichtssurveys in Nederland in historisch perspectief* (Leiden 1972) 92.
9. *Ibidem*, 93.
10. Brinkman, Drukker & Slot, "Height and Income".
11. J. Witlox, *Schaepman als staatsman* (Amsterdam 1960) 266.
12. To get an impression of this debate, consult for example, *Handelingen van de Staten-Generaal 1890-1891. Regeling van den Krijgsdienst I en II and Verslag der Staatscommissie tot voorbereiding der wettelijke regeling van de Militaire dienstplicht* ('s-Gravenhage 1889) 11-21.
13. Cf. J.A. De Jonge, *De Industrialisatie in Nederland tussen 1850 en 1914* (Amsterdam 1968) 296.
14. Which reads in the original source "farming, horticulture, forestry and stock-breeding".
15. To make quite sure, we have also checked as to whether the persons who did *not* appear at the drawing of the lots and *did* let themselves be replaced, in the main came from one occupational class (for example: without occupation). This turned out not to be the case. See also Table 5 of this article.
16. *Verslag Handelingen Staten-Generaal 1860-1861; Handelingen Eerste Kamer*, 251.
17. In the period 1850-1870, the average wage was roughly one guilder a day for an adult man, by which it has to be taken into account that people generally did not work on Sunday and that during the winter months there was often enormous seasonal unemployment, so that the average annual wage was generally much lower than 365 guilders. See: I.J. Brugmans, *De arbeidende klasse in Nederland in de 19e eeuw, 1813-1870* (Utrecht/Antwerpen 1978) 133.
18. *Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* ('s-Gravenhage 1861) No. 72, 14-17.
19. The regression line estimated on the basis of the information in Table 6 has the following form (t - values between brackets):

$$(D_5 - D_4)_t = -2581.40 + 1.46 * t + 2.26 * \text{Dummysl}$$

$$(-4.12) \quad (4.42) \quad (0.59)$$

$$R^2 = 0.85$$
20. The regression lines estimated on the basis of the information in Table 6 have the following form (t - values between brackets):

$$(D_4)_t = -4.41 + 0.87 * t + 2.45 * \text{Dummy}$$

$$(-0.019) \quad (7.13) \quad (1.74)$$

$$R^2 = 0.95$$

$$(D_5)_t = -262.55 + 1.02 * t + 2.68 * \text{Dummy}$$

(-1.01) (7.45) (1.69)

$$R^2 = 0.95$$

$$(D_6)_t = 556.16 + 0.60 * t + 3.51 * \text{Dummy}$$

(2.19) (4.45) (2.82)

$$R^2 = 0.89$$

X

DUTCH YOUTH UNDER THE SPELL OF ANGLO-AMERICAN MASS CULTURE, 1945-1965

by

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After the Second World War the daily life of Dutch youth was increasingly influenced by developments abroad, resulting from the growth of communication and information networks, increasing geographic mobility and the further internationalization of mass consumption and mass media markets. These developments accelerated at the end of the fifties and a profound modernization of Dutch society set in. In this contribution I will focus on Anglo-American mass culture insofar as it reached young people in the Netherlands via various youth specific culture industries (film, music, fashion and design, amusement and leisure) and pedagogical developments modeled upon American examples. My thesis is that during the transition from the fifties to the sixties, the influence of the more traditional pedagogical discourse declined and gave way to modern pedagogical strategies of control which were borrowed from American practices. Closely linked to this development were industries directed towards youth culture which began to mold young people through introducing the ideal types of *teenager*, and *twen* in Dutch. On the other hand, popular Anglo-American culture appealed greatly to Dutch youth and offered them some freedom, at least in the symbolic-expressive domain. Even the life-style of French existentialism as it was picked up by groups of Dutch middle-class youth, was closely intertwined with American elements, *in casu* the subculture of the beatniks. These developments, which ran partly parallel and partly contrary to each other, created tensions that dominated the societal relations between young people and their significant others among the older generations.

First, I will sketch the reception of the material and symbolic aspects of American popular culture in the Netherlands — which was not only directly "imported", but also mediated by England and West-Germany — and its relation to elite Dutch culture. Second, I will indicate the specific developments concerning the elements of *teenager* and *twen* culture among Dutch youth. Finally, I will draw up a balance sheet regarding the circumstances of the different categories of youth and the pedagogical rela-

tions between young people and their elders.

1. *Modernization of every day-life under American hegemony*

The American economic, social, cultural and political interferences with Western Europe within the framework of the Marshall-Aid program during the postwar period, influenced production and consumption levels to such an extent that a mass consumption culture gradually developed in Dutch society. This development was really carried through in the second half of the fifties.

America was the model country *par excellence* for the new consumption patterns in Holland. Via direct import or the adoption of ideas and novelties from the United States, various commodities became popular. This list included not only all kinds of household articles, domestic utensils and kitchen equipment (*e.g.* vacuum cleaners, refrigerators, mixers, pressure cookers, gas stoves¹, but also self-service shops, television sets, brand specific automobiles and so forth. The styling of industrial and many other kinds of material objects was also heavily influenced by American trends. Especially the streamlining of the equipment and the environment in modern cafés, snack bars, coffeeshops and ice-cream parlours, jukeboxes, recordplayers and wireless sets had its impact on the material culture of the youth. However, not all social categories liked all of the consumer goods to the same degree. Nor could everyone afford to buy these items in a period when the majority of the population earned rather low incomes due to the specific centralized wage policy pursued by the State until around 1963.² The largest increase in the wage level occurred in the first half of the sixties, after the liberalization of the centralized wage policy. Gradually the time lag with which the general income level rose in the Netherlands *vis-à-vis* a number of surrounding countries decreased.³

This transformation from a production to a consumption culture was the basis for a process of modernization in the Netherlands that had already started in the United States in the twenties as a response to the new demands of American capitalism, *in casu* a wide scale implementation of mass production. (As far as this is concerned, the word "Americanization" was more or less identical with modernization and anti-Americanism meant the resistance to modernization). Due to shorter working hours in some industries and generally higher incomes, members of the Dutch middle class in particular participated in this culture of consumption. Where consumption had risen among workers, it was largely the result of buying on installment, though this was also an aspect of middle-class consumption, or foregoing of one set of goods for another.

Both in the United States and in West European countries, the sociocultural changes concerned came within the horizon of the broader

population through films, radio, television, popular literature and advertisements. In this context, the symbolic role attributed to youth and youthfulness in relation to modernization and modernity was very important. In the United States this tendency also dates from the twenties, a period in which the peer group had taken its central position at American colleges.⁴ (One must consider that the relative size of the high school and college populations in the United States was much larger than in European countries during the interwar period. A substantially larger number of Americans received day time-education after their sixteenth birthday).⁵ This youth culture consisted of a mixture of work and play, preparing for a career, and love games. It was expressed within the framework of fraternities, sporting clubs and so forth. It was based on rivalry and the exclusion of nonconformists. Social adjustment was the binding agent of student life within the colleges. The shock-effects of this youth culture occurred in the domain of consumption, pre-eminently symbolized by the "flapper", the trendy girl with an inconstant pursuit of immediate gratification and an obsession with fashion, style and image. The organization of this kind of university life was to become the model for the organization of, and way of life within the American highschools during the fifties. A specific youth market developed in this period. The culture industry in the United States formulated the concept of "teenager" as the new consumption identity for adolescents. This happened in conjunction with the broad range of pedagogical interventions which had been developed in America from the 1920s in relation to the culture of the peer group.⁶

The situation was quite different in Great Britain, whose "Americanized" teenage culture also had its impact on Dutch youth in the fifties. As a result of a cultural matrix which was to a certain extent shared along with a common language, British teenage culture was in turn heavily influenced by American popular culture. England, however, added its own subcultures and styles. This occurred because teenage culture in England was distinctly a youth culture of the working class.⁷ In America, the dividing lines between social classes were — at least with respect to the ideological and social psychological aspects — less sharp. Differences between the city and the small town, the urban and the rural regions, the East and the West Coast, and whites and blacks played a much more important role. British sociologists made a distinction between working-class culture which was primarily based on the peer group solidarity of the working class and commercialized leisure; and the individualistic, middle-class career system at secondary schools and universities. Teenagers lived in the first world and the class differences that went along with it were taken for granted among young people in Great Britain.⁸ In America — more so than in England and other West-European countries, including the Netherlands — both youth cultures were related to the phenomenon of the teenager, with the highschool as its central pivot. Both cultures were aspects of a teenager definition around

which an ideological dispute took place, a point to which I will return later.

a. Psychosocial practices in a transatlantic setting

Among managers of Dutch companies, representatives of the officially acknowledged (non-communist) trade unions, and natural and social scientists, strong pro-American sentiments existed. (This applies to the general population as well. According to national opinion polls, the United States were considered Holland's second "best friend", after Belgium, out of all of the countries which were a favourite until the end of the sixties).⁹ They were very receptive to the solutions which had been found in the United States: new technologies, organization and efficiency, management, advertising, scientific education and research. In this context, images of the modern, more egalitarian pedagogical and educational patterns in America played a crucial role. They were supposed to contribute greatly to a healthy working climate and a high level of productivity.¹⁰

Within industry, the human relations approach was very influential. This management practice aimed at a better control and a smooth development of interpersonal relationships within small groups. Heavy emphasis was placed on teaching good leadership qualities to lower managers through industrial training programs (which had originally been developed in the United States during the Second World War). However, at the end of the fifties, this approach was no longer satisfactory to motivate and bind the younger generation of workers in the lower job levels. Together with drastic technical and organizational developments and corresponding changes in the quality of work, in many companies frictions developed in the relationships between young workers and the older bosses who retained an outdated style of leadership. This created specific pedagogical problems upon which I will later elaborate.

Via exchange programs and Fulbright grants, several Dutch psychologists and sociologists — many of whom were later to gain key positions in universities and in industry — studied in the United States for some time. On the other hand, a number of experienced American social scientists came to lecture and give advise on research and policy-making in Holland.) Practical pedagogics as borrowed from America was to put its stamp upon the way in which young people were viewed in the modern pedagogical discourse that became more influential after the middle of the fifties. With regard to changes in the pedagogical relations between young people and their elders, the further influence of the mental health movement — which had already been introduced in the Netherlands during the interwar years — was of great importance. Through changes in education and research, it contributed to a further modernization and professionalization of psychosocial intervention practices with respect to youth, especially within the areas of child guidance clinics and youth work. But on the other hand, directly or indirectly — whether through the popular press, columns in women's magazines or

broadcast speeches — this also resulted in a psychologizing of the societal roots of "youth problems" and a further social control of pedagogical relations by professionals.¹²

b. American popular culture as a Trojan horse

Besides positive feelings about America, there were also negative sentiments. Most members of the traditional cultural élite in the Netherlands strongly opposed the advance of "Americanism"; a term which used to be applied to processes of commercialization and vulgarization which had already started in the interwar period and were supposedly of American origin. At that time, the criticism of mass culture had concentrated on the "cinema question" and the "moral dangers" of dancing.¹³ In the postwar years this cultural concern, however, was not seldom related to an admiration for the American political tradition. These policymakers and politicians experienced, to their dismay, that with the orientation on America as a guiding country and the import of all kinds of ideas, products and consumption goods, the Trojan horse of "vulgar mass culture" was also brought in. This was in line with similar developments in other West-European countries, especially England and France.¹⁴

The Anglo-American popular culture which invaded the Netherlands after the war was certainly not enthusiastically greeted by older professional pedagogues (teachers, educationalists, youth workers) and those parents and other elders who were still strongly under the influence of the prewar cultural pattern they had internalized. An essential part of their life history dated from the period before the war, an era which was under the hegemony of the Humboldtian ideal of *Bildung* of German "higher" culture. The younger generation, of course, did not share this collective biographical background.¹⁵

At the end of the forties and during the fifties, there was a continuing public debate about topics which were in line with prewar cultural pessimism. Industrialization processes steered by the government had threatening effects: secularization and desintegration of the sociocultural life within the various religious and ideological "pillars" characteristic of Dutch society at that time. This included roman-catholics, various protestant denominations and, in a way, social-democrats and liberals. The élites of these pillars were very concerned about the appeal which American films and dances and American mass culture as a whole had on the youth. They tried to contain this movement through strategies designed to spread "culture" among a broader range of society. With regard to this policy, hardly any differences existed between the various pillars. Even the communist party shared these ideas to a great extent, although it emphasized the class struggle against the bourgeoisie. By stressing "cultural elevation", it supposed that the working class itself was not able to discriminate between art and kitsch. Mass culture, simply called "bogus culture", was identified with "Americanism".¹⁶

2. Dutch youth on the move

During the liberation of the Netherlands, many young people had already eagerly embraced elements of the popular culture which the American, English and Canadian soldiers brought with them: chewing gum, jeans, colourful checked shirts, dixieland, jazz, dances like the jitterbug, and so forth. They had a very great interest in America. According to R. Kroes, a Dutch Americanist: "Its popular culture and folk heroes, its status symbols, needed no active promotion; they invaded Europe close on the heels of its victorious armies. A whole generation which were in their late teens at the end of the war were held in thrall by the radiance of vitality of American culture. Tuning in to the mesmerizing sounds of the American Armed Forces Network late at night, watching American movies in solitary darkness was their *rites de passage*; it would have a lasting sediment, layer upon layer over the years, a substratum of affection and affinity."¹⁷

The image of America held among young people in the fifties was often very positive.¹⁸ In this respect, the image of the United States which arose in relation to American rock music is important.¹⁹ California especially played a major role in the phantasy world of teenagers. It was a mythical paradise: a kind of "teenage heaven" with a high standard of living, surf beaches and a sunny climate and a reigning optimism that every thing was within reach if one tried.²⁰ But California also had a magical appeal to beatniks and other categories of youth. Each group created its own ideal image of this part of America, and more generally of "the other America".²¹

In the mid-fifties, young people in the Netherlands also began to manifest themselves with regard to popular music (rock 'n roll and bebop) and other elements of American popular culture. Already in October 1954, Dutch youth acted very enthusiastically when Lionel Hampton played his hit *Hey Baba Ree Bop* at a jazz concert in Amsterdam. In 1956, Holland was flooded by rock 'n roll songs and films. In September of that year, the film *Rock around the clock* (with Bill Haley and his Comets) was shown in cinemas in several Dutch towns and teenage riots broke out. The behaviour of these youngsters drew the attention of the mass media which played an important role in setting the agenda concerning the life-style of other young people. At the same time, a tendentious news service stimulated the moral outrage of the general public and local authorities to these rock 'n roll concerts and films and the deviant behaviour of teddy boys, called *nozems* in Dutch. (For instance, teddy boy riots only took place after the newspapers had reported about riots at the showing of the film *Rock around the clock* in Manchester, England).²²

Two conspicuous youth cultures proliferated in the Netherlands in this period: one of the *nozems* and the other of the *artistiekelingen* (existentialists/beatniks). From a certain Amsterdam-centric perspective, due mostly to a concentration of the press in Amsterdam, these cultures were often identified by the social and geographic places where they met: the *Dijkers*

(Nieuwendijk) and the *Pleiners* (Leidseplein). But also elsewhere in the Netherlands such as larger provincial towns and in the city of Rotterdam, one could find variants of both youth cultures, although not to the same degree as in Amsterdam.²³

a. Teddy boys and other "angry young men"

In the second half of the fifties, the disposable income of working-class youngsters steadily increased, mainly because of a lesser need or obligation to pay a part of their wages to their parents.²⁴ Unskilled and semi-skilled workers especially tended to spend their money on new consumption goods and commercialized leisure activities. Because of a biographical background which differed significantly from that of their parents — a generation which had grown up in a period overshadowed by the Great Depression, unemployment, nazism and the war — these youngsters dealt with the changing societal circumstances in a very different way. While they took the relative economic stability and prosperity more or less for granted, the elder generation saw the situation as one which was obtained through hard work and sobriety. The owners of cinemas, cafés and dancing halls were well aware that this youth group was an important new commercial target-group. Products of the Anglo-American culture industry: Tarzan movies, westerns and sex films,²⁵ rock 'n roll and jive were soon the main components of this supply of commercial recreation.

In their longing for "freedom", these working-class boys also occupied the streets where they tried to demonstrate their masculine identity. Their distinctions and status symbols were the moped, checked shirts, leather jackets, black working man's trousers, leather boots, and pomade in the hair to give shape to a greasy forelock. Most of these attributes and aesthetics were inspired by Anglo-American models. These "working-class dandies" generally drove a streamlined moped (Italian type) with a buddy seat: preferably to carry a sexy female partner. This vehicle offered them the possibility of modern mobility (second best after an automobile, which most of them could not afford or were not allowed to drive). From the end of the fifties, they also carried a transistor radio with them. The girls in this social milieu had an inferior position. They were a kind of "appendage" to the boys. They wore wide frocks and broad belts and had a so-called "candy floss" hairdo.²⁶

"Teddy boy behaviour", however, was also a trend which was followed by a relatively large group of youngsters. The "original" wilder teddy boy style was commercialized and partly domesticated as a result. This process went hand in hand with the "creation" of the neat teenager type in these years, which I will describe later. The teddy boy style contained elements of the traditional working-class culture (informal solidary relationships, territorial boundaries and bodily masculinity) and had borrowed new elements from the Americanized mass culture: tight jeans, petticoat, leather

jacket, pointed shoes, a duck's ass; and behaviour patterns which were portrayed in American films like *The wild one* (1953) with Marlon Brando, and *East of Eden* and *Rebel without a cause* (both released in 1955) with James Dean who was their favourite actor. In short, items that were a contradictory mixture of authentic and manufactured style elements.²⁷

These young people did not ground their actions on higher ideals or anti-bourgeois norms, but they tried to enjoy life as much as possible in the rather unrestrained years just after their school, aware that soon the possibilities for this would vanish. They wanted to enjoy their "freedom" for as long as possible. They did not greatly care for the preoccupations voiced by adults who tried to make them feel more responsible for every-day business on the shop floor and for their future family. One might be tempted to see these youngsters as precursors of a new mentality. Although these youngsters freed themselves from parental authority, in general they were to continue the elder generation's way of life.²⁸

At the end of the fifties, managers in many Dutch companies became increasingly worried about the problem of how to motivate and integrate young unskilled and semi-skilled working men into the work situation. From the contemporary perspective of "modern sociology", with its optimistic view on the coming integral emancipation and integration of the workers in the welfare state, many of these young men were considered as "dawdlingly emancipating workers". Because of the technological and organizational changes which took place (further mechanization and a beginning of "real automatization"), many categories of production workers required little higher education. Emphasis was primarily put on some required behaviour qualities: responsibility, identification with the company, care, devotion, "autonomy" (within specific industrial constraints of course), resoluteness, changeability and adaptability.

The educational and industrial pedagogical policies regarding these young people were based on American models. They were primarily aimed at the strengthening of the aforementioned qualities and at cultivating an adequate work mentality. The more general background of these policies were found in critiques of "mass culture", which involved fears of "rootless" and "alienated" mass people who were supposed to be extremely susceptible to the pseudo-*Gemeinschaft* offered by totalitarian movements like communism and fascism.²⁹ Those young workers who were strongly oriented towards the aforementioned mass and consumption culture were especially supposed to incur this risk. Paradoxically, most of these ideas were borrowed from American authors. More than once, however, these authors were intellectuals who had fled from Germany and had accommodated European ideas to the American setting (e.g. the neo-Freudian Erich Fromm and his American pupil David Riesman, whose publications — many of which were translated into Dutch — were very popular in the Netherlands).³⁰

Industrial managers also had to find a new balance with regard to the

changing social and psychological relationships between bosses and workers. A more adequate leadership style had to be created. This issue was closely related to the problem of "industrial disciplining" which then arose due to the social security system and the labor market relations, both of which had improved greatly in the meantime. Due to the fact that the workers involved had almost no fear of becoming unemployed, their bosses and chiefs no longer had recourse to traditional disciplinary tactics. This was a more general tendency that was also signaled in various other West-European countries at the time. Their leadership style had to incorporate a more "psychological" approach than they had previously been used to employing. Even the human relations approach no longer sufficed. Essentially, a tendency developed towards a further pedagogization of the work relationships between bosses and younger workers. Many of the young workers concerned were hardly receptive to this; frequently they offered resistance to these measures.³¹

b. Existentialists and beatniks

A deviant life-style also developed among young members of the middle class. It was most distinctly manifest around the Leidseplein, a well-known picturesque square in the downtown of Amsterdam. This youth culture was a mixture of the Dutch variants of existentialism as an expression of the movement in France and the counterculture of beat(nik)s in America.

After the Second World War, J.P. Sartre's interpretation of existentialism had a strong impact on the mentality and life-style of a group of intellectual bohemians in Paris. Around this intellectual-artistic avant garde, meeting in *Quartier Latin* at the Left Bank of the Seine, a bigger circle of trend followers soon developed. Dutch youngsters, who felt themselves attracted to the "true life" with all of the violent contrasts of the French capital, were also members of this expressive movement. Most importantly, this group included the poet Simon Vinkenoog (who frequently travelled between Amsterdam and Paris) and several of his friends and followers.³²

The existentialist philosophy of life, however, was often reduced to a few superficial elements: a praxis of "authenticity" in which being doomed to freedom; to responsible self-determination; to making sense of a senseless world as such and to the necessity of escaping from the "bad faith" (*mauvaise foi*) of the crowd frequently turned into egocentrism and narcissistic behaviour. Moreover, the culture industries soon succeeded in commercially exploiting this life-style, particularly in fashion, films and popular books. In the tourist guides to Paris, curious American tourists were referred to jazz-cellars where people danced to bebop music. This kind of "existentialism" readily found its way to America: the most fervent supporters there were known as "boheys".³³ In other European countries the more popular variant of existentialism was also disseminated.

In the United States the more authentic kind of existentialism became the

vogue within the bohemian culture of the beats, a kind of American existentialism "at the guts level". This was a countercultural group which was strongly opposed to the American way of life in the fifties. Against the streamlined, commercialized society, they promoted anarchistic individualism, "voluntary poverty" and a liberating flight from the dullness of the moral and social system through drugs, hitchhiking and long chaotic car trips across the country. The ideas of Zen-Buddhism also had a big influence on their world view and way of life.

At the end of the fifties, this initially small literary movement — annex subculture — grew into a broad expressive movement whose members were called "beatniks". A process of commercialization with regard to fashion, film and music also took place. The male beatniks wore jeans, sandals, worn-out leather jackets or duffle coats. The girls usually were dressed in black clothes such as tightly lined trousers and long dark stockings, but preferably black maillots. They had long, stiff, upstanding hair, although a very short hairdo also was in vogue. These young people met in jazz-cellar where they listened to bebop music and cool jazz. They also smoked marijuana and meddled with the dominant social taboos through their rather liberal sexual practices.³⁴

In the United States an inextricable mixture of the existentialist and beatnik life-styles resulted which had a strong impact on young people in Western Europe; not in the least in the Netherlands. Temporary or permanent American émigrés in Holland and young Dutch American travellers functioned as intermediaries. The America Institute in Amsterdam also — intentionally or unintentionally — played a supporting role through the lectures given by the Americanist A.N.J. den Hollander about American popular culture and through its library which included literature of the Beat Generation.³⁵

Around the Leidseplein in Amsterdam, which was (like Eindhoven in the Southern part of the Netherlands) a leave center for American soldiers stationed in Europe, grew a mixture of American jazz, the older Bohemia, the Parish existentialist life-style and elements from the American beatnik culture. In a number of other Dutch towns — especially where there were art schools and the like — similar "scenes" developed. The people concerned imitated the French existentialism, not seldom as seen through American eyes, they read and discussed French literature and its Dutch counterpart³⁶, listened to jazz music, especially bebop and cool jazz, or to French "chansons"; and drank red wine. In the cinemas in the bigger towns of the *Randstad*, young people who were attracted to this life-style watched French and American films with an "existentialist" tendency. The aesthetics within this subculture were strongly oriented to foreign models. Black clothes were a must. Girls wore black sloppy jerseys, tight and short black frocks with black net-stockings. Boys preferably wore trousers, jerseys and sun glasses: all in black. Already in 1957 — before the great breakthrough of the Beat

Generation brought about through the American mass media — Allen Ginsberg, Peter Orlovsky and Gregory Corso paid a visit to Amsterdam and ascertained that a beat scene also existed over here.³⁷

The culture of the *Pleiners* was, in essence, a romantic revolt against the common, the *petit bourgeois* and the oppressive elements in the Dutch social and cultural climate in the fifties and the beginning of the sixties. It was primarily a situationally determined escape from everyday life at home and school. During their leisure time it occurred within the subculture of jazz-cellars, ice-cream parlours and art studios, while during holidays they took hitchhiking trips. Resistance was also directed against one's own (possible) tendency to conform to the welfare state and the consumption society. If there was any rebellious attitude, this was hardly in relation to parents. These young people were more opposed to contemporaries who participated in the old fashioned youth organizations, like scouts and students' corps. They understood the *Pleiner*-subculture as an appeal to autonomy, experimentation with life, improvisation and risk taking. (An appeal, however, which was only very modestly acknowledged in practice, as it concerned a rather cozy domestic culture within the sheltered enclaves of cafés and jazz-cellars). That is why teddy boys were such an interesting group for the followers of this life-style, in spite of the big social rift between the two. Both groups were considered as deviants by a large share of the public. Both the "passive" hanging around in cafes (existentialists/beatniks) and the consumerism and excitement linked to dancing, music and films (teddy boys) were at odds with the modesty and "civility" of the dominant sociocultural life in Dutch society during the fifties.³⁸

3. *Harnessing wild youth*

In the fifties "tamed teddy boys" and "tamed beatniks" were the ideal types of the "modern" pedagogical discourse which was based on American models. Through social scientific literature and popular writings, the developments in the United States came to the attention of Dutch pedagogues (professional and non-professional). This had its impact on the intervention practices within various domains: family life, education, work, leisure and youth work. The culture and leisure industries also made their contributions in the attempts at domesticating young people.

The ambivalent attitude to the phenomenon of the "teenager" held by many American pedagogues in the fifties was based first of all on a fear for the adolescents of the working class. They were very worried that the latter did not have the right norms and that "bad" teenagers would lead other youngsters astray. Probably the biggest obsession of the American sociologists who studied young people in the fifties was to discover the difference between delinquent and non-delinquent youth.³⁹ If the "teenager

problem" was due to a lack of proper norms, the only response of adults could be to intervene: parents and other educators had to fight street life. They did not deny the power of the peer group, but tried to institutionalize the youth culture involved and get a good pedagogical grip on it using the positive models of youth behaviour which had been developed at universities and highschoools in the twenties. At that time, leading pedagogues had already taken the stance that school parties should not be forbidden, but should be viewed as an additional opportunity to practice desirable, conformist behaviour.

In the fifties, professional pedagogues and the other experts concerned (physicians, psychiatrists, social workers, etc.) studied the problems and possibilities of controlling youth culture. They aimed at stimulating a healthy kind of competition (football games instead of street fights between gangs), specific kinds of pleasure (going to a drive-in theater instead of using alcohol or drugs), and specific forms of adjustment (extensive behaviour codes concerning dating and petting). The mainstream mass media also had a stake in promoting the thoughtful use of teenage products and in firmly anchoring teenager consumption within the context of the ideal-middle class family. Most strikingly, in all of these interferences, there is the obsession with rules and instructions for the behaviour of teenagers.⁴⁰

The consumption oriented teenager was an ideal type which had largely been "invented" by advertizing experts. It involved a hedonistic life-style in which "leisure" and "pleasure" were key words. The orientation to personal consumption had become an objective in itself. In this way, the teenage style incorporated tamed variants of other styles. As such, it was a commercial response to the teddy boy, the folk devil *par excellence* of the fifties.⁴¹

Dutch teenagers were oriented to the middle of the road teenage culture through *Tuney Tunes*, a music magazine which appeared since 1944, and especially via *Muziek Express* (since 1956). The latter magazine gave detailed descriptions of the style elements with which one should identify in order to really belong and to feel a part of the youth world: specific music (especially so-called high school pop), hairdo, clothing, cosmetics and behaviour, of which "pleasure" was the crucial component. The central tendency of *Muziek Express* was clearly related to the hedonism of teenage culture.⁴² Two striking examples of the way moral authorities tried to harness Dutch teenagers are the announcements which accompanied two American films which were shown in Dutch cinemas in the fifties. The film *Black board jungle* (1955), under the much more challenging Dutch title, *Het zaad der gewelddadigheid* or *The seed of violence*, was preceded by a warning that the contents did not really matter — it was "just a story".⁴³ The announcement preceding *The Wild One* (1953), a Hollywood film in which a gang of wild young men on motor bikes (led by Marlon Brando) terrorized social life in a small American village, said that the movie should be interpreted as a "public warning". Something like this should never be allowed to happen in

Holland. However, seized by a moral panic regarding the possibility of delinquent teenager behavior, these strategies hardly deviated from the way pedagogical interventions were made in America.⁴⁴

Besides this direct orientation on Anglo-American teenage culture, middle of the road Dutch teenagers were also substantially influenced by West German teenage culture which was permeated by American popular culture.⁴⁵

The popular youth magazine *Bravo* (since 1956) played a crucial role in the aforementioned domestication process in the Federal Republic. It showed its readers a good female and male teenager as ideal types which were taken from the media-supply of the Americanized mass culture and modelled upon the American examples concerned. *Bravo* essentially had two important functions for the commercial youth market. First, it gave a quasi-ideological legitimation for the various market segments of the youth culture industries (fashion, film, music, cosmetics) by bringing the various products together in a consumable, coherent whole: "der neue Teenager-typ". Second, the magazine was also a very suitable medium to make the more authentic cultural youth expressions more acceptable to the general public by taking the edge off of these through editorial reworking and commercialization. The magazine took a quasi-mediating stance between insurgent youth and traditional elders. For instance, with regard to female readers, a campaign was conducted against the eroticism of film stars like Brigitte Bardot and Kim Novak. Instead a more reserved, home loving and girlish teenager type was propagated who preferred skirts to blue jeans. A teenager with a decent make up, ponytail and petticoat became the ideal type, and transcended existing differences between social classes.⁴⁶ German teenage idols like Peter Krauss, Conny Froboess, Rex Gildo, Horst Buchholz and Caterina Valente were also adored in the Netherlands at the time — especially within the girls' teenybopper culture. Around 1960, German music films and neat teenager songs (full of Americanized German teenage argot) appealed greatly to a part of the Dutch teenage youth. However, in the beginning of the sixties, films and music made by "publicly accepted" British teenager stars like Cliff Richard and *The Shadows* were also very popular in the Netherlands and even had their Dutch counterparts. For the rest, Dutch pop artists mainly imitated American teenage idols.⁴⁷

a. From existentialist/beatnik to "twen"

A similar development took place when the existentialists' and beatniks' lifestyles were transformed into that of *twens*, which was more acceptable to the general public. The increasing popularity of jazz music among students at secondary schools and universities, and the corresponding ways of spending leisure, made these youngsters an interesting target group for the youth industries which expanded very rapidly at the end of the fifties. Textile manufacturers were especially active in this new market. In 1958, the textile

firms of C & A and Peek & Cloppenburg started to propagate the ideal type of *twen*, and entered the international market with all kinds of *twen*-clothing. In the same year, the West-German youth magazine *Twen* started publication. Its formula had been developed by two very commercially oriented businessmen. Although it contained excerpts from the writings of the American Beats and also covered a wide spectrum of jazz music, it first of all had a heavy commercial formula. This was shown by the 1 : 1 ratio of advertisements and text and by the numerous tips for records, vacations and fashionable clothes. There were even references to automobiles, ranging from old-timers to very fast sports cars. In fact, this magazine referred to a "tamed" and commercialized version of the more authentic existentialist life-style. *Twen* tended to be more of a medium for the younger generation of trend followers than for the elder generation of trend setters. With this process of commercialization, the "existentialists" (known as *Exis* in Germany) oppositional way of living increasingly crumbled away.⁴⁸ A similar development took place in the Netherlands.

The Dutch youth magazine *Twen/Taboe* was based on the German magazine *Twen* (which in turn had modeled its layout on the American magazine *Esquire*). This happened in connection with the publication of a commending article about the German *Twen* in the leftist weekly *Vrij Nederland* in March 1960, by André van der Louw, a member of the committee of the former *Arbeiders Jeugd Centrale* (abolished in 1959, the youth organization of the Dutch Social-Democratic Party). This was in line with the more general tendency of the trend setting *twens* at the time to draw inspiration from developments in West Germany. *Twen/Taboe* contained all of the elements of the *twen* youth culture in Germany, especially the propagation of "adequate" consumption behaviour, although the editors dissociated themselves from excessive glamour and the kind of *Wirtschaftswunder*-things which played an important role in its German counterpart. Both in the editorial articles and in the advertisements and styling, the focus was on propagating a new youth life-style which was explicitly linked to the new youth consumption market. However, *Twen/Taboe* also contained elements of a culture critique. One time, the occupations of the *twen*-industry with the life-style of the average *twen* was even made a butt of.

In the magazine, a relatively great amount of attention was paid to the American beat generation, especially Jack Kerouac. Editors and readers were attracted by the magic of this person, who in a well ordered society propagated another life-style through his book *On the Road*. The simple message that was picked up by the readers was: take your rucksack, travel the world and look around yourself. In the Dutch situation this usually implied hitchhiking to Paris or some other metropolis in Europe and gathering grapes in the South of France. The first novel of the Dutch author Cees Nooteboom, a cult-book widely read by secondary school students, clearly takes up this

topic. Hover, the tough guy in Kerouac's novel, cannot be compared to the good Dutch hitchhiker, Philip, in Nooteboom's book. There is only a poor analogy with regard to the issues of "travelling without predetermined goal" and the "search for identity".⁴⁹ So it is no wonder that MGM's film *The beat generation* (1960), based on Kerouac's book *The subterraneans* (1958) about the beatniks of San Francisco North Beach, was rather popular with the domesticated beatniks (or *twens*) in Holland. According to a young Dutch critic, in this film neat, *petit bourgeois* and overly clean youngsters were acting like beatniks, while wearing their recently washed and neatly ironed jeans.⁵⁰

b. More youth styles in a new youth polity

Around 1963, generally four kinds of youth could be distinguished in the Netherlands: a) a small group of radical and anti-bourgeois idealists; b) "organized youth" who were young people who acted like the more traditional pedagogues — particularly those who worked with youth — preferred them to act. They were members of the youth organizations led by adults oriented towards the prewar tradition of the youth movements within the pillars of specific religious denominations or political parties; c) "ordinary youth" who were pragmatic, consumption-oriented and conventional. These generally somewhat older youth were characterized by a "skeptical" mentality; and d) last, but not least, the *nozems*.

In the meantime, however, the word *nozem* had become a collective notion which indicated all kind of matters that many older people found undesirable among the younger generation. In fact, it included very different categories of youth. On the one hand, the word *nozems* covered the artistic and intellectual bohemians (*Pleiners* and other Dutch existentialists/beatniks) and the forerunners of the later *Provo* movement (a mixture of a Dutch variant of the international modernist movement within the arts of the sixties which actually started in New York, and a kind of social anarchism and anti-*(petit) bourgeois* mentality).⁵¹ On the other hand, it blurred into groups of youthful vandals and delinquents, whom diverse Dutch sociologists situated in the "proletarian rear-guard". Most of all, it indicated the broad category of young people who in the end would adjust to the common society, but who for the time being preferred to stay in their own youth world which had both conformist and "rebellious" features.

Besides the first signs of the rising *Provo* movement, mainly concentrated in Amsterdam, the Dutch counterpart of the British mods (short for "modernists") also made its appearance around 1964. This development was closely related to a strongly increased orientation towards British beat music among Dutch youth. Dutch beat groups like *The Motions* and *The Teeset* were important protagonists of this life-style. In their style, the mods displayed the elegant dandyism of specific categories of young blacks in America. Their appearance and life-style were diametrically opposed to that of their sworn enemies, the rockers, "descendants" of the former teddy boys who drove

heavy motor bikes. Mods were obsessed with trendy clothes, more specifically a British version of the continental (French and Italian) style and the American hipster⁵² style and with a well kept hairdo with a specific cut. They put much emphasis on acting as "cool" as possible: inwardly one had to keep a perfect hold on oneself and outwardly one should not show what one felt or was thinking. "Cool" also implied a specific way of walking and especially of standing around. In this the mods identified themselves with the remote "other" of the urban and "cool" blacks and their marginal position in the United States. In other words, they identified with a mythologized metropolitan America that stood in sharp contrast to the dullness and boredom of the urban environment at home. This identification also was manifested in their preference for rhythm & blues, with its roots in the Deep South, and for urban soul and Tamala Motown music of the industrial centers in the Northern United States.

This meant a shift within groups of Dutch youth who recognized themselves better in the subculture of the mods than in the neat teenage culture. The adoration of male chauvinism cultivated at dances and discotheques which, in imitation of British examples, were started in many of the larger Dutch towns, appealed greatly to them. This was, in part, a category of rebellious youngsters who freed themselves from the childish teenager world where they had been kept before. Among the mods, sometimes called *kikkers* (frogs) in Dutch, there were also a number of former teddy boys who had made the transition to this new subculture.⁵³

Finally, in addition to the traditional youth organizations, a more informal configuration of youth life began to develop in the middle of the sixties. The popular culture forms and contents "imported" from abroad were particularly new. It was, in the first place, a welfare and consumption polity.⁵⁴ Working-class youngsters who had the relative independence and the means to explore the new possibilities had been its pioneers. The dominant position in these years, however, was taken over by the increasing number of young people who grew up and stayed within the expanding educational system. For a larger share of the youth, a longer moratorium period existed. At the same time the international culture and recreation industries – under the hegemony of Anglo-American popular culture – began to promote youth styles which were primarily tuned in to the world of students at secondary schools and universities (e.g. "progressive" rock music and protest songs).⁵⁵ The young people involved were thoroughly able to cultivate these lifestyles within the societal bounds in which they had to manoeuvre. In this way, they not only distanced themselves from the ways their parents spent leisure, but also from the dominant recreational styles among working class youth. In spite of the apparent proof to the contrary, not much had changed yet in the existing class and sex differences among the youth.

4. Conclusion

At the transition of the fifties to the sixties, role models implied in the information and images offered by the culture industries and the mass media began to play a more important role in the development and containment of self-images, social identities and life-styles among youth. Caught by a moral outrage regarding the "hidden education" and "exploitation of the teenager" which were supposed to take place, contemporary authors already indicated this, though very undifferentiatedly.⁵⁶ Through the impact of the modern mass media, the beginning of a "global village" with respect to youth cultures and life-styles could be noticed. A certain internationalization took place, even though it was under the powerful hegemony of the Anglo-American mass culture. The popular cultures concerned — put in a transatlantic idiom — could not be averted by the zealots of a wider social distribution of higher Culture.

In the beginning of the sixties, *teenagers* and *twens* were recognized as social categories with specific characteristics, aspirations and problems. These "good" youngsters accommodated themselves to the role models and behaviour codes which were handed by the Americanized pedagogical practices and the youth specific culture industries which were almost weldlessly linked to these. Only later in the sixties would alternative pedagogical ideas and practices in the United States (for instance, those of Paul Goodman, Kenneth Keniston and Ivan Illich) have an increasing impact on the pedagogical discourse within Dutch society. This would be even more the case within the countercultural movement which existed at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies.⁵⁷

The teenager type was essentially the response of the consumption and recreation industries to the phenomenon of the *nozem*. The youth orientated culture industries which expanded in the second half of the fifties commercialized the subcultural style-features of this group and took possession of these features through the commodities which the consumption industry offered to teenagers. When seen this way, the "original" teddy boys — in spite of themselves — were trend setters of a modernization process which ended in the industrially produced new teenager type.⁵⁸

Although the former ideal types were commercialized and domesticated variants of the "original" teddy boys and existentialists/beatniks, at the time this nevertheless meant a breakthrough in the societal relations in the Netherlands. These young people deviated from the ideology of soberness and the calvinistic ethos, which considered enjoyment and having pleasure to be very objectionable. It should be emphasized, however, that the socialization of young people by the culture industry was less imperative than that of the traditional pedagogues. In the commercial market — otherwise than in the case of publicly organized services — power is based on

money and not on moral authority or state power. Those who have the necessary money at their disposal can – given a certain commercially organized supply – take less notice of the prohibitions and prescriptions of a public morality.⁵⁹ Also one did not have to buy a product and one could still turn off the radio or gramophone for instance. Besides, youth might give its own interpretation to the "message" which was hidden in the interferences and consumption supply of the culture industry. This also offered certain degrees of freedom and possibilities to youth. The products which were marketed enabled them to distinguish themselves from adults and peers. Also, by meeting the needs and preferences of youth, the culture industries legitimized specific elements of youth cultures: for instance, hedonism and consumerism by youth. Besides, by means of the mass media, a wider distribution of youth cultures took place. This increasingly offered the young people common identification and reference points.

"To be modern" in the fifties, when the modernization of everyday life in the Netherlands pressed on forcefully, did not mean so much the liberty to choose one's own life-style, but first of all the flexibility of conforming to the constraints of the existing social system. A fundamental supposition was that people could be allocated in multifarious ways within a functionally ordered society. This was also the dominant stance taken by "modern" sociologists at the time.⁶⁰ Right at this point the more "authentic" (not domesticated) *artistiekelingen* and *nozems* deviated from the rest of the population and – deliberately or not – constituted countermovements to the dominant civilized culture. The "alternative" life-styles which were imported from abroad offered the bohemian groups and their youthful epigones the possibilities of temporarily and situationally escaping from the societal order. However, it was a rather small group which identified with the subcultural milieu around the Leidseplein and similar enclaves elsewhere in the Netherlands. They were labelled as "dropouts" by the general public and the hard core of these young people experienced a rift between the generations. The majority, however, had rather good relations with understanding elders, not seldom also their own parents (especially in the new middle class). To the latter category also belonged the younger generation of progressive educators who were aiming at a dialogical relationship between professional pedagogues and youth within the framework of "youth service", instead of the one-sided pedagogical steering of youth as was still practiced within traditional youth organizations.⁶¹ They were oriented towards the more informal codes of behaviour which were implied in the "bargaining household" within the domain of interpersonal relations which was becoming influential in this social milieu.

To a certain extent, a similar process took place with regard to the teddy boys from the working-class, be it that this did not involve intellectually articulated protests, but an attitude against the grain which brought new forms of bodily expressions in the public sphere. This also partly involved

"oppositional" elements of a more traditional working-class culture. The relationship of these young people with their parents was, as a whole, not bad but somewhat loose. In this social milieu, the traditional command household was also gradually dropped as a result of changing power balances between young and old.⁶² These youngsters were often away from home and had a relatively large amount of leisure time. Less working hours than before⁶³ and new recreational forms offered these working-class boys and girls a greater latitude to take and leave what they wanted. In this they found compensation for their everyday work situations, which they considered too hierarchical and as having an overly disciplinary social climate. In this way they also tried, within the constraints of their youth culture, to practise the adage: "I'm free and I do what I want".

NOTES

1. D. Slootweg et. al., *Ach ja, de jaren vijftig* (Amsterdam 1974); R. Boost, *Wat je zegt dat ben je zelf en andere herinneringen aan de jaren '50* (Weesp 1985) 23-31; P. Sparke, *An introduction to design & culture in the twentieth century* (London 1986) 153-155; M. Gastelaars, "Niets zo modern als een mens alleen", in T. van der Kamp & H. Krijnen, eds, *Dagelijks leven in Nederland* (Amsterdam 1987) 154-163.
2. Between 1955 and 1965 the real per capita national income increased by 36%. At first the increase was mainly used for the expansion of the industrial and public sectors. Governmental expenditures for culture and recreation grew only gradually (from f9 to f37,10 per head of the population between 1955 and 1965). Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *75 Jaar statistiek van Nederland* (Den Haag 1975) 121; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Tachtig jaar statistiek in tijdreeksen, 1899-1979* (Den Haag 1979).
3. In the years 1948-1960, the average income increased with 44%. Due to substantial increases, especially after 1963, in 1970 the average income would be 222% of that in 1948. H. van der Cammen & L.A. de Klerk, *Ruimtelijke ordening; Van plannen komen plannen* (Utrecht/Antwerpen 1986) 105.
4. R. Marchand, *Advertising the American Dream; Making way for modernity, 1920-1940* (Berkeley 1985); S. Ewen, *Captains of consciousness; Advertising and the social roots of the consumer culture* (New York 1976) 51-59, 139-149; S. Ewen & E. Ewen, *Channels of desire; Mass images and the shaping of American consciousness* (New York 1982); T.J.J. Lears, "From salvation to self-realization; Advertising and the therapeutic roots of the consumer culture, 1880-1930", in: R.W. Fox & T.J.J. Lears, eds, *The culture of consumption* (New York 1983) 3-37.
5. Between 1900 and 1930 the high school population in the United States increased with 650%; in 1930 more than 60% of the youngsters concerned received further schooling. S. Frith, *Rock! Sociologie van een nieuwe muziekcultuur* (Amsterdam/Brussel 1984) 203.

6. P.S. Fass, *The damned and the beautiful; American youth in the 1920s* (New York 1977); S. Frith, *The sociology of youth* (Ormskirk 1984) 11-12; Frith, *Rock!*, 209-210.
7. In the fifties, British pop artists, like Tommy Steele, Cliff Richard, Adam Faith, Billy Fury, recorded rock songs and acted in films, but these were at first primarily imitations of American examples. This style of music was only gradually assimilated in British popular culture and later a British style of pop music even developed which had international influence, not in the least on Holland. M. Abrams, *The teenager consumer* (London 1959); S. Hall & T. Jefferson, eds, *Resistance through rituals; Youth subcultures in post-war Britain* (London 1976); D. Hebdige, *Subculture. The meaning of style* (London, 1982); I. Chambers, *Urban rhythms. Popular music and popular culture* (London 1985); D. Baacke, *Jugend und Jugendkulturen* (Weinheim/München 1987) 36.
8. Frith, *Rock!*, 199-200.
9. NIPO, *Zo zijn wij. De eerste vijftig jaar NIPO-onderzoek* (Amsterdam/Brussel 1970) 142.
10. E. Goubitz, *To and fro; Human relations in industry seen through Dutch eyes* (Den Haag 1954); Contactgroep Opvoering Productiviteit, *Hoe morgen hier? Mens en bedrijf in de nieuwe wereld* (Den Haag 1957); M.C.M. van Elteren, "Amerikagangers en de menselijke verhoudingen in de industrie", *Sociale Wetenschappen*, 30, (1987) 81-115; idem, "Arbeidssociatie en bedrijfsleven in Nederland", *Sociale Wetenschappen*, 30, (1987) 239-277.
11. A. van Bergen & J.M.F. Jaspars, *Social psychology in the Netherlands* (Leiden 1969); S. Koenis & J. Plantenga, eds, *Amerika en de sociale wetenschappen in Nederland* (Utrecht 1986); M.C.M. van Elteren, "Tussen opvoering van arbeidsproductiviteit en ethiek; De receptie van de "human relations"-benadering in Nederland", in: *Psychologie en Maatschappij* 11 (1987) 339-353.
12. Chr. Lasch, *Haven in a heartless world. The family besieged* (New York 1977) 97-110; H.M.M. Fortmann et. al., eds, *Groepswerk* (Groningen 1958); C. Brinkgreve & M. Korzec, "*Margriet weet raad*"; *gevoel, gedrag, moraal in Nederland 1938-1978* (Utrecht 1978); L. Burnett-Souta et. al., *Autoriteit en gezin* (Leiden 1983).
13. B. de Graaff, "Bogey or saviour? The image of the United States in the Netherlands during the interwar period", in: R. Kroes & M. van Rossem, *Anti-Americanism in Europe* (Amsterdam 1986) 51-71; T. Beckers, *Planning voor vrijheid; Een historisch-sociologische studie van de overheidsinterventie in recreatie en vrije tijd* (Wageningen 1983) 143-144, 377-378 note 131.
14. C.W.E. Bigsby, "Europe, America and the cultural debate", in: C.W.E. Bigsby, ed., *Superculture; American popular culture and Europe* (Bowling Green, Ohio 1975) 1-27; Chambers, *Urban rhythms*, 3-5.
15. G.C. de Haas, *Andere tijden, andere zeden; Jeugdgedrag en jeugdcultuur na 1945* (Bilthoven 1971) 15. Compare the very intense preoccupation of professional pedagogues with so-called "mass-youth" at the end of the forties and the first half of the fifties; F. Meijers & M. du Bois-Reymond, eds, *Op zoek naar een moderne pedagogische norm. Beeldvorming over de jeugd in de jaren vijftig: het massajeugdonderzoek (1948-1952)* (Amersfoort/Leuven 1987).
16. H.M. in 't Veld-Langeveld, "De sociale cultuurspreiding", in: A.N.J. den Hollander, ed., *Drift en Koers; Een halve eeuw sociale verandering in Nederland* (Assen 1968) 181-207 (first printed in 1961); H. van Dulken, "De cultuurpolitieke

- opvattingen van prof. dr. G. van der Leeuw (1890-1950)", in: H. van Dulken et al., "*Kunst en beleid in Nederland*" (Amsterdam 1985) 112, 130; T. Gubbels, "Kunst en communisme in Nederland", in: Van Dulken, *Kunst en beleid in Nederland*, 202-203; R. Kroes, *Amerika in onze ogen; De Amerikanistiek in Nederland* (Amsterdam 1986); R. Kroes, "The image of America in Europe", in: A. Rijksbaron et. al., eds, *Europe from a cultural perspective* (Den Haag 1987) 121-131; B. Tromp, "Reflections on Anti-Americanism and Dutch social democracy", in: Kroes & Van Rossem, *Anti-Americanism in Europe*, 90.
17. R. Kroes, "The nearness of America", in: R. Kroes, ed., *Image and impact; American influences in the Netherlands since 1945* (Amsterdam 1981) 11-12.
 18. Cf. the Dutch journalist Jan Donkers, as cited in Tromp, "Reflections on Anti-Americanism", 93-94, and the "autobiographic" phantasy-stories by Jan Cremer with his "yankee-olatry"; texts full of extremely positive stereotypes about the United States and adoration of American mass culture. Especially see Jan Cremer, *Made in U.S.A. Een kritische Amerikaanse documentaire* (Utrecht/Antwerpen 1969).
 19. Cf. the way G. Marcus has analyzed key images about America in rock music, in his *Mystery train; Images of America in rock 'n roll music* (New York/London 1977) 1985 (rev. ed.).
 20. N. Cohn, *Pop from the beginning* (London 1970) 92; G. Melly, *Revolt into style; The pop arts in Britain* (London 1970) 8; B. Martin, *A sociology of contemporary cultural change* (Oxford 1981) 183.
 21. Cf. the beat-poet Robert Duncan: "We must all remember that America is (...) at least a big and very mixed bag", cited in: B. Cook, *The Beat generation* (Westport, Conn. 1971) 132.
 22. A contemporary Dutch study on the reactions of the mass media, local and police authorities and a small field study led to conclusions which relativized the alleged delinquent effects of rock 'n roll films and music. D.E. Krantz & E.W. Vercruijse, *De jeugd in het geding* (Amsterdam 1959) 30-32, 147-149.
 23. Y. Bernard, "De Dijkers en de Pleiners", in: *EWB Bulletin*, 8(1987) no.2, 21-31; L. van Schaardenburg, *Meisjes uit mijn straat; Op zoek naar onze sociale kansen en ambities* (Amsterdam 1988) 231, 241, 246.
 24. Between 1955 and 1965 the wages of boys under 21 years increased by 149% and those of working girls under 21 years by 146%. The girls' wages, however, lagged behind those of boys: in 1955 they averaged 83.3% of boys' wages and in 1965 only 82.5%. A study made in 1959 showed that generally 16 or 17% of the wages had to be paid to parents. But specific groups of working-class youngsters had more money at their disposal, because of additional jobs. Besides, elder young people were allowed to keep more money for themselves. Krantz & Vercruijse, *De jeugd in het geding*, pp. 101-102; E. Bloemen & L. Brug, *Toevallig jong. Werkende jongeren na 1945 en de vakbeweging* (Nijmegen 1982) 39; J. Peet, *Het uur van de arbeidersjeugd; De emancipatie van de werkende jongeren in Nederland* (Baarn 1987) 216-217.
 25. While the general population in Holland was very housebound, youth (between 12 and 17 years of age) and unmarried men and women (18 to 39 years of age) from the working class visited the cinema frequently (more than 25 times a year). While in 1962, 94% of the population on average never went out during weekdays, unmarried youth (18 to 39 years, in practice youth of 18 to 26 years) went out a good deal: on average more than two hours a night. Centraal Bureau

- voor de Statistiek, *Vrije tijdsbesteding in Nederland 1962-1963* (Zeist 1965) III, 38.
26. P. de Rooy, "Vetkuijfe waarheen? Jongeren in Nederland in de jaren vijftig en zestig", *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden*, 101 (1986) 76-94; Bernard, "De Dijkers en de Pleiners", 21-26.
 27. S. Hall & P. Whannel, *The popular arts* (London 1984) as cited in Chambers, *Urban rhythms*, 27; H.-H. Krüger, "Sprachlossen Rebellen. Zur Subkultur der Rocker in den Fünfziger Jahren", in: W. Breyvogel, ed, *Autonomie und Widerstand; Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Jugendprotestes* (Essen 1983) 78-82; H.-H. Krüger, "Es war wie ein Rausch wenn alle Gas gaben", in: W. Bucher & K. Pohl, eds, *Schock und Schöpfung. Jugendästhetik im 20. Jahrhundert* (Darmstadt/Neuwied 1986) 269-274.
 28. Peet, *Het uur van de arbeidersjeugd*, 221-222; Krantz & Vercruijjse, *Jeugd in het geding*, 95-97; G. Mik, *Onaangepaste pubers; Dissociaal gedrag bij jongens in de puberteit* (Groningen 1965) 24-25; W. Buikhuisen, *Achtergronden van nozemgedrag* (Assen 1965) 6-7, 134-142, 317-326; W. Buikhuisen, "Research on teenage riots", in: *Sociologica Neerlandica* 4 (1966/67) 1-22; J. Perry & H. Vossen, "Oude problemen, nieuwe oplossingen; De cultuur van de arbeidersjeugd en de katholieke levensscholen, 1945-1955", in: H. Galesloot & M. Schrevel, eds, *In fatsoen hersteld; Zedelijkheid en wederopbouw na de oorlog* (Amsterdam 1987) 89-115.
 29. W. Banning, *Moderne maatschappijproblemen* (Haarlem 1953); K. Bednarik, *De jonge arbeider van deze tijd, een nieuw type* (Utrecht 1955); H. Feitsma, *Jeugdige ongeschoolden* (Assen 1958); S.W. Couwenberg, *De vereenzaming van de moderne mens* (Den Haag 1959); M.C.M. van Elteren, *Staal en Arbeid* (Leiden 1986) 648-668; idem, "Vakman van ijzer en staal?", in: J. von Grumbkow & J. van Ruijsseveldt, eds, *Arbeid in verandering; De strategische rol van industrieel vakmanschap en management* (Deventer 1988) 20-36.
 30. E. Fromm, *Escape from freedom* (New York 1941) [*De angst voor de vrijheid* (Utrecht 1952)]; idem, *The sane society* (New York 1955) [*De gezonde samenleving* (Utrecht 1958)]; D. Riesman, *The lonely crowd* (New York 1950) [*De eenzame massa* (Utrecht 1959)].
 31. J.A.C. Brown, *The social psychology of industry* (Harmondsworth 1954) 18; H.F. Mulder, "Opleiding en vorming van arbeidskrachten ten behoeve van de industrie", in: *Paedagogische Studiën* 38 (1961) 66-79.
 32. H.-H. Krüger, "Exis, habe ich keine gesehen" – Auf der Suche nach einer jugendlichen Gegenkultur in den 50er Jahren", in: H.-H. Krüger, ed., "Die Elvis-Tolle (...)"; *Lebensgeschichte und jugendliche Alltagskultur in den fünfziger Jahren* (Opladen 1985) 131-132; A. Muijen, "De Lichtstad", *De Haagse Post* (July 16, 1988) no. 28/29, 32-36.
 33. Krüger, "Exis", 133; M. Brake, *Comparative youth culture. The sociology of youth cultures and youth subcultures in America, Britain and Canada* (London/New York 1985) 87.
 34. Cook, *The Beat generation* 100-101; 150-152; N. Polsky, *Hustlers, beats and others* (Harmond 1971); M. Dickstein, *Gates of Eden; American culture in the sixties* (New York 1971) 3-12; B. Ehrenreich, *The hearts of men* (New York 1983)
 35. P.J. Mol, "Paradise lost; Een generatie op drift: Hitweek 1965-1969", in: *Jeugd en Samenleving* 15, (1985) 659; Tromp, "Reflections on Anti-Americanism", 93-94.
 36. Recently Van Anbeek has questioned the supposed influence of French existentialism on contemporary Dutch writers like A. Blaman, Lucebert, B. Schierbeek, W.F. Hermans, G. van het Reve. He prefers to speak about a certain

- "Wahlverwandschaft" of ideas during the first postwar period. T. van Anbeek, *Na de oorlog; De Nederlandse roman 1945-1960* (Amsterdam 1986) 140-190.
37. S. Vinkenoog, "De barbaren van het Leidseplein", in: *Twen 1* (1960) p. 43; Cook, *The Beat generation*, 152-153; Bernard, "De Dijkers en de Pleiners", 26-30.
 38. De Rooy, "Vetkuijfe waarheen?", 87-88; T. Regtien, "A tale of two cities" in: *Moet dit een wereldbeeld verbeelden? Van en over Pé Hawinkels* (Nijmegen 1979) 50-51, 71; Bernard, "De Dijkers en de Pleiners", 30.
 39. The classic study is A.K. Cohen, *Delinquent boys; The culture of the gang* (Glencoe, Ill. 1955).
 40. Cf. the teenage-etiquette book D. Clark, *Your happiest years* (New York 1959); Frith, *The sociology of youth*, 11-15; Frith, *Rock!*, 204-207; D.T. Miller & M. Nowak, *The fifties; the way we really were* (New York 1977); D. Hebdige, "Framing the 'youth problem': The construction of troublesome adolescence", in: V. Garms-Homolová et al., eds, *Intergenerational relationships* (Lewinston, NY/Toronto 1984) 184-195; J. Gilbert, *A cycle of outrage. America's reaction to the juvenile delinquent in the 1950s* (New York 1986).
 41. R. Lindner, "Teenager; Ein amerikanischer Traum", in: Bucher & Pohl, *Schock und Schöpfung*, 278-283.
 42. K. de Graaf, *Je krijgt er een rollin' van* (Amsterdam 1984); P. Schilthuisen, *Beelden van Amerika; Beeldvorming over Amerika en Amerikaanse invloeden in Nederlandse jongerentijdschriften in de jaren zestig* (Rotterdam 1988) 80-96.
 43. Cf. *Critisch Filmbulletin* 9, no. 3 (1956) 87.
 44. Cf. the American pocketbook *Teenage Jungle* (1957), as paraphrased in Frith, *Rock!*, 201-202.
 45. Cf. the winged pronouncement "The Americans have colonised our subconscious" of the German film-maker Wim Wenders, which he made one of the main characters in his film "Im Lauf der Zeit" (1977) express. J. Simons, "W. Wenders", in: *Jaarboek Film 1983* (Bussum 1983). This exclamation is also cited with regard to the British situation in Chambers, *Urban rhythms*, 31; D. Baacke, *Jugend und Jugendkulturen* (Opladen 1987) 34-35; J. Zinnecker, *Jugendkultur 1940-1985* (Opladen 1987) 85-94.
 46. Chr. Bartram & H.-H. Krüger, "Vom Backfisch zum Teenager — Mädchensozialisation in den 50er Jahren", in: Krüger, "Die Elvis-Tolle", 84-101; H.-J. von Wensierski, "Die anderen nannten uns Halbstarke", in: Krüger, "Die Elvis-Tolle", 102-128.
 48. G. Herm, *Amerika erobert Europa* (Düsseldorf/Vienna 1964) 393; Krüger, *Exis* 150-151.
 49. C. Nooteboom, *Philip en de anderen* (Amsterdam 1955); Schilthuisen, *Beelden van Amerika*, 80-96.
 50. Filmcritique by F. Endt in *Taboe*, 2 (1961) 47; also H.J. Meijer, "Burgers en beatniks, boven- en ondergronds", in: *Critisch Filmbulletin* 14, (1961) 5.
 51. J. Goudsblom, *De nieuwe volwassenen; Een enquête onder jongeren van 18 tot 30 jaar* (Amsterdam 1959); J.G.M. Thurlings, "De jonge mens tegenover de maatschappelijke structuur", in: *Dux*, 30 (1963) 422-434; M. Berman, *All that is solid melts into air; The experience of modernity* (New York 1982) 318-321.
 52. A hipster was a negro who had the role of a dandy (wearing well-tailored flashy costumes) within the Beat scene and was tolerated as such.
 53. Notwithstanding the pronounced cultivation of male chauvinism, the position of

- girls among the mods was relatively better than in the other working-class youth cultures of the time; they had some room to manoeuvre on their own. C. McArthur, *Underworld USA* (London 1972); R. Barnes, *Mods!* (London 1979); Chambers, *Urban rhythms*, 38-39, 41, 47, 52-53, 60; Ter Bogt, "Badlands", 585.
54. Peet, *Het uur van de arbeidersjeugd*, 22. He explicitly opposes the characterization by J.S. van Hessen in his dissertation *Samen jong zijn* (Assen 1964). Van Hessen puts the emphasis on the active and creative components of the new youth polity, as opposed to the more passive and consumptive aspects which he did not deny were characteristic of the rest.
 55. S. Frith, *Sound effects; Youth, leisure and the politics of rock 'n roll* (London 1983) 213; Ter Bogt, "Badlands", 577-611.
 56. U. Beer, *Verborgene mede-opvoeders van de jeugd* (Bilthoven 1963); H. Lamprecht, *Exploitatie van de teenager* (Utrecht 1963). References to both books in: G. Lutte, F. Mönks, G. Kempen & S. Sarti, *Ideaalbeelden van de jeugd; Onderzoek in zeven landen van Europa* ('s-Hertogenbosch 1969) 88. The latter research was primarily aimed at the general characteristics of the *adolescence éternelle*.
 57. Cf. various articles by the late professor of pedagogy N. Beets with reports of his visits to the United States in the years 1965-1968, published in *Dux*, also in N. Beets, *Jeugd en Welvaart; Een bundel essays* (Utrecht 1968) en N. Beets, *Persoonsvorming en adolescentie* (Utrecht 1974); P. Goodman, *Growing up absurd* (New York 1960); K. Keniston, *Young radicals* (New York 1968); Th. Roszak, *The making of a counter culture* (New York 1969) [*Opkomst van een tegencultuur* (Amsterdam 1971)]; G.C. de Haas, *De onvoorziene generatie* (Amsterdam 1966); G.C. de Haas, *Die jeugd van tegenwoordig* (Baarn 1975).
 58. Lindner, *Teenager*; Krüger, "Es war wie ein Rausch", 273.
 59. M. van den Heuvel & H. Mommaas, "Oorden van vrijheid en vermaak. De herstructurering van de vrije tijd", in: Du Bois-Reymond, M. van Elteren, F. Meijers, & G. Tillekens, eds, *Geleidelijk los; De beeldvorming over de jeugd in de periode 1956-1965* [to be published in 1990].
 60. Gastelaars, *Niets zo modern*, 155.
 61. Y. te Poel, "Jeugdwerk tussen massageugd-onderzoek en Cower-rapport", in: Du Bois-Reymond et. al., *Geleidelijk los*.
 62. M. du Bois-Reymond, "Gezinsopvoeding in de jaren vijftig en zestig", in: Du Bois-Reymond et. al., *Geleidelijk los*; A. de Swaan, "Over de verschuiving van bevelshuishouding naar onderhandelingshuishouding", in: A. de Swaan, *De mens is de mens een zorg* (Amsterdam 1982); W. Zeegers, *Andere tijden, andere mensen. De sociale representatie van identiteit* (Amsterdam 1988) 156-224.
 63. However, one must not exaggerate. For many years the Netherlands had the longest work week in comparison to surrounding countries. In 1960 a free Saturday was introduced; working time still varied between 45 and 49 hours a week and gradually decreased to 40 hours at the end of the seventies. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *75 Jaar statistiek van Nederland* (Den Haag 1975) 138.

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